

Journal of Army Special Operations History

PB 31-05-2 Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012

Veritas

ARSOF IN THE KOREAN WAR: PART V



USASOC



Veritas

CONTENTS



- i **Azimuth**
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 1 **Psywar in Korea**
A Matter of Adjustment
By Kenneth Finlayson
- 6 **Radio Pusan**
"The Voice of South Korea."
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 23 **Postscript**
Joseph E. Dabney
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 27 **Flying High**
The 4th MRBC Antenna Riggers
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 37 **The 4th MRBC in Japan & Korea, 1951-1952**
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 56 **Full Spectrum: Strategic Psywar 1952**
UN Psywar Aligns with Allied Bombing Campaign in Korea.
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 68 **Full Spectrum: Contrasts in Independence**
March 1st and Plan PATRIOT
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 71 **Full Spectrum: FEAF's Humanitarian Bombing Campaign in Korea**
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 76 **Right Man for the Job**
Colonel Charles H. Karlstad
By Michael E. Krivdo
- 87 **The May Day Riots**
By Charles H. Briscoe
- 93 **We're Asking the Reds to SURRENDER-PLEASE!**
Collier's, 13 December 1952
By Peter Kalischer
- 95 **Herbert Avedon**
Making Psywar a Career
By Troy J. Sacquety
- 102 **The Psywar Center**
Part II: Creation of the 10th Special Forces Group
By Eugene G. Piasecki

The Azimuth of the USASOC History Office



While the USASOC History Office must react to a wide variety of requirements, it is striving to produce *Veritas* quarterly. Regardless, the ARSOF history presented will be well-documented, thoroughly researched, personalized with veterans' input, and validated by them. This gives life to our articles and makes our jobs more interesting. When historians write solely from 'official' records that cannot be challenged by participants, the results become 'cleaned up history of the dead' as selective as a senior leader's top down view of battles.

Articles in this issue conclude strategic Psywar during the Korean War. The majority cover the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) mission in Korea. The Far East Command (FECOM) G-2 Psywar Division wanted forward radio detachments and the antenna riggers of 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) to rebuild the *Korean Broadcasting System* (KBS) stations. Thus, the first operational station, *Radio Pusan*, supporting President Syngman Rhee, became the 1st RB&L hub for radio operations in South Korea. Psywar veterans and a Korean translator who worked at *Radio Seoul* and *Pusan* explain what was key to restoring radio broadcasting, preparing daily programs, and enhancing Tokyo's strategic Psywar mission.

It will also connect Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Chief of Psywar and his staff at Department of Army to the establishment of the U.S. Army Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and introduce Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad, the first Commandant whose work

validated that decision. McClure's unconventional warfare (UW) veterans of WWII defined 'Special Forces (SF)' and got the positions from the Army to staff the Center and man a Special Forces Group (SFG), yet to be recruited, organized, trained, and tested for an overseas assignment. This became 10th SFG and overages were used to create the 77th SFG. The Psywar Center also levied ninety-nine SF-trained officers and sergeants for Korea.

The next issue, the sixth *Veritas* dedicated to Army SOF during the Korean War, will explain units whose names and organizational structure changed constantly. Line crossing teams and partisan advisors were activities of the 8240th Army Unit (AU). COL John H. McGee, Chief of Miscellaneous Division, G-3, Eighth Army directed guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. The CIA paramilitary and intelligence organization was called the Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK). CCRACK (Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea) was a FECOM joint staff agency formed by General Matthew B. Ridgway to 'get a handle' on all of the special operations in theater...an impossible task. This final issue will conclude with an update on Army special operations stateside.

Thanks to the 1st RB&L and early SF veterans and families who contributed to this issue and to those who served as reader/commentators on the draft articles. It is your history, not ours. Keeping veterans involved reinforces credibility and gives pride of ownership. CHB

VERITAS: *Veritas* is published by the United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (ISSN 1553-9830). The contents are not necessarily the official views of, nor endorsed by, the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or USASOC. The contents are compiled, edited, and prepared by the USASOC History Office. All photos not credited are courtesy of the USASOC History Office.

COPYRIGHT: Material in *Veritas* may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to *Veritas* and the creators.

COPIES: Copies of previous *Veritas* issues are no longer available. A limited number of the current issue is maintained at the USASOC History Office.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT VERITAS ARTICLES & MATERIALS: Reprinting well-received *Veritas* articles in a modified version and/or without the documentation (endnotes) degrades serious historical scholarship. If this professional courtesy cannot be accorded, requests will be denied. Permission to use photographs from private collections was granted **ONLY** to the USASOC History Office. These photos, like the illustrative sketches, customized maps, and schematics used in *Veritas* articles are **NOT** available for public use.

QUESTIONS: Address questions and comments to USASOC, ATTN: AOHS Veritas, E-2929 Desert Storm Drive, Fort Bragg, NC 28310, or e-mail one of our editors.

FIREWALLS AND SPAM BLOCKERS: DOD computer **FIREWALLS** routinely place unrecognized addresses into a Junk E-Mail box. Encryption is another problem. Personal computer **SPAM** blockers further delay and negate responses. Therefore, if you would like your e-mail answered, please adjust your personal **SPAM** blocker before you send a message. Thanks.

SUBMISSIONS: Submit manuscripts, art, illustrations, and photos to the address above. Digital format is preferred. All article submissions must cover ARSOF topics from WWII to the present, be based on primary sources, and have active participant voice. See articles in *Veritas* for examples. Please provide contact information for all submissions. If you have an article topic that falls outside these key parameters, please email one of our editors. The USASOC History Office reserves the right to edit all submissions for publication.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Those wishing to subscribe to *Veritas*, should write to USASOC, ATTN: AOHS Veritas (Dr. Sacquety), E-2929 Desert Storm Drive, Fort Bragg, NC 28310 or email Dr. Sacquety at sacquett@soc.mil. Please include affiliation to Army Special Operations or list any applicable military service. This helps us build a support network for future *Veritas* articles. If you send an email and do not receive a response, it is likely because firewalls are being constantly upgraded. If this is the case please assume that we did not get your message.

COMMAND HISTORIAN AND EDITOR:

Charles H. Briscoe, PhD 910-432-3732
charles.briscoe@ahqb.soc.mil

ASSOCIATE EDITORS:

Kenneth Finlayson, PhD 910-432-4320
kenn.finlayson@ahqb.soc.mil

Troy J. Sacquety, PhD 910-432-9324
sacquett@ahqb.soc.mil

Eugene G. Piasecki 910-432-9780
eugene.g.piasecki@ahqb.soc.mil

Jared M. Tracy, PhD 910-396-5906
jared.tracy@ahqb.soc.mil

Michael E. Krivdo, PhD 910-908-0939
michael.krivdo@ahqb.soc.mil

ART DIRECTOR:

Daniel W. Telles tellesd@ahqb.soc.mil

GRAPHIC DESIGNER:

Laura Goddard laura.goddard@ahqb.soc.mil

PHOTO EDITOR:

Earl J. Moniz monize@ahqb.soc.mil

ILLUSTRATORS:

Mariano Santillan mariano@santillan.cc
Frank E. Allen fallen1364@sbcglobal.net

Psywar in Korea

A Matter of Adjustment

By Kenneth Finlayson

The Korean War presented the United States with challenges unlike any previously faced in the Twentieth Century. In contrast to World War II, when the national objective was the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, the political and military ramifications resulting from the entry of Communist China into the conflict altered the U.S. campaign to one designed to reach a negotiated settlement between the warring factions. The Korean War was the first major conflict in which the United States engaged without a formal Congressional declaration of war, but rather conducted under Presidential authority.¹ The U.S. prosecution of the war can be broken into five distinct phases.

The initial phase of the war was the reestablishment of the pre-War South Korean national boundary along the 38th Parallel following the 25 June 1950 attack by North Korea. In the second phase, General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur's stated goal of destroying the North Korean Army led to the drive north to the Yalu following the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the Inch'on landing. The entry of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) into the war pushed the United Nations (UN) forces back in Phase Three, necessitating the reestablishment of the line along the 38th Parallel in Phase Four. The fifth and final phase of the war was the effort by both sides to seize key terrain and establish the most advantageous



The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company was responsible for the repair of the damaged *Korean Broadcasting System* and for establishing radio broadcasting facilities at Pusan, Seoul, Taegu and Taejon.

position during the protracted armistice negotiations. By necessity, every aspect of the U.S. military effort was adjusted to reflect the change from the initial offensive against North Korea to subsequent operations designed to strengthen the United Nations position in the Armistice negotiations. This included adapting the priorities and capabilities of the Psychological Warfare (Psywar) effort to the changing nature of the war.

Psywar was a critical element of the U.S. campaign from the initial phases of the war. The articles presented in this issue of *Veritas* run the gamut from the strategic to the tactical and cover the period from mid-1951 through the signing of the Armistice in 1953. The focus is largely, but not exclusively, on the radio broadcasting operations conducted in support of the UN effort. Told largely through the words of the participants, each article describes the establishment of the radio broadcasting capability in South Korea, the expansion of the radio network, the technical support required to get the stations on the air

and an American perspective on the 1952 May Day riots in Tokyo that followed the official end of the U.S. occupation of Japan. Included are articles on the implementation of strategic Psywar operations, the establishment of the Psywar Center and early 10th Special Forces Group, and biographies of two individuals prominent in the development of the Army Psywar capability.

The first Psywar priority for Far East Command (FECOM) at the outset of the war was the establishment of *Radio Tokyo* and the *Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC)* in order to counter the widespread Communist propaganda. Psywar support was the responsibility of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L). Within the 1st RB&L, the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (4th MRBC) was the unit tasked with establishing radio stations and developing and executing the radio programming. Headquartered in Tokyo after arriving from the United States in August 1951, the 1st RB&L was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields. His immediate strategic priority was the program management of *Radio Tokyo* with the concurrent responsibility of airing the *Voice of the UN Command*. He then had to focus on the establishment of a radio broadcasting capability in South Korea to regenerate the decimated *Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)*. Support to these two missions fell on the 4th MRBC.

As described in a previous issue of *Veritas* (Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011), the establishment and operation of *Radio Tokyo* was handled by the 1st RB&L using all the assets within the Group.² To resurrect the *KBS* on the mainland, a four-man detachment led by 2nd Lieutenant (2LT) Jack F. Brembeck was dispatched to Pusan in mid-August 1951 to assess the extent of the wartime damage to the *KBS* facility and prepare for broadcasting from the city. Soon replaced in Pusan by 2LT Eddie Deerfield, Brembeck

moved to Kaesong to replace First Lieutenant (1LT) Jack F. Brennan who was the 1st RB&L liaison officer at the preliminary armistice talks. By October, *Radio Pusan* was operational and became the focal point of the 4th MRBC effort until the signing of the Armistice.

Pusan was the primary port of entry for troops and supplies entering South Korea. In addition, at the beginning of the war, the South Korea government led by President Syngman Rhee relocated there after the fall of Seoul. From the repaired KBS studio, Rhee was able to broadcast to his nation. *Radio Pusan*, the 'Voice of Korea,' was the hub of the 4th MRBC-supported stations. As the UN offensive rolled north, the MRBC detachments followed, establishing radio stations in Seoul, Taegu, and Taejon. The company relocated to Seoul with the recapture of the capital, supporting the outstations from there.

An unheralded, but crucial part of the 4th MRBC operation was emplacing the antennas that supported each station. Within the company were three Mobile Radio Broadcasting Platoons. Each platoon had a Radio Service Section that included four antenna riggers whose training included erecting the organic 180-foot radio towers. In Korea, the riggers repaired and maintained the KBS towers that reached as high as 365 feet. A good 'head for heights' was a prerequisite for an antenna rigger. Once *Radio Seoul* was established, the 4th MRBC headquarters relocated from Tokyo to Seoul to provide administration and coordinate support for the outlying detachments.

When *Radio Seoul* became operational, the 4th MRBC moved the company main body to the Korean capital in

Leaflet (below) used by the United Nations Command to warn civilians of an impending air attack. The Leaflet reads: "Air Raid Warning! Move Away From Military Targets."



November 1951. Soon *Radio Seoul* was on the air and the 1st RB&L regularly rotated scriptwriters and technicians to Korea to give Psywar troops field experience to improve their skills and performance at *Radio Tokyo* and *VUNC*.³ The company headquarters provided the daily administration and logistical support to the outlying radio stations, which were connected by teletype and telephone. The *Radio Pusan* detachment remained the hub for all the Psywar personnel moving between South Korea and Japan. Through their radio broadcasts, the personnel of the 4th MRBC executed the strategic Psywar campaign in Korea. As the war progressed, a number of Psywar initiatives were implemented.



A good "head for heights" was a prerequisite for the riggers who repaired the *Korean Broadcasting System* antennas and erected the antennas to support the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company operations.



The aerial distribution of leaflets from a U.S. Air Force C-47 over Korea. Leaflets were an integral part of the United Nations information campaign.

In Japan, the 1st RB&L expanded its operations providing Psywar support to the UN strategic objectives. One example is the Group's support to the bombing campaign conducted by Far East Air Force (FEAF), the air component of FECOM. Leaflets developed by the RB&L warned North Korean civilians when military targets in their vicinity were scheduled for bombing. Coupled with broadcasts from *Radio Pusan*, this mission employed the full range of Psywar capabilities and was lauded by the Secretary of the Air Force as an exemplary example of the humanitarianism of the UN air campaign. Similar missions combining leaflet drops with radio broadcasts were executed, leading to the most ambitious Psywar operation in the war, Plan PATRIOT.

The purpose of Plan PATRIOT was to commemorate the original Korean Independence Day, 1 March 1919. To this end, on 23 February 1952, a synchronized distribution of leaflets and radio broadcasts began to reinforce the sense of national unity and resistance in the manner that the original 1919 Declaration presented Japanese occupation authorities. The *Radio Pusan* and *Radio Tokyo* (VUNC) broadcasts featured some of the original signers of the Korean Independence Day Declaration. The seamless employment of the entire Psywar arsenal, both in Korea and Japan, resulted in a very successful operation that was well received by the Korean population.

Plan PATRIOT led to additional operations that furthered the Psywar campaign. Operation HOAX was a deception plan created around a fictitious UN amphibious landing at Wonsan to break the armistice negotiations deadlock. Operation EYEWASH was a comprehensive public information display extolling the value of Psywar to newly-arrived U.S. infantry divisions. The Psywar troops were fully engaged both in Korea and in Japan, where on 1 May 1952 the American units got a dose of 'Yankee, Go Home.'

On 28 April 1952, the United States Senate ratified the peace treaty with Japan returning full sovereignty and formally ending the Allied occupation. This precipitated anti-American riots led by the previously suppressed labor unions. On 1 May 1952, over three hundred thousand people gathered in Tokyo's Meiji Park. Abetted by Communist agitators, the rally turned into a riot as a crowd of ten thousand surged three miles into the city center to battle the police outside the Emperor's palace. Observing from atop the U.S. military headquarters buildings were members of the 1st RB&L, many of whom documented the chaotic scene in photographs and letters home. When the rioters were eventually subdued, the entire tenor of the U.S. presence had changed and Japanese politicians received a different view of democracy. No longer did the U.S. military enjoy the privileged life of the ruling occupiers; the Army now went on 'full alert.' While there were no further outbreaks of violence in the days that followed, for the Americans stationed in Japan the 'good old days' were over. At the time of the riots, most of the personnel who had arrived with the



Students composed a significant portion of the rioters who took to the streets during the 1952 May Day riots.



Colonel Charles H. Karlstad, an experienced World War II combat commander, came to the Psywar Center from the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia. An authority on training soldiers, he was instrumental in raising the standards of the Psywar Center to equate to the other Army training centers.



Captain Herbert Avedon was an early convert to Psychological Warfare and as commander of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, worked diligently to improve the training of his Psywar soldiers.



Hand-to-hand combat training on the main parade ground at the Psywar Center, 1954. Under COL Charles H. Karlstad, the training program at the center was quickly brought up to Army Field Forces standards.

1st RB&L were beginning to rotate back to the United States. Some officers went to the recently established U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg.

The Psychological Warfare Center and School (PWCS) was the creation of Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Army's Chief of Psychological Warfare. The school initially faced resistance from conventional Army officers who did not see a need for Psywar. In order to rapidly bring the Psywar Center up to the highest levels of Army school administration and training, McClure tapped Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad to be the Psywar Center commander and school commandant. A veteran of both world wars, Karlstad was the Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia. A consummate trainer and organizer, Karlstad was the ideal choice to bring to the new Psywar Center and School up to Army Field Forces standards. Among the officers who benefitted from Karlstad's tenure was Captain (CPT) Herbert Avedon.

CPT Avedon was the World War II signal officer of the 1st Ranger Battalion. He later also served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Burma in the Morale Operations Branch. After the war Avedon stayed in the Army Reserve and was recalled to active duty in 1951. Initially assigned to the 306th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (USAR), he completed the Psychological Warfare Course at Fort Riley, Kansas, before assignment to Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. An early convert to the value of Psywar, Avedon was a Psywar staff officer and then the third commander of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. He remained devoted to the promotion of Psywar throughout his long and varied military career. He typified officers who rode the rapidly growing wave of Psywar during the war in Korea.

In this issue, the rapid expansion of the Army's Psywar capability, in particular the employment of the mobile radio broadcasting systems in Korea is highlighted. The personal experiences of the men who, very often straight out of civilian life, were instrumental in shaping the Psywar mission, reveal that the heaviest responsibility for executing Psywar campaigns fell to the junior officers and enlisted men. The privates wrote the scripts, and supervised foreign language broadcasts featuring presidents and senior generals. This shows that the ability to communicate effectively is an integral part of the Psywar campaign at every level. This applies to today's special operations soldiers. ▲

Kenneth Finlayson is the USASOC Deputy Command Historian. He earned his PhD from the University of Maine, and is a retired Army officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, special operations aviation, and World War II special operations units.

Endnotes

- 1 On 30 June 1950, Congress passed the Selective Service Extension Act that gave President Truman the authority to call up National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units for a period of twenty-one months. During the course of the war more than 342,000 National Guard and 244,000 Army Reservists were called to active duty. The call-up extended to the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Reserves. Additionally, in July 1950 the Selective Service issued draft notices to 50,000 eligible males. Sean Williams, in *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social and Military History*, Spencer Tucker, ed., (Santa Barbara, CA, ABD-Clio, 2000), 456-457.
- 2 Charles H. Briscoe, "Top Priority RB&L Missions: *Radio Tokyo*, *VUNC*, and *KBS*," *Veritas*, Vol 7, No. 2, 2011, 19-31.
- 3 "Tokyo-Korea Traffic Heavy with Groupers: Radio Ops Keep Men Between Japan-Korea," *The Proper Gander*, 1:27 (8 November 1951), 1, Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Radio Pusan

The Voice of South Korea



by Charles H. Briscoe

While the rest of 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) was reorganizing to meet the number one Far East Command (FECOM) Psywar priority, broadcasting from *Radio Tokyo* and creating a *Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC)*, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields needed an initial assessment of the *KBS (Korean Broadcasting System)* facility in Pusan. Rebuilding South Korean radio stations was his number two priority. In mid-August 1951, he told Chemical Corps Second Lieutenant (2LT) Jack F. Brembeck, who had worked in an Army Expeditionary Radio Station in Italy and directed the preparation of an enlisted Psywar program of instruction (POI) at Fort Riley, KS, to select someone to help him evaluate and begin supervising *KBS* operations in the port city. Private First Class (PFC) Leon H. "Lee" Nelson, a 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) programmer, was his choice.¹


They were to write and broadcast daily news and commentaries on current events. This was critical because the South Korean [Republic of Korea (ROK)] president, Syngman Rhee, and his government had returned to Pusan after Seoul was captured by the Communist Chinese in early 1951. LT Brembeck and PFC Nelson were to build a transmission capability to deliver Psywar beyond the 38th Parallel.² Until the 4th MRBC mobile radio systems arrived in theater, UN programs would be broadcast over *KBS* stations that American military were in the process of rebuilding in the South.³ MRBC teams were capable of doing this at several different sites once *Radio Pusan* was well-established.

The purpose of this article is to explain how and why *Radio Pusan*, the first American-supervised *KBS* station, became the "*Voice of South Korea*," the central radio hub for the 1st RB&L in Korea, and the FECOM G-2 Psywar "clearing station" for all UN broadcasts made in the Republic.⁴ Korean presidential speeches with reunification rhetoric broadcast over the radio posed threats to UN Armistice negotiations. Yet, the responsibility for 'controlling' the ROK president fell upon a junior 1st RB&L officer serving as the Program Officer/Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of *Radio Pusan*. In order to understand how this cooperative arrangement evolved, a look at the MRBC structure is in order.

According to its Table of Distribution (T/D) effective 1 September 1951, the 4th MRBC was to conduct strategic propaganda against the enemy and disseminate information to friendly elements in enemy-held territory by radio broadcasting. The company headquarters, in addition to providing administrative and supply support, had a Captain (CPT) commander and lieutenants as the executive officer, radio officer, and monitoring section leader. A WWII Infantryman, CPT Robert A. Leadley, the 4th MRBC commander, had been dual-hatted as 1st RB&L Radio Officer [S-3 (Operations)] to oversee *Radio Tokyo* and *VUNC*.⁵ Since each of the three MRB platoons was authorized four officers and twenty-two enlisted men, LTC Shields had a pool of talented personnel to 'kick start' the *KBS* radio stations.⁶ They could be task organized as independent detachments to conduct strategic radio Psywar.

LT Jack Brembeck was to restore radio broadcasting for President Rhee.⁷ But, a family emergency interrupted his efforts. Thus, Signal Corps 1LT William J. Eilers, a Stanford electrical engineering and journalism graduate who had *Armed Forces Radio (AFR)* experience in Tokyo (1946-1948), Infantry 2LT Eddie Deerfield, a decorated WWII Air Corps veteran, and PFC Joseph E. Dabney were sent to join PFC Nelson and Corporals (CPL) John L. "Stod" Stoddard and Alvin R. "Al" Busse at *Radio Pusan* in mid-August.⁸ Since *Radio Pusan* was the surrogate for *Radio Seoul*, it became the "*Voice of South Korea*." "We ran a 'seat of the pants, jerry rigged' operation with American military-repaired/replaced Korean transmitters, antennas, and station facilities," said LT Eddie Deerfield.⁹

Co-locating in the *KBS* compound on a hilltop overlooking Pusan harbor offered the best operational solution. The 4th MRBC enlisted soldiers lived in a Quonset hut while two wooden-floored tents served the lieutenants and any visitors. The *Radio Pusan* 'office' was



Broadcasts are made from fixed stations or from mobile broadcasting stations. In some cases, the latter can be established on the site of fixed stations that have been destroyed and employ the frequency of the station they replace." U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 33 5, *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations*, August 1949.

Previous page: Former radio sportscaster Yun Chul Sung became the "Voice of Philosophy" commentator for *Radio Pusan*.

in a separate wooden building. A ten-minute drive to the 2nd Logistics Command mess by the railroad station was convenient. An armed Korean guard provided security by controlling the compound gate. The only threat was an occasional North Korean Air Force 'Bed Check Charlie.' The pilots of these WWII-vintage propeller aircraft hand-dropped mortar shells into the perimeter at night. Within three weeks 2LT Deerfield was elevated from newsroom OIC to detachment Radio Officer responsible for assigning script writing tasks, editing products, and coordinating broadcast times with the KBS station director.¹⁰

Officially, the *Radio Pusan* team had four major tasks: (1) supervise and counsel KBS personnel on the installation and operation of radio broadcast equipment; (2) take the initiative in program development for all programs aired over the *Pusan* network, not just Psywar; (3) co-operatively promulgate FECOM and UN Command policy with ROK government officials; (4) successfully sell Psywar at 'ground' level by developing a close working relationship with the Korean people.¹¹ U.S. assistance was categorized as technical and programming support.

Technical assistance came first. This included arranging the transportation, engineering, and installation of new broadcast equipment and coordinating use of interim Army Signal Corps broadcast equipment until KBS network facilities were restored. Specifically, the following was done for *Radio Pusan*: (1) an Army Signal Corps master sergeant was temporarily attached as the engineering advisor to supervise the installation of a U.S. Army 5 KW broadcast transmitter. This supplement to the one KW expanded local transmission coverage and reduced station down time. He also managed the network and worked to improve the quality of transmissions; (2) they arranged for the installation of a radio teletype news service to provide 24-hour daily world news for the network; (3) they coordinated the transfer of repair parts and components for transmitters and studio



1LT William J. Eilers (above left), Signal Corps, and 2LT Eddie Deerfield (above right), Infantry were sent to replace 2LT Jack L. Brembeck (left), Chemical Corps at *Radio Pusan*.

equipment; (4) they programmed one of the AN/MRT-5 Mobile Studios for *Pusan* to tape record and serve as backup for live broadcasts; (5) they furnished fuel, Korean vehicle tires and parts, water, and transportation when deemed critical to broadcast operations.¹² While these technical aspects were being accomplished, LTs Eilers and Deerfield focused on programming.

"My maxim was to always tell the truth," said LT Deerfield. "You never wanted to get caught in a lie. That always worked well for me."¹³ The programs were consistent with overall theater policy based on the best available intelligence. Truthful, accurate news was the backbone of American programming. The Free

The 4th MRBC *Radio Pusan* detachment, initially co-located at the Korean radio station compound, lived in 'Paradise Pines.' The officers had a tent covered shelter and the soldiers lived in the Quonset hut behind.



"The Reds' Newest Weapon: 'Kaesong'"

CCF News Commentary

Dabney

4 September

111111111

The Reds' newest Weapon: 'Kaesong'

Good evening, soldiers of China. The war in Korea erupted anew today as the Communist-caused armistice talks suspension dragged through its thirteenth day.

On the battered heights north of Yanggu, the "Battle of Bloody Ridge" continues in all its savagery. Yesterday, the Communists attempted to regain a strategic hill they lost last week. They pushed some 5,000 of their soldiers into murderous UN fire. The Reds attacked behind a heavy artillery and mortar attack. But when the artillery lifted, UN troops greeted the Redx attackers with searing-white steel and lead.

While the battle flamed on in Korea, the UN Command worked overtime to bring about an honorable armistice. General Matthew B. Ridgway called his negotiation team to Tokyo last night. Presumably the UN Command leaders will draft a reply to the poisonous Communist message of Saturdayx. In it, the Reds "demanded" the UN re-investigate their Kaesong neutrality violation charges. The Communists, however, failed to answer the challenge Ridgway had put to them, that of his offers to resume armistice talks.

Ridgway has ^C~~be~~ fed up with the flimsey and numerous inventions the Reds have produced to stallx the negotiations. He probably will ask for a change in site.

And just as surely, the Communists will react with a volley of excuses, ~~to keep the talks in Kaesong.~~

You see, ~~K~~ ever since the conferences started, Kaesong has been a Communist tool. It has been exploited just as infamously and as bloodily as you yourself have been exploited, Soldier of China. Kaesong is a Red weapon. With ~~the~~ the Communist^s have called their own signals. To the Reds, Kaesong was a Godsend. The walls of Kaesong have afforded the Reds a wobbly base to escape responsibility for breaking off the talks. The Reds went to Kaesong on that initial day of negotiation --- July tenth --- with three purposes in mind: To gain political ground; to make up for their failure on the battlefield; and to re-establish themselves for a re-invasion of the ROK.

CCF News Commentary

Dabney

But the Reds soon realized that as rain against the "stonewall" UN neutrality agreements. Maybe it. Nevertheless, they broke the rule. The Communists had marched heavily conference house. As a consequence quite naturally placed the blame

That's when the Communists had. A flurry of ~~Red~~ trumped-up Red charges just couldn't stand to lose on the distasteful was that the world had habits of violations. The eyes of the Reds. For the Reds, and the Red. That was a month ago.

Now the talks have broken down of the same culprits. Behind the Kaesong, they attempted to conceal song," ~~xxxxxx~~ which the world has peace, overnight became a Red weapon guard of Communist soldiers, the. They represent the extreme of they may, your Communist leader anybody's eyes. They have mere the Reds will stoop to gain the

The free world has not been at face value. If anything~~xx~~, vigilance in the face of crazed a pillar of strength in the mid and incidents.~~xxxxxx~~

No matter how many facts to exase the fact that if they can armistice talks, their armies

UN Eighth Army Commander, today: Said the husky army ch

4 September 2222222

at all their pretending was weak
N negotiat~~ors~~. The Reds broke
was deliberate. Maybe accidental.
s. And the world was told about it.
y-armed troopers right by the
ce, The talks broke down. The world
squarely on the Reds.
atched their new weapon of "Kaesong."
charges set the signal. For the Reds
he negotiation table. But even more
ad discovered their infamous ~~xxx~~
of Asia ~~xxx~~ turned their gaze toward the
s only, were to blame for the break

own again. And this time it's the re
their own little iron curtain around
eal their acts of dishonesty. And "
ad hoped would symbolize the name c
eapon of treachery. Behind the clo
e Reds invented incidents at ~~will~~
treacherous blackmailing. And try
s have not pulled the ~~xxx~~ wool ov
ly underscored the dishonesty to v
ir objectives.

n deceived. It has noted the Red ac
~~xxx~~ UN prestige has been enhanced
d Communist trickery. The UN stand
ist of all the Communist fabricat

he Reds twist, however, they can
use a ~~xxx~~ permanent failure in t
will be obliterated.

General Van Fleet, put the case
chief: "We can crush anything (the f
^

CCF News Commentary Dabney 4 September 3333333

threw at us." Then the pistol-totin General added emphatically:
"And they know it."

From San Francisco, meantime, the President of the United States,
Mr. Truman, put it bluntly also: "We will not give in to aggression."

The American president emphasized, however, that the UN Command
is ready at any time to reach an honorable settlement.

The recent series of fact-twisting and incident-manufacturing
has not gained the Reds one square foot of ground. They have
attempted vainly to wear down the UN Command's patience. Through their
nefarious exhibition of trickery, they have only aroused the world
to the true picture of Communists in action.

Kaesong has become another Communist weapon. And never more
will the world trust any~~xx~~ propaganda that comes from behind its
Communist-controlled portals.

Yes, the Reds have used Kaesong as a tool. They're using you as
a tool, too, soldier of China. How long will be before you
~~xxx~~ discover the truth?

##



Original news commentary script



The *Radio Pusan* detachment, 4th MRBC was attached to 2nd Logistics Command (SSI shown here) for administration and logistics support.



The 4th MRBC writers (above) shared the building and work tables with Korean translators.



The 4th MRBC *Radio Pusan* staff in the fall of 1951 (L to R): CPLs William F. Morton, Anthony E. Severino, Joseph E. Dabney and Kenneth V. (Ken) Benson; Korean Secretary, Miss Suh (Suzie); PFC Bradley Duckworth; 2LT Eddie Deerfield; and Mr. Min, the chief Korean translator, a Department of Army Civilian (DAC).



1LT Arthur E. Holch, 1st RB&L Radio News Operations, and CPT Frederick P. Laffey, 4th MRBC Radio Manager, relax in 'Paradise Pines' during a field visit to *Radio Pusan*.

World proclaimed that its Psywar was based on truth while that from the Communist world was built on lies.¹⁴ Specific program times were allocated for daily news broadcasts from the *United States Information Service (USIS)* and UNCACK (UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea).¹⁵

Beginning with four daily fifteen-minute sessions, the script writers (CPLs Stoddard and Busse and PFCs Nelson and Dabney) explained why UN forces were fighting in Korea, UN goals versus those of the Communists, and tried to undermine enemy leaders. The RB&L soldiers were labeled the "Root Beer & Lemonade" guys by the combat soldiers in Korea.¹⁶ CPLs Anthony E. Severino, Kenneth V. Benson (farm programs), and William F. Morton were replaced after several months.¹⁷ Korean service rotations for 1st RB&L script writers and programmers varied from three to four months, but some stayed longer.¹⁸ By late 1951, *Radio Pusan* programming had stabilized.

Programs included live and taped broadcasts that were regularly used by *KBS* and *VUNC*. Network world reports, commentaries, a daily children's show, a special for teens emphasized responsibilities in a postwar Korea, a weekly farmers program, special events in Korea, and UN spot announcement campaigns filled the air time. This broadcast schedule was accomplished by one officer, four enlisted writers, and a Korean staff working twelve to sixteen hours daily. Four Korean local news reporters covered assigned 'beats' in Pusan. A Korean DAC (Department of Army Civilian) supervised seven bilingual translators who spanned the day and night requirements by working overlapping eight hour shifts. Asian news transmissions via Morse Code were recorded by five Korean monitors doing four hour shifts.¹⁹ Regular anchor programs provided consistency to the daily and weekly broadcast schedule.

Though there were two breaks (0830-1130 hours and 1430-1730 hours) in the broadcast day that went from 0630-2300 hours, the 'Gander' (nickname for 1st RB&L personnel) script writers never stopped writing. They rewrote news broadcasts from *AP (Associated Press)*, *UP (United Press)*, *INS (International News Service)*, *Reuters*, *Pan Asia* wire services & *Central News* Morse Code transmissions, wrote commentaries and children stories, and edited the local news and field interviews (by *KBS* reporters) for content and policy violations, and did the 'first cut' English reviews of translated materials.²¹ Recording local interest stories was challenging.

Considerable innovation was necessary. Battery-powered Japanese tape recorders did not work well in the winters and hot, humid summers of Korea. Cigarette lighter fluid hand warmers, popular with North American deer hunters, increased functionality



Psychological Warfare

Factual news and entertainment, such as music, sports reports, and skits are particularly effective with soldier audiences" FM 33 5, *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations*, August 1949.

in the cold. "Tube technology recording equipment was ponderous, unreliable, and weather-sensitive. Capturing live current events like the Koje-do prison riots, speeches by Generals [Matthew B.] Ridgway and [James A.] Van Fleet, the inauguration of the ROK Military Academy, counter-guerrilla operations around Chiri-san in December 1951, and interviewing wounded aboard the USHS *Hope* was frustrating. They were 'crap shoots,'" said Deerfield. "There was nothing worse than getting back to HLKA (*Radio Pusan*) and discovering that the recording tape was either distorted by static or contained nothing."²² Pre-recording "*Voice of South Korea*" speeches by President Rhee was a necessity.


Formal addresses by the ROK president were recorded to edit sensitive UN issues like a South Korean victory

and Korean unification. "The South Korean president took the monitoring well. It was his Austrian wife, Francesca, who always gave me a hard time despite having arranged every session through the Minister of Public Information, Dr. Clarence Ryee. I was the only U.S. Army Psywar officer who worked directly with President Rhee. LTC Shields told me to 'cut the power' if the ROKs tried any shenanigans. Thank heavens, they did not," stated LT Deerfield.²³ But, that guidance was easily given from Tokyo when you did not live in the HLKA compound and work with the KBS staff daily.

Official guidance came to LT Deerfield from Tokyo via teletype, not radio or telephone. As controversial as some of the things done by President Rhee and the National Assembly were, "the teletype provided solid records." Since

Radio Pusan Anchor Programs

United Nations Command Calling (Shortwave radio relay)	1-thirty minute broadcast (b/c)	Daily
Voice of America (Broadcast relay)	1-thirty minute broadcast b/c	Daily
Tokyo Calling	1-thirty minute b/c	Daily
World News Roundup (AP, UP, INS, Reuters, Pan Asia & Central News Morse Code transmissions)	4-fifteen minute & 1-five minute b/c	Daily
Dictate Speed News (USIS slow speed news b/c for copy "word for word" by radio set owners)	2-thirty minute b/c	Daily
World News Commentary (Mimeographed copies of b/c mailed on request - 750 subscribers)	3-fifteen minute b/c	Daily
United Nations News	1-fifteen minute b/c	Daily
Children's Hour	1-fifteen minute b/c	Daily
Story Grandmother (Fairy tales & kindred stories for children between five & twelve years)	1-fifteen minute b/c	4 days a week
People Who Shape Our World (Life stories of important role players for teenagers thirteen to twenty years)	1-fifteen minute b/c	3 days a week
Your Farm Hour (Latest information of agricultural developments, future plans, and UNCACK efforts) ²⁰	1-fifteen minute b/c	Weekly



Original “fan” letter sent to “Voice of Philosophy” commentator Yun Chul Sung, Radio Pusan.



Translation:

Dear Sir,
How are you getting on?
I am one of the listeners of your commentary failing never to switch on the dial of our radio when we have been given electric power.
Your commentary's hour draws all our families around the radio. It will be the greatest honor I might be given when are kind enough to send me the copies of your instructing commentaries everyday.
Receive my cordial and warm blessings on your glory as well as the further development of the Section of Announcement.

Sincerely Yours,
Lee Ki Sung,
#96, 3rd, Taepyeong Ro,
Taegu

he was at “the tip of the Psywar radio broadcasting spear” in Korea, the WWII veteran took care to submit Memoranda for Record (MFR) on tough issues: Accusations of domestic interference (after some out-of-favor ROK assemblymen sought asylum in American Army facilities); Armistice negotiation caveats; and constant reunification rhetoric by President Rhee. Deerfield had no choice because CPT Robert Leadley, his company commander and the Psywar Group Radio Officer, simply reiterated guidance from COL Greene, Chief, G-2 Psywar Division, FECOM and his deputy COL James E. Goodwin:

1. Primary mission in KBS: retain control of the stations where we have detachments.
2. Secondary mission: See that material supporting UN interests in turbulent political situations is aired over the KBS facilities.²⁴

The secondary “umbrella” mission was to be accomplished by airing only official ROK PIO (Public Information Office) releases not blasphemous to the U.S. or UN cause, all official statements from USIS, UNCURK (UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea), UNCACK (UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea), UN, other UN or State Department agencies, and authenticated news releases not speculative nor editorial in nature if they come from reliable sources and these sources are carefully labeled.²⁵

An Army second lieutenant was held accountable for daily judgment calls on blasphemy, speculation, and non-objectivity from every conceivable information or intelligence source. The teletype message concluded with this reminder: “Despite our mission of supporting the UN cause and carrying out all of the above, we

must remember that KBS broadcasts go above the 38th Parallel. We must not furnish the enemy with food for propaganda against us (the U.S.).”²⁶ The ‘we’ was ‘the royal we’ because whenever there were radio broadcast problems in Korea, “the buck stopped at LT Deerfield and Radio Pusan,” the 1st RB&L in-country radio hub.²⁷

LT Deerfield had to explain that Army personnel at Radio Pusan suggested that a Korean announcer read a denial of ROK Government charges that eight National Assemblymen arrested had been involved in an international plot against President Rhee and received money from Communist sources. After discovering that it was the result of a misinterpreted comment, LT Deerfield officially apologized to Dr. Clarence Ryee, the ROK PIO, but reiterated his authority over all KBS broadcasts: “We will continue to exercise censorship on news and commentary affecting United Nations policy, but we will refrain from interfering in the internal affairs (of South Korea).”²⁸ Typical for the time (on 20 May 1952, several weeks after the Occupation ended), his apology was printed on the last page, first section of *The Nippon Times* (Tokyo) while President Rhee’s hollow ban on VUNC broadcasts headlined the front page.²⁹

Deerfield’s frustration was evident when he reminded LTC Shields and MAJ Leadley that he was “caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place”: “A constant state of alert is required to catch all utterances [by President Rhee] and to edit them for policy” before they can be aired as KBS broadcasts because they could sabotage the VUNC campaign if presented in the original form. A junior Psywar officer ‘at the tip of the spear’ was the ‘lone arbitrator of high policy on the spur of the moment.’³⁰

The *Radio Pusan* officer also reminded the Psywar Group and FECOM staff officers in Tokyo that his Korean reporters and translator/interpreters and the *HLKA* managers and staff should be praised for being “disciples of radio Psywar,” instead of being called to task. The interpreters, in particular, bridging the language gap for the Americans were “very wary about new program ideas, special events, and the speeches by public officials” being approved for broadcast by *KBS*. Though they were on “tricky ground,” the loyal *KBS* personnel regularly alerted *Radio Pusan* personnel about potentially controversial issues. LT Deerfield summarized it well: “They were numb to just how tricky this unwritten responsibility is. There might well have been ‘loss of face,’ relations ruptured between the ROK government and *KBS*, and policy violations.”³¹

Because there was a continuous exchange of ideas, daily coordination, and mutual respect between *KBS* program directors and the Psywar detachment officers, Deerfield felt that they had a good working relationship. The Psywar detachment and *KBS* were in the same family working generally toward the same purpose. “The *KBS* staff is almost one hundred percent in agreement with the aims of Psywar and with what it is trying to help the network do in Korea.”³² Every day involved some polite ‘give and take’ negotiations and mutual ‘back scratching.’ Hiring Korean commentators with solid prewar reputations was politically sound.

The introduction of Korean radio announcers with name and voice recognition proved popular. Yun Chul Sung, a well-known sports commentator, regained his ‘star’ status shortly after *HLKA* began broadcasting again. “While his English was poor, Sung spoke Korean with a deep, melodious voice. He got the most fan mail. And, it was all good because we translated it into English,” said Deerfield. “He praised the scripts effusively.”³³ CPL Burton C. “Bud” Perfit wrote many of Sung’s commentaries.³⁴ Sung, the “Voice of Philosophy,” “built up an impressive following among South Korean listeners.” *Radio Pusan*



2LT Eddie Deerfield supervised the pre-recording of President Syngman Rhee's speeches in Pusan. The bulky tape recorders pictured were also used in the field to collect live interviews and cover significant current events.

started mimeographing his commentaries and mailed them on request.³⁶

2LT William F. Brown II a former *Look* magazine writer, conveyed the frustration of the Korean refugees and provided an astute assessment that was published in *The Proper Gander*: “If you look at Pusan with ‘Psywar Eyes,’ you notice poverty which is almost unimaginable, the necessary selfishness of almost everyone, and the vaguely accusing eyes of a people who have been cheated out of something. They can be our friends, or our enemies. Everywhere you go, you feel that ‘something has got to be done.’ The people need our help.”³⁷ At *Radio Pusan*, the American Psywarriors helped the *KBS* staff and their extended families as best they could.

“Koreans probably get a bigger kick out of seeing a photo than any people in the world. Whenever someone pulls out a snapshot, he always has a balcony of Koreans leaning over his shoulder. You can imagine what happens when they get a chance to see a movie,” explained CPL “Stod” Stoddard. “The crowd starts gathering about 6:00 P.M. At first it is just kids. About 6:45 P.M. our Korean station workers start bringing chairs and benches into the Quonset hut. You’d be amazed at how many people can squeeze onto a board laid across a couple of water cans. At 7:00 P.M. the house is really filling up. Personnel from *HLKA* along with their friends and the neighborhood families pour in. The kids sprawl out in front. At 7:25 P.M. when we go over, the crowd is so thick that it’s like fighting through a bargain basement sale to find our seats. The lights go out, and *Bugs Bunny* springs onto the screen bringing a chorus of ‘Oh’s and ‘Ah’s’ just like



South Korean President Syngman Rhee and his Austrian wife Francesca commemorate the reopening of the Han River railroad bridges in 1951.

Saturday afternoons [matinees] back home," wrote Stoddard.³⁸ This entertainment was icing on a cake decorated with supplemental food and clothing provided by the American troops. But, health care for the Koreans in the Pusan Perimeter was limited.

The winter of 1951 was especially hard on the refugees who had sought sanctuary in the Pusan area. "About midnight one evening in early December, an *HLKA* staff member knocked on my tent door to introduce a friend whose daughter was extremely ill. There was no room for the seven-year-old child in any Korean hospital and her father was very distraught. In the dead of night I loaded them in my jeep and drove to the *UNCACK* hospital. Since we were approaching the Christmas season, I implored their sympathy to help the young child. They agreed to make an exception and the *AP Wire Services* and *Stars and Stripes* jumped on the story. It appeared twice on 10 and 14 December 1951. "The look of gratitude on the face of Cho Jong Hee's mother made it a perfect Christmas," recalled Deerfield.³⁹

When UN forces stabilized the front near the 38th Parallel after the second recapture of Seoul, the success of *Radio Pusan* prompted *LTC Shields* to expand *KBS* rehabilitation efforts. Antennas were critical to transmitting and receiving radio broadcast transmissions. Repair of salvageable ones and

Bugs Bunny cartoons had universal appeal.



The "Proper Gander" was featured on 1st RB&L Christmas cards designed by the Graphics Section. They sold for a piddling 3 ½ cents" when beer cost "a nickel and a high ball sold for a quarter" in Japan. A Christmas card was an easy way to claim credit for writing home.

the erection of new antennas was what the 4th MRBC riggers did. As the initial steps were put in motion for *Radio Taegu* and *Radio Seoul*, the antenna men were sent to Korea. Two occupations by the Communists had left Seoul in shambles.

Well ensconced in the best Pusan facilities, President Rhee and his government elected to remain there despite the reestablishment of *Radio Seoul* and the relocation of 4th MRB company headquarters to the capital. Thus, *Radio Pusan* remained as the 1st RB&L mother station and UN Psywar radio relay hub. It became the *KBS* model for radio stations in *Taegu*, *Seoul*, and *Taejon*. An Infantry lieutenant and his script writing teams were responsible and deserve the lion's share of the credit for the American success—WWII veteran LT Eddie Deerfield—was the 'tip of the Psywar spear' in Korea, 1951-1952. Because the United States was funding the restoration and sustainment of radio broadcasting to South Korea, it was in the best interests of the government, military, and *KBS* staff to capitalize on the 4th MRBC talent and maintain good relationships with American Psywar detachment personnel. And, just as *FECOM* paid *Japan Broadcasting System (JPS)* for 'air time' in *Radio Tokyo* when the Occupation ended on 28 April 1952, they did the same after the Armistice was signed in Korea. This was basically a 'win-win' situation for all parties that most benefitted South Korea long term.⁴¹



LT Eddie Deerfield was instrumental in saving the life of seven-year-old Cho Jong Hee in December 1951. After Korean doctors had diagnosed her sickness as fatal and denied hospital care, Deerfield got her admitted to the UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (*UNCACK*) hospital in Pusan where she survived.

1LT Eddie Deerfield, 4th MRBC, *Radio Pusan*, Korea



T/Sgt Eddie Deerfield, Radio Gunner, B-17 *Flying Fortress* heavy bomber, 303rd Bomb Group, RAF Molesworth, England, qualified for both the Goldfish and Caterpillar Clubs while accruing thirty combat missions, 1943-1944. Aircraft is "Iza Vailable."

Eddie Deerfield, born 24 August 1923 in Omaha, Nebraska, was the oldest of three children. The family moved to Chicago in 1927. While in high school, he was the sports editor of the Tuley High School *Review*. Graduating in June 1941, he was hired as copy boy on the *Chicago Times*, then left to enlist in the Army Air Corps after Pearl Harbor. His stateside assignment on a B-17 *Flying Fortress* bomber was in the cramped space of the ball turret operating a pair of .50 cal machineguns. On arrival in England, SGT Deerfield was reassigned as a replacement radio operator to a new crew. On his sixth mission, their heavily damaged bomber crashed in the North Sea.⁵⁵ On his fourteenth mission, the crew bailed out of their burning B-17 before it crashed in the south of England. Technical Sergeant (T/Sgt) Deerfield came down hard and was prodded to consciousness by a pitchfork wielding farmer. "It was my 'Chicago gangster' accent that convinced him that I was not part of a German paratroop invasion," laughed Deerfield.⁵⁶ He added a Caterpillar pin for the jump to his Goldfish pin for the crash at sea. Missions against Berlin and preparatory D-Day invasion targets predated his thirtieth mission when he was wounded



303rd Bomb Group
"Hell's Angels" jacket patch.



8th Air Force SSI

by flak. The young Tech Sergeant left England with a DFC (Distinguished Flying Cross), four Air Medals, and a Purple Heart to train at Truax Army Air Field, Madison, Wisconsin, on the B-29 *Superfortress* until victory over Japan in August 1945.⁵⁷

Returning to the *Chicago Times* in 1945, Deerfield progressed from sports reporter to features writer. Deciding to use his GI Bill, he earned honors as a freshman at the University of Illinois, Chicago campus, and then transferred to Northwestern University where he received a B.S. in Journalism in 1950 shortly after North Korea invaded the South.⁵⁸ While at Northwestern, Deerfield accepted a commission in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Infantry Second Lieutenant (2LT) Deerfield was activated from the USAR in April 1951 to serve with the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley, KS. His *Radio Pusan* assignment lasted fourteen months.⁵⁹

EPILOGUE

By April 1952, *Radio Pusan* had a staff of forty-four personnel. The 4th MRBC detachment consisted of an OIC (Technical & Program Officer), an assistant Program/Radio Officer/News Chief, two communications chiefs, two radio transmitter operators, a radio repairman, antenna rigger, two wheeled vehicle mechanics, a sound recording repairman, teletype operator, electrical powerman, a news writer, a production assistant-writer, and two radio broadcast script writers. A Korean DAC, the chief interpreter-translator, supervised eight local translators, five Morse Code monitors, and three bilingual stenographers. The OIC also had a bilingual secretary. Five Korean laborers were the responsibility of the senior detachment NCO (non-commissioned officer), who was one of the communications chiefs.⁴² It was “the high water mark” in *Radio Pusan* manning.

By late spring 1953, the original 1st RB&L Group had undergone a 90+ percent turnover in personnel and its organic companies (minus the 4th MRBC in Korea) had become assimilated into the FECOM Psywar staff and Publications Command. The drawn out Armistice negotiations, tactical stalemate along the 38th Parallel, and the anticipated end of combat impacted heavily on the strategic Psywar mission. WWII Army Air Corps veteran 1LT Nevin F. Price, the former 8th MRBC commander, 6th RB&L at Fort Riley, KS, and Fort Bragg, NC, was the link to what happened at *Radio Pusan* in 1953-1954.⁴³

The Fate of *Radio Pusan* 1953-1954

Having trained two Army Reserve RB&Ls on the new radio broadcasting equipment for their MRBCs and built the Radio Section, 5021st ASU into the 8th MRBC (three officers and thirty-four enlisted), the WWII B-26 Radio/Gunner brought a wealth of experience to the 4th MRBC in October 1953. Most notably, Signal Corps 1LT Nevin F. Price, when alerted for Korea, had written a letter to the

Army Chief of Psywar requesting assignment to the 1st RB&L. He did not want his MRBC expertise to be wasted.⁴⁴

Hence, when the USS *General William Mitchell* (T-AP-114) docked at Yokohama, a 1st RB&L soldier was waiting for 1LT Price. They made a quick trip to Tokyo to change his orders to Korea. “I got no guidance or instructions, only told that I was replacing the *Radio Pusan* OIC who was homeward bound on emergency leave. With new orders in hand, I was driven to the airport to catch a plane bound for Korea. When I got to K-9 (Airbase) near Pusan, a jeep and driver were waiting for me. Though the company headquarters was in Seoul, I went straight to our ‘compound’ down the road and got to work,” recalled Price.⁴⁵ While the Radio Platoons had three officers and twenty-three enlisted soldiers assigned according to the T/D, reality was quite different in the fall of 1953.⁴⁶ *Radio Seoul* had reclaimed HLKA as its KBS call letters and *Pusan* had become HLKB again.

“I arrived a week before a massive city fire destroyed HLKB. There were ten or twelve soldiers assigned, less than half authorized strength. My NCOIC was Master Sergeant (MSG) Pipkin. There was a Sergeant First Class (SFC) Fitzwater, who handled the broadcasts, a motor sergeant, a couple of antenna riggers (one, a former lumberjack from Oregon), two truck drivers, Private (PVT) Kintz, and some others. Since we had no radio mechanic, I became that as well as OIC,” related Price. “They had the same mobile radio broadcast vans that I had in the 8th MRBC at Fort Bragg.”⁴⁷ (Note: The FECOM Table of Distribution Number 80-8239-2 for 4th MRBC dated 1 May 1953 reduced the Radio Broadcasting Platoons from three to one and the company headquarters to a third of its 1951 strength. Following the Armistice the mission was radio broadcast sustainment and public information instead of Psywar).⁴⁸ After the fire swept Pusan in April 1953, the 4th MRBC detachment assumed the radio broadcast programming mission again.

“The day after the fire I moved our two twenty-six foot V-51 trailers with S56/GRC shelters [containing an AN/

The *Radio Pusan* site (lower right) after the great 1953 fire.



The Great Fire of 1953



Fire ravaged KBS Radio Pusan within a week of 1LT Nevin F. Price's arrival. Afterwards, the 4th MRBC detachment assumed the radio broadcast programming mission again in April 1953.



"I arrived a week before a massive city fire destroyed HLKB. There were ten or twelve soldiers assigned, less than half authorized strength... They had the same mobile radio broadcast vans that I had in the 8th MRBC at Fort Bragg."

— 1LT Nevin F. Price.

MRT-5 transmitter and an AN/MRR-4 studio] inside the *HLKB* compound on the small hill overlooking the beach. I started routing the *HLKB* programming through our transmitter [*Area Pusan*]. Since our Quonset hut had been untouched, it became home for five displaced civilian operators and their families. They had barely escaped their homes. I scrounged food, clothing, and blankets from the American, British, and Canadian elements located nearby," stated Price.⁴⁹

Radio Pusan, still serving as the 4th MRBC mother station in Korea, received Psywar missions from CPT Charles D. Worley, 1st RB&L Radio Officer in Tokyo, until the Armistice was signed.⁵⁰ Anti-communist propaganda (delivered from Tokyo via the Mukden transoceanic cable) was directed towards North Korean and Chinese forces north of the 38th Parallel. Psywar consolidation (occupation) themes broadcast at 500-1600 KC (kilocycles) covered the South.⁵¹

With a simple "clothes line" antenna between two poles (35 feet and 82 feet tall), "I was able to reach North Korea, Communist China, 'back home' in Pennsylvania, and 'Radio Row' in New York City," remarked Price.⁵² "The 4th MRBC commander in Seoul was a WWII Infantry CPT Robert R. Root. When another infantry veteran, 1LT John H. Hill, a friend from the 6th RB&L at Fort Bragg, arrived in January 1954, he became Officer in Charge [OIC]

because he outranked me by a few days. I became Radio Officer. This was the arrangement until Hill left in July 1954 and I became OIC again."⁵³ The mutual cooperation and rapport with the KBS staff established in August 1951 continued to be the *modus operandi* for *Radio Pusan*.

With the cooperation of the ROK government, Psywar radio programs were broadcast over the KBS facilities and the 4th MRBC mobile radio stations. As LT Nevin Price explained, they reciprocated in kind when *Radio Pusan* and the city were devastated by a massive fire in April 1953. By then, the network of fixed KBS stations that originated with *Pusan* had spread throughout the Republic to *Taegu, Seoul, Taejon, Mawwon, and Kangnung*.⁵⁴ ▲


Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Retired LTC Eddie Deerfield interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; "Nelson, Brembeck Invade Radio Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 1, 18 August 1951, 2 and "Don't Get Blinded! Mickelsen, Sing, Wearing Silver Bars," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 4 October 1951, 1, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as *The Proper Gander* with date and collection; Thomas M. Klein, Robert J. Herguth, and Robert McConaughy, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: 1952 Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group...50 Years Later 2002* (Round Hill, GA: Round Hill Productions, 2002), 148, hereafter cited as *Life & Times 2002*.

The rebuilt *Radio Pusan* compound consisted of wood-framed tents in early 1954.

Guard shack at the Motor Pool entrance to 4th MRBC Detachment at *Radio Pusan*. The two Autocar 4-5 ton G510 tractors behind it were the prime movers for the mobile transmitter and radio studio mounted on the V-51-G trailers.



1LT Nevin F. Price, 4th MRBC



U.S. Army General School Psywar
Staff Officers Course #2 graduation certificate
for 1LT Nevin F. Price.



A B-26 Marauder from the 599th
Bombardment Squadron with its WWII
ETO 9th Air Force markings.



Technical Sergeant Nevin F. Price (center) with his B-26
Marauder aircrew shuttle jeep at an airfield in France, 1944.

In the spring of 1953, First Lieutenant Nevin F. Price, 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) commander, 6th RB&L, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was alerted for Korea. Price wrote a letter to the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) requesting assignment to the 4th MRBC (1st RB&L) in Korea. "I wanted the Army to use my radio broadcasting background and Psywar experience. It was that simple," said the WWII veteran.⁶⁰ The decorated Air Corps B-26 Marauder radio gunner accepted a direct Army Reserve commission as a Signal Corps Second Lieutenant in 1948 after NBC (*National Broadcasting Company*) began sponsoring the 301st MRBC as industry had done for other specialty units in WWII. Price was working in radio and television broadcasting in the New York City area. In March 1951, he volunteered for active duty, attended the Signal Officers Basic Course at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and reported to the 5021st Psywar Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas.⁶¹

The former NBC radio transmitter engineer was sent to head the Radio Section, 5021st Psywar Detachment during the formative days of the 1st RB&L, 301st RB&L (USAR), and the 6th RB&L. 1LT Price scavenged Army and Air Force salvage yards throughout Kansas to build radios to train his personnel in Morse Code monitoring

and broadcast transmission. He was the chief evaluator for the Gates Radio-produced mobile radio systems for the MRBCs, trained two USAR RB&Ls in Chicago and Los Angeles on their new equipment, and worked closely with the Psywar Board on research and development projects. LT Price graduated from Psywar Staff Officers Course #2 (January-March 1952), U.S. Army General School (AGS), Fort Riley, KS, as the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and Tables of Distribution (T/D) for Psywar units were being finalized by the Psywar Division, AGS, the Army Psywar Board, OCPW, and Army Field Forces headquarters.⁶²

The Radio Section of the 5021st ASU became the nucleus for the 8th MRBC, 6th RB&L at Fort Riley, KS. The 6th RB&L relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in September 1952, as part of the new U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center.⁶³ Having trained the 8th MRBC personnel from the unit's inception, evaluated the new mobile radio systems for MRBCs in the active Army and Reserves, familiarized two USAR RB&Ls on their newly acquired mobile radio broadcast equipment, and commanded a MRBC for eighteen months before going to Korea, this WWII veteran brought a wealth of experience to *Radio Pusan* in October 1953.⁶⁴



Captain Nevin F. Price, Radio Pusan OIC, returning to the States in 1954.



1LT John H. Hill became the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Radio Pusan in January 1954 because he outranked 1LT Nevin Price by a few days.

- 2 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Nelson, Brembeck Invade Radio Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 1, 18 August 1951, 2 and "Don't Get Blinded! Mickelsen, Sing, Wearing Silver Bars," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 4 October 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 3 SB, "New Weapons, Complementing Bombs and Bullets Go Forth to Wage A War With Words," GHQ Headquarters and Service Command's Weekly Publication, *The Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 28, 11 April 1952, 3, Broderick Collection.
- 4 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, APO 500, Radio Operations Division. "Report on Psywar Radio Operations in conjunction with the Korean Broadcasting System August 1951 – March 1952," USACOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 5 Charles H. Briscoe, "Radio Tokyo, VUNC, and KBS: The Priority Missions for 1st RB&L," *Veritas*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011.
- 6 HQ, U.S. Army Forces Far East Command, APO San Francisco 343. Table of Distribution Number 80-8239-2, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit, APO 301 dated 1 May 1953 in retired Major Nevin F. Price Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Price Collection.
- 7 "Nelson, Brembeck Invade Radio Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 8 *Life & Times* 2002, 167.
- 9 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; Joseph E. Dabney interview, 16 December 2011; "Morton, Deerfield, Dabney to Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (21 November 1951), 1, Dabney Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 10 Deerfield interviews, 16 and 17 September 2010.
- 11 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 12 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 13 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010.
- 14 "Ideas in Action," undated *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) in the James B. Haynes Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by collection; Department of Army, Office of the Chief of Information. "Psychological Warfare," *Officers' Call*, Vol. 4, No. 9, 6 (1952) in the Robert L. Darcy Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by collection.
- 15 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010.
- 16 *Life & Times* 2002, 231-232. **CPL John L. Stoddard served two four month stints as a script writer for Radio Pusan. He wrote five newscasts and a commentary each day;** Dabney interview, 16 December 2011; "Morton, Deerfield, Dabney to Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (21 November 1951), 1, Dabney Collection.



The KBS staff at Radio Pusan pose with 1LT John H. Hill, the 4th MRBC Detachment OIC.

- 17 *Radio Tokyo of the Japan Broadcasting System (JPS)* shared broadcast facilities and 'air time' on a cooperative basis. When the Occupation ended on 28 April 1952, the U.S. government began paying for 'air time.' Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1948 [2nd edition], 306; Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Bob Carroll, 4th MRB, Recovering From Operation in Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 17 January 1952, 1, Broderick Collection. *Radio Pusan* CPL Robert Carroll, TDY from the 4th MRBC in Seoul, had a hernia operation on 14 January 1952 at the 22nd Field Evacuation Hospital in Pusan. Tom Klein, Ken Benson, and Bud Perfit "Personal Remarks," in *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 2, 10, 36. Other scriptwriters that "interned" with 2LT Eddie Deerfield were CPLs Thomas M. Klein, William F. Morton, John L. "Stod" Stoddard, Burton C. "Bud" Perfit, and PFC Hanno Fuchs. CPL Perfit became a long term; Dabney interview, 16 December 2011; "Morton, Deerfield, Dabney to Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (21 November 1951), 1, Dabney Collection.
- 18 Ken Benson, "Personal Remarks," in *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 11.
- 19 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 20 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 21 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 22 Deerfield interviews, 16 and 17 September 2010; Charles H. Briscoe, "Republic of Korea General Paik Sun-yup," *Veritas*, 6:2, 2010, 40-41; Benson, "Personal Remarks," in *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 11.
- 23 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; Deerfield Memorandum for the Record (for 9 June 1952) to HQ, 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, APO 500, 9 June 1952 in the Eddie Deerfield Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Deerfield MFR, date, and collection.
- 24 Deerfield MFR (3 June 1952) sent 5 June 1952, Deerfield Collection.
- 25 Deerfield MFR (3 June 1952) sent 5 June 1952, Deerfield Collection.
- 26 Deerfield MFR (3 June 1952) sent 5 June 1952, Deerfield Collection; Deerfield interview, 17 September 2010.
- 27 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010.
- 28 "U.S. Army Apologizes," *The Nippon Times*, Friday, 30 May 1952, Darcy Collection, Box 2, Folder 10, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
- 29 "ROK Radio Bans 'Voice'," *The Nippon Times*, Friday 30 May 1952, Darcy Collection.
- 30 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 31 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 32 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 33 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010.
- 34 *Life & Times* 2002, 220-222.
- 35 William F. Brown II, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 36 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 37 "Grouper Reports on Poverty and Chaos in War-Torn Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 23, 19 September 1951, 1, 3, Broderick Collection; "Nelson, Brembeck Invade Radio Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951 and "Late News Briefs: Bulletin," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 4 October 1951, 1, Broderick Collection. PFC Hanno Fuchs spent nine days as a radio scriptwriter at *Radio Pusan* from 25 September to 4 October 1951 and 2LT William H. Booth, Operations Research Section, spent five weeks temporary duty (TDY) in Korea from the middle of August until early October 1951.
- 38 CPL John Stoddard, "The Chosen Few," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 27, 3, 8 November 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 39 "Today's Heroes: Korea Christmas Story," *Chicago Times*, 10 December 1951; "Hospitalized Korean Girl Eats Solid Food Again," *Stars and Stripes Pacific*, 14 December 1951, Deerfield Collection; Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010.
- 40 "Group Christmas Cards Available," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 24, 18 October 1951, 1 and "Late News Briefs," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25 October 1951, 1, Broderick Collection. The Graphics Section produced the card. Announcements in *The Proper Gander* said that a thousand copies would reduce the price to 2 ½ cents while five hundred would raise the cost to "a piddling 3 ½ cents apiece." Response was excellent. More than two thousand were printed.
- 41 Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 306.
- 42 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 43 Retired MAJ Nevin F. Price, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 18 September 2009, 30 September 2009, and 21 October 2009, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; 6th RB&L Group, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; *Edge of the News*, Vol. 1, No. 7, 29 May 1953 in Nevin F. Price Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by collection name.
- 44 Price interviews, 18 September 2009, 30 September 2009, and 21 October 2009; *Edge of the News*, Vol. 1, No. 7, 29 May 1953, Price Collection.
- 45 Price interview, 7 October 2009.
- 46 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company T/D 80-8239-2 dated 1 May 1953, Price Collection.
- 47 Price interview, 7 October 2009; "The enlisted personnel of the Mobile Radio platoon are not properly assigned or distributed, therefore accurate discussion of their duties is not possible" read the FECOM T/D 80-8239-2. It also said that "it should be stressed that the technical personnel of an MRBC must be highly specialized and well trained in their duties, as their equipment is of commercial design and is not common throughout the Army." ILT Nevin F. Price's recall of the number of soldiers assigned to the *Radio Pusan* detachment was accurate. The 1 May 1953 T/D had a lieutenant dual-hatted as the platoon commander and program director. Enlisted personnel consisted of a Communications Sergeant (Master Sergeant) dual-hatted as NCOIC, a Supply Sergeant, two Signal Message Clerks (Teletype Operators), a Clerk/Typist, and a Field Wireman. HQ, FECOM. T/D 80-8239-2 dated 1 May 1953, Price Collection.
- 48 HQ, FECOM. T/D 80-8239-2 dated 1 May 1953, Price Collection.
- 49 Price interview, 7 October 2009; ILT Nevin F. Price received an official Certificate of Appreciation from the Republic of Korea government for his humanitarian actions during and after the Pusan fire in October 1953; U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Research and Development Section. Fort Riley, Kansas, report on "Standard Method of Packing AN/MRR-4 and AN/MRT-5 for Overseas Shipment" in Price Collection. Former CPL Nick H. James, 4th MRBC, amplified the advantages of the detachment being co-located with *HKL B* above the beach at Pusan: "We had our own Quonset hut at the transmitter site on a nice beach about ten miles from town. The water was much too cold for swimming unless you were a native, but just right for chilling some brew. Ate and clubbed at an adjacent Engineer company. Really OK duty." *Life and Times* 2002, 190.
- 50 Price interview, 7 October 2009; 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Personnel Roster, 1 February 1953, Darcy Collection, Box 2, File 2, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
- 51 Price interview, 7 October 2009.
- 52 Price interview, 7 October 2009; The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Station AN/MRT-5 was designed to broadcast over distances of 25 to 125 miles. Its operating range was 540 to 1600 kilocycles. ILT Nevin F. Price dramatically increased broadcast range with this simple 'clothes line' antenna. Report on Standard Method of Packing AN/MRR-4 and AN/MRT-5 for Overseas Shipment dated 20 December 1951. Appendix B – Characteristic Sheets Packing Report – Packing Methods for AN/MRR-4 and AN/MRT-5, 1. Price Collection.
- 53 Price interviews, 7 October 2009 and 28 July 2010; Radio Pusan, 4th MRBC, 1st RB&LG, APO 59, Certificate of Transfer of Classified Documents dated 20 January 1954, 4th MRBC, 1st RB&LG, APO 301, Orders Number 35 dated 6 July 1954 and HQ, 1st RB&LG, 8239AU APO 500, Special Orders Number 85 dated 3 June 1954, Price Collection. CPT Nevin F. Price was awarded the Army Commendation Medal for meritorious service in Korea, October 1953 to October 1954.
- 54 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952"; "Ideas in Action," undated *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo), Haynes Collection.
- 55 Deerfield interview, 15 September 2010. The B-17 crash into the North Sea earned T/Sgt Deerfield membership in the Goldfish Club for escaping death in an emergency dinghy on 30 July 1943.
- 56 Deerfield interview, 15 September 2010. Having his life saved by parachute on 26 September 1943 qualified T/Sgt Deerfield for membership in the Caterpillar Club and to receive its distinctive lapel pin.
- 57 Deerfield interview, 15 September 2010. The Army Air Forces Central Technical Training Command at Truax Field, Madison Wisconsin, trained radio operators to be B-29 *Superfortress* crewmen.
- 58 Deerfield interviews, 15 and 16 September 2010.
- 59 Deerfield interviews, 15 and 16 September 2010.
- 60 Price interview, 14 October 2009.
- 61 Price interview, 14 October 2009.
- 62 Price interviews, 30 September 2009 and 9 June 2010.
- 63 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "Major General Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare" at <http://www.soc.mil/psyop/mcclureday.html>, accessed 31 August 2009; Alan H. Smith interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 1 June 2009, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Headquarters, Fort Riley, KS, ALRGO, SUBJECT: Movement Order #18 dated 23 May 1952 in Henry Bast (8th MRBC) Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files hereafter cited by collection name. The T/D for the 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (250-1203), 18 July 50 w/C2 to SR 310-30-1) had 3 officers and 34 enlisted authorized. Bast Collection.
- 64 Price interviews, 18 September 2009, 30 September 2009, and 21 October 2009; 6th RB&L Group. *Edge of the News*, Vol. 1, No. 7, 29 May 1953, Price Collection.

Postscript

Joseph E. Dabney


by Charles H. Briscoe

Sergeant (SGT) Joseph E. Dabney, 4th MRBC, 1st RB&L, was one of several soldiers in the Psywar group advance echelon (ADVON) sent to Japan in July 1951. He was also part of the second 4th MRBC increment charged with making *Radio Pusan* operational in October 1951. Until February 1952, Dabney was a broadcast news script writer on Second Lieutenant (2LT) Eddie Deerfield's team in Korea. A pending compassionate reassignment prompted a recall to Tokyo. While in Korea, the former Columbus (GA) *Ledger-Enquirer* reporter wrote Psywar commentaries for Yun Chul Sung, the popular broadcaster, competing with William F. 'Bill' Morton and Anthony E. 'Tony' Severino to see whose work got the most fan mail from avid Korean listeners. Back in Tokyo, Corporal (CPL) Dabney returned to the *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC) desk as a script writer. The stateside transfer was not approved. Thus, SGT Dabney was present for the May Day riots in 1952. A year later, Mr. Joe Dabney, Florence (SC) *Morning News*, re-lived that day with a feature article "Japanese Reds Lost Their Power on May Day, 1952: Morning News Writer Recalls Tokyo Riots."¹ ▲

These Joe Dabney photos span the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley, KS, Tokyo, Japan, and Pusan, Korea.



PVT Joseph E. Dabney stands outside the entrance to Building 39, Fort Riley, KS, the first home of the 1st RB&L Group (Spring 1951).



"Paradise Pines" was the billet area of the 4th MRBC detachment at *Radio Pusan* (Fall 1951).



Korean refugees collect water from a common spring in Pusan (Fall 1951).



Refugees bringing charcoal up the hill where *Radio Pusan* was located (Fall 1951).

CPL Joe Dabney gets a boot shine outside the 4th MRBC enlisted quarters (Quonset hut) at *Radio Pusan* (Fall 1951).



SGT Joe Dabney poses in front of the Meiji Building [Far East Air Force (FEAF) Headquarters] on 'A' Avenue, Tokyo (Summer 1952).



(L to R) CPLs Bill Morton and Joe Dabney get their picture taken alongside a Korean *papa-san* and his children in Pusan.



1



2



3

The photos above were taken during and after the May Day riots in Tokyo in 1952. They were published in the Florence (SC) *Morning News* on 1 May 1953. (1) 3,000 Communists, shouting "Go Home, Yank" swung off "A" Avenue to engage police in the Imperial Plaza; (2) Beaten back, knots of Communist rioters retreated down "Z" Avenue; (3) Humiliated by defeat, the rioting Reds overturned American cars and set them afire; (4) Police positioned outside the *Dai Ichi* (Number One) Building, the Far East Command (FECOM) headquarters of General Matthew B. Ridgway.

This photo shows the Voice of the UN Command (VUNC) News Section, 1st RB&L Group, in their area of the sixth floor, Empire House, Tokyo. (L to R): Department of Army Civilian (DAC) Alexander Liosnoff, radio information specialist; SGT Joseph Dabney, staff news writer; 2LT Arthur Holch, Officer-in-Charge (background); and SGT Leon Nelson (Spring 1952).





SGT Joseph E. Dabney,
1st RB&L news desk

On 29 January 1929, Joseph Earl Dabney was born, the youngest of five sons, to a grocery store owner in Kershaw, SC, near Springs Mill. He played baseball for Flat Creek High School. As an English/Journalism major at Berry College in Rome, Georgia, he wrote for and became the editor of the school newspaper, *Mount Berry News* and yearbook, the *Cabin Log*, before graduating in May 1949. Following graduation, Dabney took a job with the Cartersville (GA) *Daily-Tribune News* until he went to the Columbus (GA) *Ledger* for double the salary in July 1950. Ironically he received his draft letter

after doing a special on the Fort Benning training of Korean War draftees. After six weeks of Basic Combat Training (BCT) by the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, Fort Jackson, SC, Private (PVT) Dabney was sent to Fort Myer, Virginia, in early 1951, to be evaluated for Psywar assignment. Deemed qualified by his newspaper experience, PVT Dabney boarded a train for Fort Riley, KS.² An early task was to write a *Proper Gander* article on a unit linguist, Sergeant (SGT) Vladimir B. Strakov, a former Soviet Air Force lieutenant who defected.³ Dabney was "bumped" from the contract flight carrying the 1st RB&L advance echelon (ADVON) to Japan in July 1951. The private was left in Honolulu with a telephone number to call when he got to Japan. When he arrived at Haneda Airbase on Sunday afternoon, the young private called and was picked up by a unit jeep. On Monday, PVT Dabney was taken to the 1st RB&L offices and 1LT Alvin Yudkoff assigned him as a script writer for *Voice of the UN Command (VUNC)*.⁴ Three months later, Private First Class (PFC) Dabney accompanied Lieutenants William Eisler and Eddie Deerfield to Korea to get *Radio Pusan* operating. He was one of several broadcast writers in the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) detachment posted at Pusan.⁵

Endnotes

- 1 Joseph E. Dabney, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 12 and 16 December 2011, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Letter, Lee Ki Sung to Yon Chul Son, *Radio Pusan*, 8 October 1951, Joseph E. Dabney Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Joe Dabney, "The Reds' Newest Weapon: 'Kaesong,'" 1st RB&L Group, CCF News Commentary, 4 September 1951, Dabney Collection; "Joe Dabney's Father Passes, January 26," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 4 (14 February 1952), 1, Dabney Collection; Joe Dabney, "Japanese Reds Lost Their Power on May Day, 1952: Morning News Writer Recalls Tokyo Riots," Florence (SC) *Morning News*, Friday, 1 May 1953, 2-A, Dabney Collection.
- 2 Dabney interview, 12 December 2011.
- 3 PVT Joe Dabney, "Starkov Baring USSR in Book: Ford, GM Sold Ex-Russian Airman on U.S.," *The Proper Gander* (26 April 1951), Dabney Collection.
- 4 Dabney interview, 12 December 2011.
- 5 Dabney interview, 16 December 2011; "Morton, Deerfield, Dabney to Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (21 November 1951), 1, Dabney Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

FLYING HIGH

The 4th MRBC Antenna Riggers




by Charles H. Briscoe

Media broadcasters personify the image of radio and television stations. Audiences elevate the most popular like Walter Cronkite and Rush Limbaugh to celebrity status. Voice quality and a convincing tone further acceptance by listeners and facilitate recognition. However, to broaden interest and achieve marketing success voice broadcasts have to be transmitted long distances. Antennas provide direction and range to electrically boosted radio wave transmissions. The U.S. Army soldiers who erect and maintain this critical link in radio broadcasting and long range reception are called antenna riggers.

This article will explain what the antenna riggers of the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC), 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) did,

Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, circa 1951



Not included in reduced strength company.

The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Platoons in the MRBC were capable of operating independently. Each platoon had four antenna riggers in the Radio Service Section.

when and where they did it, and the equipment they used during the Korean War. Articles from the 1st RB&L weekly newspaper, *The Proper Gander*, contemporary news stories, veteran interviews, official documents, U.S. Army field manuals (FMs), and the unit “yearbooks” for 1952 and 2002 provided information. To appreciate the accomplishments of these Psywarriors during the Korean War, an understanding of the 4th MRBC organization, missions, and capabilities is needed.

According to its Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1203 effective 18 July 1950, the 4th MRBC was to “conduct strategic propaganda by radio broadcasting against an enemy and disseminating information to friendly elements in enemy-held territory.”¹ The headquarters included a small radio (Morse Code) monitoring section. Each of the three mobile radio broadcasting platoons were authorized four officers and twenty-two enlisted soldiers.² As organized radio platoon personnel could operate as small independent detachments to meet immediate mission requirements. This capability was critical key in the summer of 1951 when Seoul and a significant part of South Korea were controlled by the Communists for a second time.

Independent broadcasting was not possible without radios, receivers, transmitters, and antennas. Three new commercial radio systems (specially-modified for mobility) and antenna sets accompanied the last large 1st RB&L contingent to Japan in mid-September 1951. Seven officers and sixty-three enlisted men and the large MRBC unit equipment came to Yokohama aboard the USNS *General John Pope*. During the voyage “vigilance was maintained against Saboteurs, Communist Guerrillas, and Apaches” by dedicated Psywarriors. The “alert guardians” disembarked from the *Pope* in OD (olive drab) uniforms, combat boots, helmets, and packs with duffle bags, overnight bags, and carbines in hand to join “the Fighting First at GHQ.”³ Among them were the antenna riggers from the three mobile radio platoons.

While being bussed to the Finance Building in Tokyo, antenna rigger Private First Class (PFC) Keith H. McDaniel,




Gates Radio in Quincy, IL hosted several orientations for Army Psywarriors in 1951.

Previous page: Each mobile radio station was equipped with ten-foot triangular sections of antenna for assembling towers. CPL Claybourne H. Mass is pictured here.

KBS TOWER

365 FT



A snatch block pulley lifting apparatus, or 'gin pole,' was used to assemble towers.

MRBC TOWER

180 FT



Towers ranged from 180 to 365 feet high, making work on them only for those sure of foot and comfortable with heights.

mimicking actor John Wayne warning his Marine squad in *Sands of Iwo Jima*, told his buddies, "Be careful. This place is crawling with Japs" and got a good laugh. Initial orientation classes were followed by weekend passes in Tokyo. An opportunity to "test" the antenna rigger complement came shortly thereafter.⁴

Each mobile radio platoon in 1951 had four antenna riggers (MOS 3189) assigned to the Radio Service Section: one Sergeant (SGT), a Corporal (CPL), a PFC, and a Private (PVT).⁵ Some assigned members had been trained as Signal Corps telephone wiremen while others were Combat Engineers with antenna destruction training. Wiremen were taught to climb telephone poles that rarely exceeded 35 feet while the engineers focused on using demolitions to topple radio towers.⁶ The riggers were not trained in erecting tall antenna towers.

Each platoon mobile radio station was equipped with a 180-foot "Erector set-style" three-sided transmitter antenna tower (AB-127/FR). The assembled ten-foot sections of antenna were progressively lofted skyward, and bolted to the others until reaching optimal height.⁷ However, *Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)* towers still standing ranged from 250 to 365 feet high and new replacements from *Nippon Electric* in Tokyo were similar. Because not all assigned riggers were comfortable being, let alone working, above the ground, the antenna "climbers" had to be identified before they went to Korea.⁸

The *Radio Yokohama* antennas became the testing ground. A pair of 250-foot triangular, steel girder radio towers was located on a small island in the harbor. The best MRBC climbers joined the two towers with interconnecting wires while other antenna riggers installed a radial system of concrete-shored guy wires around the base to provide more stability. Both missions were accomplished, but not without a few trying moments on the towers for some personnel.⁹ While a radio detachment had been operating *Radio Pusan* from that KBS facility since early September 1951, the success of the UN late winter offensive allowed expansion to other sites.

On 17 January 1952, Signal Corps Second Lieutenant (2LT) Paul C. Kennedy took six antenna riggers to *Radio Pusan* to support the repatriated KBS facilities. SGT Kenneth D. Sexton was in charge of Corporals William S. Keenan, Robert C. Johnson, and Robert S. Adams, Robert J. Kaufeldt and newly-promoted Keith H. McDaniel.¹⁰ "The rest of the riggers had gone to *Gates Radio* in Quincy, Illinois, with SGT James O. Justice for training. SGT Eugene N. Deschenes, CPLs Kenneth D. Sexton, and James A. Clancy and PFCs Billy J. Eakes, Albert F. Schroeder, Felix Gonzalez, Charles Butler, and me followed them a few weeks later," recalled CPL Claybourne A. Mass.¹¹

The Allied entry point for South Korea in early 1952 was still Pusan. "The Perimeter was jammed with people, most squatting where they could. Thousands of starving, homeless children with bloated bellies were everywhere. Pusan was our first dose of real cold. We were billeted in a Quonset hut with LT Eddie Deerfield's *Radio Pusan* team. They lived and worked next to the



Note: The remainder of the 4th MRBC arrived in Seoul on Valentine's Day in February 1952 to establish the company headquarters in Korea. From the South Korean capital they supported radio teams in Pusan, Taegu, Seoul, Taejon, and temporary outlying stations.

and disconnected the 'gin pole.' With the 'gin pole' over my shoulder, I climbed up to the top, unhooking and reattaching my safety strap as I went."¹⁴ Riggers worked an antenna tower in pairs.

CPL Billy J. Eakes stressed how hard and difficult it was working on a tower. "Two climbers worked on a tower together. Our wrenches were open jaw, not adjustable *Crescents*. Manipulating the screw mechanism on a *Crescent* wrench while wearing gloves was too difficult on the tower. We did a couple of sections and then took a break. A day's effort was usually four to six sections," remembered Eakes."¹⁵ It was also dangerous on the ground during construction.

"The antenna guys on the ground wore their steel pots, avoided the ever expanding danger ring directly below us, and maintained an alert eye upward. It was cold and windy working on the tower and you dropped things occasionally. By the time the guys down below heard a warning yell, it was too late. The object was at least halfway to the ground," recalled McDaniel. "Guy wire tension was regularly adjusted to keep the antenna tower vertical. I used my dog tags as a field expedient plumb bob. It was simple, but it worked."¹⁶ After the

KBS station on a hill overlooking the harbor. Three times a day we walked down that hill for meals with another outfit. Showers were close to the train station," remembered CPL Keith McDaniel.¹² The antenna sets, AN/MRT-5A tuning shelters, and 6 x 6 trucks to carry them were waiting for the riggers.

The crated antenna systems and tuning shelters had arrived by ship from Decatur Army Signal Depot, IL. They were stored in a burned-out warehouse on the Pusan docks. Two 6 x 6 trucks and a trailer were needed to carry one antenna set, the antenna tuning shelter, a generator, and a half dozen riggers with their individual equipment.¹³

CPL McDaniel explained, "The first antenna to be erected was at Pusan by the ocean. It was a 180-footer with a blinking aerial warning light. The original KBS tower had been hit by lightning several times. When we arrived the resistor ball was just lying on the ground. We mixed our own cement to 'fix' the antenna base and thirty-four guy wire supports [augers and anchor rods]. As soon as the first section of antenna was assembled, vertically locked into the base, and stabilized by guy wires, I strapped on my rigger belt with tool bag containing wrenches, nuts and bolts, and small sledge hammer. Then, I put my leather safety strap around my waist and began climbing the ladder side to the top of that first ten foot section to rig a 'gin pole' [snatch block pulley lifting apparatus]. This enabled the men below to winch up the next section which I bolted to the first section. Then I moved the guy wires up to the next level



Typically two climbers worked on a tower, here CPL Keith McDaniel (facing) is working a tower above the Han River.

antenna was erected, the light and radio transmitter had to be installed at the top.

The radio transmitter and the antenna required tuning to be functional. After connecting the transmission line, operators calibrated the transmitter and antenna from the Antenna Tuning Shelter (S56/GRC) mounted in their 6 x 6 truck bed. This was the final touch to a complicated construction project that spanned a 400 square feet area on the ground. The antenna, resting on a steel base plate, was grounded by thirty-six 200-foot wires radiating outward every 10 degrees, and kept erect by a skeletal cone-shaped system of guy wires. A wire fence was erected around the "field" by a local Korean work gang.¹⁷ This simple mission was a good rehearsal for Taegu.

The *Radio Taegu* team, led by First Lieutenants (1LT) Ernest H. Luick and Jack G. Morris, initially shared an old factory building with the 62nd Engineer Topographical (Topo) Company supporting Eighth Army (EUSA). The KBS station was located outside of Taegu. While topo engineers enlarged 1/50,000 WWII Japanese map sheets to 1/25,000 scale and converted aerial photos into maps, the *Radio Taegu* group focused on getting *HLKG* back into operation.¹⁸ SGT Eugene S. Deschenes, the team antenna rigger, taught CPL Arnold Tepfer, a Cooper Union (NYC) electrical engineer (1949) *cum laude* "jack of all trades" how to drive. Tepfer became proficient on the 6 x 6 truck, 5/4 weapons carrier, and a Russian [former North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA)] jeep. The fixed station radio repairman took over Deschenes' daily job of collecting Korean day laborers and transporting them to and from the antenna site. He also was the detachment typist.¹⁹

On 18 May 1952, *Radio Taegu, HLKG*, went on the air. It had the most powerful radio beam on the Korean peninsula. Installing the 10 KW high-power transmitter became a joint 4th MRBC/KBS mission done by radiomen, antenna riggers, and technicians. The Japanese-made antenna was topped by twin halo ring transmitter-receivers.²⁰ Republic of Korea (ROK) officials recognized the 4th MRBC antenna riggers for their work.

During the *Radio Taegu* dedication ceremony, the ROK Director of Public Information, Dr. Clarence Ryee, presented their Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) to the 4th MRBC radio and rigger teams, the 1st RB&L, the Far East Command (FECOM) G-3 Psywar Section, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) G-3 Psywar Section, and the 1st L&L Company. Major General (MG) Lee Jeung Chan, Chief of Staff, ROK Army presented Defense Ministry Commendation Certificates to twelve 1st RB&L personnel (LTC Shields, CPT Leadley, and LTs Eilers, Luick, Deerfield, Frank H. Preston, Jr., Brembeck, Terry Stose, and Roy Guth, CPLs Devere Doerr and Tepfer and PFC Victor Lee), FECOM Psywar, EUSA G-3 Psywar, and 1st L&L officers.²¹ Born in the States, but raised in P'yongyang, PFC Lee translated for the senior U.S. officers during the ceremony. He joined the U.S. Army after escaping the North Korean capital with his mother and sister when his Protestant minister father was taken away by the Communists.²² Visits from the Tokyo Psywarrior leadership seemed coincidental.

CPL Tepfer was quite direct: "Bi-monthly visits by Tokyo 'brass' were calculated. They came to Korea a day or two before end of month and stayed a few days into the next. Candidly, they were playing the two months combat



Psywarriors representing the FECOM and EUSA elements were awarded the ROK Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) by Dr. Clarence Ryee, the ROK Director of Public Information, at the inauguration of *Radio Taegu* on 18 May 1952. Standing L to R: COL J. Woodall Greene, FECOM G-3 Psywar, LTC Homer E. Shields and MAJ Robert A. Leadley (1st RB&L), LTC Claude Matchett (EUSA G-3 Psywar), 2LT Eddie Deerfield (4th MRBC *Radio Pusan*), 1LT Jerry Stose (1st RB&L), MAJ Phillip Loomis (EUSA G-3 Psywar), and CPT Herbert Avedon (1st L&L); Squatting L to R: 2LT Roy Guth, PFC Victor Lee, CPL Arnold Tepfer, 1LT William J. Eilers, CPL Devere Doerr, and 1LT Ernest H. Luick (4th MRBC, 1st RB&L).



ROK Presidential Unit Citation (PUC)



CPL Arnold Tepfer, the fixed station radio repairman at *Radio Taegu*, was presented a ROK Defense Ministry Commendation Certificate by MG Lee Jeung Chan, Chief of Staff, ROK Army, during the inauguration of the station on 18 May 1952.

pay game.”²³ The riggers missed the Tokyo visitors. They had returned to Seoul, where significant progress had been made at *HLKA*.

According to the 4th MRBC *Ye Olde Broadcastre* of 28 April 1952, the antenna rigger team had to offload a new Japanese 10 KW transmitter and antenna (180 feet) filling a boxcar and two gondola cars in the Seoul railyard. It took all available personnel a day to unload 106 heavy wooden crates for their new job: Taejon.²⁴ But, instead of driving to Taejon, the riggers had to go by railroad which meant reloading everything aboard another train.

The most exciting part of the Taejon assignment was getting there via ammunition train. With their trucks and antenna tuning shelter loaded aboard a flatcar and the 10 KW transmitter and antenna crates in boxcars, the riggers climbed into a *Pullman* car. Unfortunately, the Pusan-Taejon railway was a favorite guerrilla target. All windows were kept open in the *Pullman* so the “passengers” could take up firing positions with their carbines. It was a dirty, smelly cold ride. The antenna men arrived without incident covered with soot and reeking of coal smoke.²⁵

The KBS antenna site for *Radio Taejon* provided another surprise. Korean day laborers had disinterred numerous remains from an unmarked grave site while digging antenna ground wire trenches. When the American rigger team arrived, a pile of bodies was awaiting removal. The area had to be thoroughly fumigated before the thirty-six wires could be buried and cement poured for the guy wire augers.²⁶

“The antenna site selected for *Radio Taejon* could best be described as an outpost,” said CPL McDaniel. “It was by an old building with some old barbed wire around it. There were no Americans anywhere around...just a pile of dead Koreans. We had our 6 x 6 truck carrying the antenna shelter and another loaded with personal gear and C-Rations. Every day we unloaded crated equipment from the railhead and hauled it to the work site. There was a well nearby for water, so we used halazone tablets. I became suspicious of the taste and took some to the field hospital for testing. The water was contaminated. The lab technician recommended that we get some local Koreans



1LT Robert B. Shall, Radio Officer for the *Radio Seoul* detachment, sits outside the entrance of *HLKA*.



The 4th MRBC antenna riggers installed a new double-doublet (T-bar) mast atop the *Radio Seoul* antenna to improve reception quality from *Radio Pusan*.



PFCs Frank Poulalion and Bob Carroll along with another rigger batten down Seoul's new antenna.



4th MRBC Rigger CPLs Bob Adams and Bill Keenan with others install fencing to prevent sabotage.



CPL Billy J. Eakes works aloft with two other riggers.

to check the well for bodies. Sure enough, they found six. They were pulled out, but we never drank that water again. We filled up water cans at the hospital.”²⁷

“Since we were all alone out there,” continued McDaniel. “We took turns pulling guard shifts at night and kept a guy posted on the high ground while we worked. It was really cold at night. Even with folding cots, I slept in a sleeping bag with my clothes on and a parka over me. Since we were exposed, alone, and had no radio [to talk with *Radio Taejon*], we did that job in record time and took off for Seoul as soon as we finished.”²⁸

CPL McDaniel and several riggers first climbed the *Nippon Electric* antenna to inspect the assembly by the Koreans. CPL Tepfer, who carried the local laborers from *Taeju* in a 6 x 6, remembered watching the antenna erection: “I admired how the Koreans put it up. It was obvious that they were ‘learning as they went.’ They got three or four sections up. Since they had not tightened the guy wires properly, the tower started swaying. Three workman on the structure were hanging on for dear life as the ground men scrambled around below to set tension on all sides using ‘Kentucky windage.’ It was something to behold. No wonder our guys wanted to inspect it before installing the transmitter.”²⁹ The assembly was determined to be safe, so the MRBC riggers proceeded to install the 10 KW transmitter/receiver on top. After checking reception from various locations, a barbed wire fence was put up around the antenna field and the American antenna men left for Seoul, driving instead of taking the train.³⁰ It was CPL Clifford M.G. Kim, a *Radio Taejon* powerman, who reported that the tower had “254 rungs” and “a wonderful view from the top” which meant that it was more than 300-feet high.³¹ At Seoul more work awaited the rigger team.

Repairing the *Radio Seoul* antenna towers was the toughest and most dangerous mission undertaken by the 4th MRBC riggers. Their twin RCA radio antenna towers had been seriously damaged by shrapnel, shellfire, and bullets during two Communist takeovers and subsequent recoveries by UN forces in October 1950 and April 1952. CPL McDaniel described the task: “The 270-foot and 365-foot antenna towers, linked together by cable, were ten miles north of Seoul. That was a really big job. We had three riggers working aloft at the same



To get to antenna sites trucks and an antenna shelter were loaded aboard a flatcar of an ammunition train with the transmitter and antenna crates in boxcars. The riggers boarded *Pullman* cars like the one shown above. The Pusan-Taejon railway was a favorite guerrilla target. (Photo courtesy of John Rich)


time, Eakes [Billy J.], Keenan [William S.], and me. Below, there were three watchers constantly keeping track of us. Working that high up we dropped a lot because the 'pucker factor' was real high," chuckled McDaniel.³² "There were lots of steps missing on the 270 footer. It looked like Swiss cheese," recalled CPL Eakes. "The 365-foot tower was in pretty good shape. When we were done Billy Keenan and I climbed it so he could take pictures with his Brownie camera."³³

McDaniel continued. "Remember, those towers were assembled like giant *Erector* sets. Damaged girder sections had to be replaced. We had rusted nuts to loosen and remove. Bolts usually had to be hammered out so there was a lot of flying debris. The broken and damaged sections were lashed to the 'gin pole pulley' and tediously lowered to the ground by the guys down below. Replacement sections were gang-pulled upward to us, from 20 to 365 feet in the air. It was scary and exciting both. 'Hanging in the breeze' was cold, hard physical work. We wore field jackets with soft caps and leather gloves. When I climbed down after several hours aloft I was whipped. On the tower at dusk the artillery firing along the front line looked like lightning in a West Texas thunderstorm," said McDaniel.³⁴ "The final part was installing a double-doublet mast atop the 365-footer to improve reception quality from *Pusan*. It was several weeks before we finished that job. We trucked out and back to the compound every day."³⁵

In between jobs the antenna riggers relaxed in Seoul. Their only regular mission was to inspect the antenna towers and accompany the tuners as they calibrated broadcast signals around the transmitter site. The riggers enjoyed mess hall food, hot showers, the beer ration, access to a post exchange, and a nearby, raucous Korean vaudeville show. After a 4th MRBC studio engineer accidentally shot himself CPLs McDaniel and Mass volunteered for some adventure.

"Supplies were ready to be picked up at Kunsan, about 120 miles from Seoul. The bad news was that 70 miles

Erected or Repaired Antenna Towers:



Radio Seoul	HLKA	10 KW	970 KC
		10 KW	2510 KC
		1 KW	7953 KC
Radio Pusan	HLKB	5 KW	800 KC
Radio Iri	HLKF	500 W	570 KC
Radio Taegu	HLKG	10 KW	710 KC
Radio Kwang-ji	HLKH	500 W	780 KC
Radio Dae-jon	HLKI	10 KW	880 KC
Radio Chun'chon	HLKM	300 W	1230 KC
Radio Mok'po	HLKN	500 W	650 KC
Radio Masan	HLKO	50 W	600 KC
Radio Chong-ju	HLKQ	500 W	600 KC
Radio Kangneung	HLKR	500 W	650 KC
Radio Cheju	HLKS	500 W	1080 KC
Radio Namwon	HLKL	500 W	1030 KC ⁴⁰



HLKF	570 KC	이리	HLKN	1080 KC	목포
HLKH	780 KC	광주	HLKO	600 KC	마산
HLKQ	600 KC	충주	HLKS	1080 KC	제주
HLKG	710 KC	대구	HLKI	880 KC	대전
HLKA	800 KC	부산	HLKA2	970 KC	서울

of the trip was in guerrilla-controlled territory where the people were not very friendly. A trucker had been shot in the leg and two fellas in a jeep were beheaded by a wire across the road. The toughest rigger, [CPL] Clay Mass, agreed to go along as long as we got extra ammo for our carbines. I took ninety rounds and we set off in a 6 X 6 truck. The first 45 miles was easy until we blew a tire. Claybourne had changed a 'six by' tire, but I never had. Still, we did it in record time! The 'pucker factor' was real high. By the time we got loaded up, it was pouring down rain. Just outside of Kunsan, we picked up a Catholic

The original KBS station site in Pusan above the beach proved to be the best location.



nun with a dozen orphan kids. In retrospect, that simple act of kindness probably saved our lives," reflected CPL Keith McDaniel.³⁷ That incident was short lived because SGT Kenneth Sexton selected a team of riggers for a Pusan assignment.

They were going to erect another transmitter tower to supplement those already in use. "Since they will be living at the site, the men will undoubtedly have one of the finest billets in the Far East ['Paradise Pines'] this summer. It is a few yards from a beach and ocean," wrote CPL John "Stod" Stoddard in *The Proper Gander*.³⁸ Instead of a large 10 KW transmitter like the one installed at Taegu in mid-May, *Radio Pusan* was putting a high power 5 KW 800 KC (kilocycles) model atop a 180-foot antenna. During the inauguration by ROK officials and KBS staff on 19 July 1952 Lieutenants William J. Eilers and Edwin M. Sjolholm, Jr. (*Radio Seoul*) and CPLs Stephen Radgowski, Nicholas H. James, and Arnold Tepfer from *Radio Pusan* were guests along with antenna riggers, SGT Sexton and CPLs Eakes, Mass, McDaniel, Kennan, and Gonzalez.³⁹ By then, the 4th MRBC had helped to rebuild KBS radio stations all over South Korea and would continue supporting them until late 1954. The antenna riggers had erected or repaired antenna towers at thirteen locations.

In summary, the 4th MRBC radio and antenna teams rebuilt the KBS with American funded equipment and technical expertise. Starting with *Radio Pusan*, antenna teams moved to Taegu, Seoul, and Taejon repairing, replacing, and augmenting radio transmitter/receiver towers and maintained them afterwards. *Radio Pusan* remained the 1st RB&L Psywar radio "hub" in Korea throughout the war. The Armistice brought attendant personnel reductions. The 1953 FECOM T/D reduced the number of antenna riggers in the 4th MRBC Radio Platoons to one, a Senior Rigger sergeant, because the mission had dwindled to sustainment.⁴¹ Quite simply, the MRBC antenna riggers worked themselves out of a job. ♣

CPL Billy J. Eakes,
4th MRBC Antenna Rigger

Billy Joe Eakes was born 4 May 1930 in Dyer, TN, the youngest of seven children. After graduation from Yorkville High School in 1948, he worked on the family farm until getting his draft notice on 12 February 1951. Eakes followed two older brothers (WWII veterans) into the military. Eakes remembered little about BCT at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, except some knot tying classes which seemed absurd. Climbing "came natural" to him and he was awarded a 3189 Rigger MOS. The USNS General John Pope brought him to Yokohama on 11 October 1951.



CPL Keith H. McDaniel,
4th MRBC Antenna Rigger

Born 24 June 1927 in Odell, Texas, Keith Hart McDaniel was the only child of a land agent and housewife. After lettering in several sports in high school, McDaniel left Odell after graduation in 1946, headed for the University of Southern California. Following a semester he went to work at Convair Aircraft in Fort Worth, Texas, assembling the six-engine B-36 Peacemaker bomber. In 1951 McDaniel was drafted and sent to Fort Leonard Wood, MO, for Basic Combat Training (BCT) before going to Engineer Basic at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A three month Antenna Riggers Course followed. He learned to build, erect, and disable antennas with explosives. The antennas ranged from fifty to three hundred and sixty-five feet high. McDaniel, not bothered by heights, finished in the top quarter of his class. Then, he was sent to Fort Riley, Kansas, to the 4th MRBC, 1st RB&L Group. His prep training for overseas consisted of Psywar radio broadcasting, propaganda leaflet production, radio operations, and basic electrical classes. There was no antenna practical work; the mobile radio antennas were shipped directly to Korea from Gates Radio in Quincy, Illinois. McDaniel and fifteen 1st RB&L men joined 5,200 troops aboard the USNS General John Pope headed to Japan in early September 1951.⁴²



CPL Arnold Tepfer,
4th MRBC Fixed Radio
Station Repairman

Born 4 August 1928 in New York City, the only child of a school teacher father and pharmacist mother, Arnold Tepfer graduated from the Bronx High School of Science in 1945. He took advantage of the free engineering (Cooper Union) and arts schools to complete a BEE (Bachelors in Electrical Engineering) in 1949. Tepfer worked for Belmont Electrical for a year before reuniting with his neighborhood friends at the local Draft Board. He spent Thanksgiving and Christmas in BCT (six weeks) at Fort Dix, NJ. After a couple of weeks as a cadre instructor, Tepfer was sent to Fort Myer, VA 7001st ASU (Army Service Unit) Technical Detachment for interview, given a Fixed Radio Station Repairman MOS, and assigned to 1st RB&L, Fort Riley, KS. Tepfer, an original on the Radio Taegu team, assisted Radio Taejon, and completed his tour at Radio Pusan.



Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Army Field Forces. Fort Monroe, VA. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1203, Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, Radio and Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950, Robert L. Darcy Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA, hereafter cited by collection name.
- 2 HQ, U.S. Army Forces Far East Command, APO 343 c/o PM San Francisco, CA. T/D Number 80-8239-2, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit, APO 301 dated 1 May 1953, retired Major Nevin F. Price Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by collection name.
- 3 "Goslings See Frisco; Blue Pacific, On Trip," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 24, 1, 2, 18 October 1951, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as *The Proper Gander* with date and collection.
- 4 Keith H. McDaniel, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 5 and 6 October 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 5 Army Field Forces T/D 250-1203 dated 18 July 1950, Darcy Collection.
- 6 McDaniel, interviews, 5 and 6 October 2010.
- 7 1st RB&L Group, Fort Riley, KS. Program of Instruction. Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company POI: AN/MRT-5A and AN/MRR-4A, Price Collection.
- 8 According to the 1st RB&L Program of Instruction (POI) for a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (undated), "The riggers erect the transmitter antenna tower, lay the ground system, assemble and raise the temporary balloon antenna (MX-591/GR). They may also erect receiving antennas as required by the platoon monitoring section." The balloon antennas were not shipped to Korea. Only the 6th RB&L at Fort Riley, KS, and Fort Bragg, NC, and the U.S. Army Reserve RB&Ls employed balloon antennas. Price Collection; McDaniel interviews, 5 and 6 October 2010.
- 9 McDaniel, interviews, 5 and 6 October 2010; Billy J. Eakes, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 13 May 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Robert Kaufeldt, "Personal Remarks," in Thomas M. Klein, Robert J. Herguth, and Robert McConaughy, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: 1952 Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group...50 Years Later 2002* (Round Hill, GA: Round Hill Productions, 2002), 192, hereafter cited as *Life & Times 2002*.
- 10 "Riggers Leave for Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 4, 17 January 1952, Broderick Collection; Headquarters and Service Command, General Headquarters Far East Command, 8234d Army Unit APO 500 Letter Order Number 14-8, SUBJECT: Temporary Duty dated 15 January 1952, McDaniel Collection.
- 11 Claybourne A. Mass, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 18 October 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; McDaniel interview, 5 October 2010.
- 12 McDaniel interviews, 5 and 6 October 2010.
- 13 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010; 1st RB&L POI: Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, Price Collection.
- 14 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010.
- 15 Eakes interview, 13 May 2011.
- 16 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010.
- 17 Arnold Tepfer, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 November 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; 1st RB&L Mobile Radio Broadcasting POI: AN/MRT-5A and AN/MRR-4A, Price Collection.
- 18 Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010; John Milhaupt, "Marilyn Monroe Calendar Scoundrel" (Entry 61071), 62nd Engineer Topographic Co, <http://www.koreanwar.org/html/units/62topo.htm> accessed 1/13/2011.
- 19 Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010.
- 20 CPL Burton C. "Bud" Perfit, "ROK Defense Ministry Commendations Given to 15 Psywarriors," *The Proper Gander*, 19 May 1952, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 21 ROK Defense Ministry Commendation Certificates were presented to LTC Homer E. Shields, CPT Robert A. Leadley, LTs William J. Eilers, Eddie Deerfield, Frank H. Preston, Jr., Ernest H. Luick, Jack F. Brembeck, Terry Stose, and Roy Guth, CPLs Devere Doerr and Arnold Tepfer, and PFC Victor Lee, 1st RB&L, COL J. Woodall Greene, FECOM Psywar, LTC Claude Matchette and MAJ Phillip Loomis, EUSA G-3 Psywar, and CPT Herbert Avedon, 1st L&L. Perfit, "ROK Defense Ministry Commendations Given to 15 Psywarriors," *The Proper Gander*, 19 May 1952, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 22 *Life & Times 2002*, 202-203.
- 23 Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010.
- 24 "Ambitious Riggers," *Ye Olde Broadcastre*, Vol. I, No. 8, 1, 28 April 1952, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, Seoul, Korea, McDaniel Collection.
- 25 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010; Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010; Tepfer, "Personal Remarks," in *Life & Times*, 2002, 239.
- 26 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010; Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010; Tepfer, "Personal Remarks," in *Life & Times 2002*, 239.
- 27 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010.
- 28 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010.
- 29 Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010.
- 30 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010; Tepfer interview, 2 November 2010; Tepfer, "Personal Remarks," in *Life & Times 2002*, 239.
- 31 "From Taejon," *Ye Olde Broadcastre*, Vol. I, No. 8, 1, 2, 28 April 1952, McDaniel Collection.
- 32 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010; Eakes interview, 13 May 2011.
- 33 Eakes interview, 13 May 2011.
- 34 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010.
- 35 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010; "This and That around Seoul" and "Double-Doulet," *Ye Olde Broadcastre*, Vol. 1, No. 8, 1, 2, 28 April 1952, McDaniel Collection.
- 36 McDaniel interview, 6 October 2010.
- 37 "This And That Around Seoul," *Ye Olde Broadcastre*, Vol. I, No. 8, 1, 28 April 1952, McDaniel Collection; McDaniel interviews, 6 October 2010 and 23 April 2012.
- 38 John Stoddard, "The Chosen Few," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, 19 May 1952, 2, Broderick Collection.
- 39 Office of Public Information. Republic of Korea. KBS Pusan Radio Station. Invitation to Inauguration Ceremony for High Power (5 KW) Transmitter, 19 July 1952, McDaniel Collection.
- 40 Office of Public Information. Republic of Korea. KBS Pusan Radio Station. Invitation to Inauguration Ceremony for High Power (5 KW) Transmitter, 19 July 1952, McDaniel Collection.
- 41 FECOM, T/D Number 80-8239-2, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company dated 1 May 1953, Price Papers.
- 42 McDaniel interview, 5 October 2010; U.S. Army. The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, VA. Enlisted Courses. Grades – Group 4: Rigging Course (MOS 3189), Co. N – 2nd Sch Bn (19 Feb 51-30 Mar 51) and 1st RB&L Group, Fort Riley, KS. Certificate for Personal Affairs and Atomic Energy III training dated 30 August 1951, McDaniel Collection.

Pusan harbor as viewed from the Radio
Pusan hilltop location (Fall 1951).

The 4th MRBC in **Japan** & **Korea**, 1951-1952

by Charles H. Briscoe



Shortly after the main body of the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) arrived in Tokyo in early August 1951, the Far East Command (FECOM) adjusted its strategic Psywar priorities. *Radio Tokyo* program management was number one. Inherent in that mission was responsibility for *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC) because broadcasting would originate from *Radio Tokyo* studios. Second Lieutenant (2LT) William F. Brown, II, the 1st RB&L Psywar officer at Kaesong, Korea, was the first UN line of defense against Communist disinformation and propaganda during the Armistice talks. His daily teletype reports served as the official UN statement on the status of negotiations.¹ Restoring the *Korean Broadcasting System* (KBS) radio stations to full operation was the 1st RB&L second priority.² Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, the Psywar group commander, functionally realigned his staff, “dual-hatted” the most experienced officers, and pulled in talent from his subordinate units to begin addressing FECOM priorities.


Organizationally the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) had the majority of assets in the 1st RB&L for radio broadcasting missions in Japan and Korea. The pressure to field the 1st RB&L, get officers and soldiers Psywar-trained, and deploy overseas left little time to practice collective unit tasks, solidify assignments, and develop work procedures. The internal restructuring had little impact on the soldiers because the 1st RB&L had a large number of WWII veteran lieutenants and captains whose leadership and management skills included professional writing,

commercial radio, television, publishing, and advertising experience. Shifting priorities were taken in stride.³ The reshuffling was done while the soldiers settled into billets, got oriented in Japan, learned staffing procedures, created work areas, and became familiar with their duties.⁴

This article shows how the 4th MRBC adjusted to theater Psywar priorities in Japan and Korea and conducted “combat” training. The explanation shifts back and forth between Korea and Japan until mid-February 1952 when company headquarters relocated to Seoul. Veterans discuss their jobs, the challenges, and overseas duty. The reader will be kept current on soldier activities in Tokyo and Korea. Weekly 1st RB&L newspaper articles from *The Proper Gander*, contemporary commercial news articles, veteran interviews, U.S. Army FMs and TMs (Field Manuals and Technical Manuals), U.S. Army General School, Psywar Division POIs (Programs of Instruction), official documents, the USNS *General Brewster* personnel manifest, and the unit “yearbooks” (1952 and 2002) provided invaluable source material. Once in Japan, the 1st RB&L quickly adjusted to its wartime requirements.

1st RB&L broadcast script writers and programmers were consolidated to support *Radio Tokyo* and VUNC. The Headquarters & Headquarters Company had one Sergeant First Class (SFC) chief script writer and three script writer Sergeants (SGT) with the same MOS (military occupation specialty): 0288.⁵ The majority of soldiers with this MOS were assigned to the Programming Section, 4th MRBC, under the direction of Captain (CPT) Frederick P. Laffey.

1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group and 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, circa 1951



The majority of the Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (RB&L) radio broadcast programmers and script writers were assigned to the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) by Army Field Forces, Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1201 dated 18 July 1950.

(Previous page) CPL ‘Sig’ Front organized the *Radio Seoul* “Tape Team” around Choi Sung Ju, a well-known prewar South Korean radio broadcaster. Capturing and having “local voices” explain activities added credibility to the efforts of KBS.

Since the situation in Korea had not stabilized sufficiently to relocate the MRBC there, the simple solution was to attach all script writers and programmers to the Group S-3 Radio Section. Thus, soldiers with journalism degrees or writing experience were summarily detached from the 3rd Reproduction (Repro) Company. The programmers and script writers were moved into the programming department of *Radio Tokyo* to learn production, draft propaganda messages and news reports, and develop as announcers.⁶ Since the studios of *Radio Tokyo* would be used for *VUNC* initially, both requirements were covered by this manpower shift.

The rationale for the reorganization and broadcast duty rotations in Korea was provided by CPT Edward C. Janicik, Group S-3: "Creative writers and technicians of Radio Operations need actual field experience in the combat area so that their work can be more accurate and effective. Conversely, it is important for [4th MRBC] Korea personnel to gain experience in Tokyo, programming, writing, and producing Psywar programs. The quality of work will be greatly improved by these on-the-spot orientations."⁷

While the rest of 1st RB&L reorganized to accomplish the top FECOM priority, Psywar broadcasting from *Radio Tokyo* and the creation of *VUNC*, LTC Shields had to assess the KBS facility in Pusan. Rebuilding South Korea's radio stations was his number two priority. In mid-August 1951, he chose Chemical Corps 2LT Jack F. Brembeck, who had Army Expeditionary Radio Station experience in postwar Italy, to evaluate and supervise KBS operations in the Korean port city.⁸

2LT Brembeck, script writer Corporals (CPL) John L. "Stod" Stoddard and Alvin R. "Al" Busse, and Private First Class (PFC) Leon H. "Lee" Nelson, a programmer, were to write and broadcast daily news and commentaries on current events. This was critical because the South Korean (Republic of Korea [ROK]) president, Syngman Rhee, and his government were in Pusan. The 4th MRBC


detachment had to upgrade the KBS broadcast capabilities to cover the Communist-occupied South and into North Korea.⁹ A family emergency led to Brembeck's replacement by 1LT William J. Eilers who had served at Armed Forces Radio (AFR) in Tokyo, 1946-1948, and 2LT Eddie Deerfield, a WWII veteran with newspaper experience, in August 1951.¹⁰ The KBS *Radio Pusan* station would be the first RB&L link in Korea.

Until the 4th MRBC mobile radio systems arrived in theater, UN programs would have to be broadcast over KBS stations that were being rebuilt by the American Army.¹¹ Since each of the three MRB platoons was authorized four officers and twenty-two enlisted men, LTC Shields had a pool of talent to task organize into detachments for "kick starting" the KBS stations. Once *Radio Pusan* was well-established, expansion would follow UN offensive operations.¹²

In the meantime, the advance echelon (ADVON) (July 1951) and main body (August) of the 1st RB&L would be joined by two more contingents in September and October. Sarcasm best described the "Gander" train rides from Fort Riley, KS, to catch their ship overseas: "The most special part of the train [to Camp Stoneman, CA] was the air-conditioning system. Air, flowing in the doors and windows, was conditioned by a pall of coal smoke from the locomotive. The soot never became a problem because a fireman would come through every few hours with a wheelbarrow and shovel," reported *The Proper Gander*.¹³ The major organic equipment, three mobile radio broadcast systems and the Harris LTV 35" X 45" multi-lithograph presses, arrived at the end of October 1951. By then, the Psywarriors, like the rest of the FECOM Headquarters Support Command (HSC) were doing weekly field training.

With the exception of the 3rd Repro personnel who went straight to Motosumiyoshi, 1st RB&L soldiers started maneuvers in Japan on 10 October. CPT Robert A. Leadley, the dual-hatted 4th MRBC commander and group Radio Officer, was in charge of defending Hama Park while 2LT William Brown, back from the Armistice talks in Korea, led the aggressors in the attack. "Due to another day of disgustingly 'clement' weather, [1st RB&L] radiomen were crawling all over Hama Park. The first enemy soldier declared 'killed' was Headquarters Company first sergeant [1SG] Russell E. Beckwith. PFC [Donald R.] Newman, manning a machinegun, did not see any aggressors. His biggest triumph of that afternoon was the fierce look he used to impress some Ginza girls nearby. Most men spent the afternoon 'valorously combatting a great variety of flying insects.'"¹⁴ Hibaya Park behind *Radio Tokyo* was another site for field training and close order drill.¹⁵ After their exercises, "Gander warriors" enjoyed cold "nickel beer" and Cokes in the third floor lounge of the Finance Building. Those "social Ganders never had it so good" when 360 Japanese *yen* was the exchange for a U.S. dollar in MPC (Military Payment Certificate) script.¹⁶

On 14 October 1951, Private (PVT) Herbert A. Stevens, the 4th MRBC company clerk with a Kansas State Teachers College degree in accounting and commerce, wrote: "We



PFC Richard George, armed with an M3A1 .45 cal submachinegun "Grease Gun" kept aggressors from seizing Hama Park.



Field training, while mandated for all Army units in Japan, was quite casual for the 1st RB&L 'Groupers': (L to R) PFCs Milton Banta, Herbert A. Stevens, Nick H. James, and Sigmund S. Front relax afterwards.

sure have it nice here. They have planned a week or more of tours and entertainment. I don't know when we are going to start work. The food is fine and the service is hard to become used to, after eating in a hot chow hall and that place aboard ship. I never was hungry then, but I can eat now. Labor is so cheap that we only have to clean our own room. There is 12 o'clock curfew and you'd better be in. They take your pass if you come in a minute later."¹⁷

SGT James McCrory, a Marquette University grad and former Milwaukee *Sentinel* reporter, provided a more illustrative description of life in Occupied Japan: "The first time I ever had 'Baked Alaska' was in the enlisted mess on top of the NYK building where *Escoffier*-trained Japanese chefs prepared meals with menu choices, and you ate at tables for four that had flowers. This was the tail end of the MacArthur empire, and it vanished about four months after we got to Tokyo."¹⁸ Stevens continued, "The EM [Enlisted Men's] Club membership costs \$5. If I join the club and bring my blood donor card, I'll get a free \$1.50 meal, the highest priced regular meal they have. I finally got a stripe and hope to add another before too long. Then, I'll be satisfied. I'm not looking for a lot of rank in the Army."¹⁹ While enjoying the "good life" in Japan, the 1st RB&L assumed the strategic Psywar load for FECOM in October 1951.

The Army Chief of Psywar in the Pentagon, Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, wanted to show the military how Psychological Warfare had already proved that it was a "force multiplier" in Korea. That month an Army Signal Corps film team went to Tokyo to capture the 1st RB&L in action, conducting Psywar for FECOM. The motion picture team started filming live radio broadcasts being done by "Ganders" (nickname for 1st RB&L Psywar soldiers taken from the name of its weekly newspaper) in the studios of *Radio Tokyo*. On the second day, the cinema photographers captured the preparation of propaganda leaflets. They finished filming at the 3rd Repro where Psywar leaflets were printed and packaged for air and artillery delivery. "Needless to say, the 1st RB&L soldiers were all looking sharp for that Hollywood moment."²⁰



During the Army Signal Corps film team visit to the 1st RB&L, PFC Sigmund S. Front discussed an upcoming broadcast script with a Korean announcer in a *Radio Tokyo* studio of NHK, the Japanese government radio system.

But, by November 1951 the 1st RB&L was losing original members. The majority of the group consisted of Army Reservists "called up" by the president and draftees serving two years. Three activated Reservists elected to go home and a couple of soldiers took reassignments.²¹ The Headquarters Company lost its first sergeant, Russell E. Beckwith, a WWII Psywar veteran, who had fifteen years of service. He left with two other veteran Reservists from the 4th MRBC, SGTs William H. Cedar and Paul Lennhoff. Beckwith was replaced by Master Sergeant Charles D. McColery, a Regular Army veteran, best-remembered for the fine job his cooks did aboard the train to Camp Stoneman, CA. CPLs Jerry K. Delano and Harold L. Fenwick, Message Center, volunteered for the infantry in Korea. Fenwick had been wounded twice while in the 1st Cavalry Division before being medically evacuated to the States. He was reassigned to Fort Riley after leaving the hospital.²² The 1st RB&L had been created by Army Field Forces as a (T/D) Table of Distribution unit. Assigned to FECOM as such, the overseas command could determine the level of personnel fill in theater.

January 1952 brought more changes. The 1st RB&L was redesignated the 8239th Army Unit (AU) by FECOM and its motor pool was incorporated into that of GHQ Headquarters & Service Command. Some script writers and programmers were "drained away" by the FECOM G-2 Psywar Division, also located in the Empire Building, two floors below. LTC Shields was criticized by some "Ganders" for allowing the higher headquarters command and staff to bleed off organic resources.²³ He had little choice; his Psywar group staff had been absorbed into G-2 Psywar with the assignment of Army civilians.

The reality was that G-2 Psywar, after assigning Department of Army Civilians (DAC), English-speaking Japanese typists, and Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Russian linguists and artists (temporary DACs and contract employees) to the 1st RB&L, had simply amalgamated the Psywar unit into the FECOM staff.²⁴ The internal reorganization along commercial advertising and publishing lines inadvertently facilitated this "melding." It likewise allowed the G-2 Psywar to reduce

its role to executive authority for strategic Psywar and guidance. These subtle nuances went unnoticed as the busy 1st RB&L staff expanded its KBS mission to Seoul.

Seoul was recaptured by UN forces a second time and the 4th MRBC dispatched a second radio detachment to the South Korean capital in the fall of 1951 to reestablish *Radio Seoul*. PFC Sigmund S. "Sig" Front was producing news reports in Chinese that were being broadcast three times a week on NHK, the Japanese government radio system, the equivalent of America's NBC, CBS, and ABC systems combined. This was a challenge because the *Nippon Electric Company* was simultaneously rebuilding the war-damaged Tokyo electrical grid. This meant constantly changing broadcast times and frustration. When someone was needed to program broadcasts for *Radio Seoul*, it was former infantry radioman Front who volunteered.²⁵ His description of early days at *Radio Seoul* in late 1951 and the beginning of 1952 capture the enthusiasm, initiative, and positive attitudes essential to Psywar success during the Korean War.

While the rest of the 1st RB&L soldiers were recovering from Thanksgiving dinner in 1951, PFC Front was off to Korea. "The C-46 (*Commando*) flight was four and a half to five hours from Tokyo to Seoul. I rode on the floor, leaning against my pack and duffle bag. When we arrived at Kimpo Airport, 1LT Henry A. Glowacki and the Supply Sergeant, [Eugene W.] Roberts, were waiting in a jeep. It was a beautiful day, but I was stunned by the war damage. As we entered the capital and drove down the main traffic stem, destruction was everywhere. Walls

of the few standing buildings were heavily pockmarked by bullet holes and shrapnel. There were supposedly only 60,000 Koreans in Seoul," recounted Front.²⁶ LT William Brown on the way to the armistice talks in July 1951 described the city for *The Proper Gander*: "Seoul is a city of shambles; of shacks and broken buildings; of shattered window panes and shell-pocked masonry; of hungry civilians and soldiers in fatigues."²⁷ That was reaffirmed by PFC Front, the former West Virginia disc jockey.

"The U.S. Army engineers had gotten a roof on our facility, an old bus barn two miles from the radio station. Some Army signal guys were cannibalizing the remains of a room-sized 100 KW RCA [*Radio Corporation of America*] transmitter to build a 5 KW one. I was given a cot, typewriter, field desk and folding chair, and told to get to work," recalled Front.²⁸

Despite having another 4th MRBC detachment at *Radio Pusan*, there was no interface with *Radio Seoul*. "LT Glowacki was sent to get *Radio Seoul* on the air," said PFC Sig Front. "He was involved in hiring station staff, engineers, announcers, and arranging entertainment. I was told to collect the news, write it up, get it translated, and program the daily broadcasts. We got 'on the air' the evening of 9 December, but could only broadcast to North and South Korea three hours a day."²⁹ Life was quite different for the rest of the 4th MRBC back in Tokyo.

The 4th MRBC orderly room was in the Finance Building according to PFC Stevens, the unit clerk. By December 1951, "Ganders" could make three-minute short wave radio-telephone calls home via MARS (Military Auxiliary Radio



The GHQ Honor Guard controlled access in and out of the Finance Building (GHQ Service Command) in Tokyo where 4th MRBC troops were billeted.



(Above) Repromen enjoyed the Shiga Heights Hotel after skiing in the Japanese Alps.

War-devastated Seoul, Korea 1951

"It was a beautiful day, but I was stunned by the war damage. As we entered the capital and drove down the main traffic stem, destruction was everywhere. — PFC Sigmund S. Front



Devastated rail yards and buildings in Seoul, 1951.

(Photos above, left and in background courtesy of John Rich)



In 1951 Seoul was a city in shambles after being captured by the North Koreans and Chinese and repatriated twice by UN forces.



*"Seoul is a city of shambles;
...shacks and broken buildings;
...shattered window panes
and shell-pocked masonry;
...hungry civilians and soldiers
in fatigues." — LT William F. Brown II*



The KBS Radio Seoul building was a "shell" in the fall of 1951.

System).³⁰ Stevens provided the orderly room telephone number (Tokyo 57-8692) so that his family could assemble in Pittsburg, KS, to make their call.³¹ Typical for soldiers there was a little bitching: "The weather has been too good. If it rains we don't have to get up at 5:30 for PT [physical training]. But, it hasn't rained a single day this week. We can see Mt. Fuji from the rooftop of the Finance Building on a clear day," wrote CPL Broderick, a 3rd Repro man detailed as a script writer.³² Duty for most 4th MRBC soldiers continued to be very good in Tokyo.

"We certainly don't miss a chance to go anyplace. Our main concerns are how to get out of training and inspections and what to do on weekends," said Stevens in January 1952.³³ He and some friends had just returned from a three-day pass at the Atami Hot Springs Hotel with its golf course, "run by Special Services so it is very cheap. It costs \$1 a day per person for a room and the meals are free. The food was very good and service wonderful. The trip including train fare [\$1.50] was about \$2.50 a piece."³⁴ In Seoul, PFC Sig Front established a news collection "beat," augmenting it with visits to front line units.

"The international press corps of fifty or sixty correspondents was billeted in a large Japanese-style house. The mayor's office in Seoul was at one end of the main stem; the capital building was on the other. The Eighth Army [EUSA] PIO [Public Information Officer], Colonel Herman Smith, the future mayor of Ponca City, Oklahoma, took me 'under his wing,' and suggested that I tell the folks back home about the destruction in Seoul. I made three large reel tape recordings as I discovered how bad conditions were in the orphanages, especially for infants. The majority of them had no food or medicine for children that ranged in age from six months to four years," remembered Front.³⁵ The young Psywarrior had been motivated by his visits to the AAA Orphan's Hospital and the *Samae* Orphanage and the work being done by the Seoul UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) team.³⁶

"I sent a TELEX [radio telegram] to Tokyo asking the 1st RB&L to solicit donations. SGT Roberts accomplished miracles on the black market with the first hundred dollars provided. Thus, the 'Ganders' became an orphanage



The Tae Wha Hospital supporting refugees in Seoul was overwhelmed, understaffed, and had few medical supplies until UNCACK took it under wing.




CPL Sig Front enlisted 1st RB&L in Tokyo to support orphanages in Seoul.

sponsor. The *Associated Press* [AP] correspondent, Bill [William C.] Barnard wrote a story about the orphanage and included photos of SGT Roberts and me. It got nationwide coverage on 24 December 1951, making the front page of my hometown newspaper. "I was a celebrity for a day," chuckled Front.³⁷

"The head of BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] in Korea, George Marshon, asked me if Radio Seoul could

"The food was very good and service wonderful. The trip including train fare [\$1.50] was about \$2.50 a piece."

— CPL Herbert A. Stevens



Atami Hot Springs Hotel was popular with Psywarriors for rest and relaxation (R&R).



1LT Robert B. Shall, *Radio Seoul*, and CPT Frederick P. Laffey, 4th MRBC Radio Manager, pose with the KBS station mascot.

broadcast to Tokyo,” explained Front. “He had five minutes of airtime to fill before the King gave his holiday greeting from Buckingham Palace. Our primary news broadcaster, Choi Sung Ju, rounded up fourteen ten and eleven year-old children to sing Christmas carols. After they sang an ancient folk song, ‘*Arirang*,’ they did ‘Silent Night’ in Korean. Then, Mr. Marshon wished everyone a ‘Merry Christmas from the British Forces in Korea.’ Seventeen seconds later, Australia received the broadcast and relayed it on to San Francisco where it was routed through New York to London on time.”³⁸ Just as 2LT Eddie Deerfield at *Radio Pusan* “won the hearts and minds” of the KBS staff by convincing the UNCACK hospital doctors to admit a seriously-ill seven year-old Korean girl in “the true spirit of Christmas,” so Psywarrior Front had done in Seoul.³⁹ But, recording interviews using 1950s technology was a “crap shoot.”

“Choi Sung Ju deserves full credit for the ‘Tape Team’ idea. He spoke good English and was a top newscaster before the war,” related Front. “We attached a shoulder strap to the bulky reel-to-reel tape recorder to carry it for live interviews. It was hand-cranked, tube technology which froze up in the cold weather. Sergeant Roberts found lighter fluid hand warmers used by hunters in the States. We stuck one inside the tape deck to warm it up before interviews. Some days, we discovered afterwards that our recordings were unintelligible.”⁴⁰ “Local voices” made the special events in Korea more appealing to the people.⁴¹ This was the primary function of the American program staff (two 4th MRBC enlisted men). Because Seoul was a source of pride to most Koreans, what was happening in the city since the evacuations and liberations “to and fro” was

“Since there were no movies and entertainment was limited, we recorded a well-known woman violinist and collected human interest stories. We tried to ‘put life back into the Korean society.’ — PFC Sigmund S. Front



The address given by General James A. Van Fleet, the EUSA commander, celebrating Korean Independence Day (1 March 1919), was recorded by CPL Sig Front’s “Tape Team.”

of considerable influence. Tape recordings of the “local goings-on” were aired nightly over *VUNC* in Tokyo and called the “SEOUL REPORT.” Most taped features dealt with UNCACK activities.⁴²

“Since there were no movies and entertainment was limited, we recorded a well-known woman violinist and collected human interest stories. We tried to ‘put life back into the Korean society.’”⁴³ A new program, “WOMEN IN THE NEWS,” consisting of interviews with women leaders in Seoul was prepared for weekly broadcast by *Radio Pusan*.⁴⁴ Work filled the daylight hours.

“I got so busy that I forgot how really cold it was until I crawled, fully dressed into my sleeping bag. Field jackets were the extent of our winter gear,” related Front. “My time with the 1st Marine Division [MARDIV] and the 1st ROK Marine Regiment netted me some ‘Mickey Mouse’ boots, wool socks, a parka, sweater, and vest liner. Those items saved me from frost bite. I also got a No. 10 tin can of peanut butter and an impromptu introduction to SGT ‘Rocky,’ a 5’ 9” Jake LaMotta [the boxer] look alike, who had two Silver Stars, a Bronze Star, and three Purple Hearts. Having been given a cot in his bunker, he woke me at 4:30 A.M. by shooting a foot-long rat with a .45 automatic. Still

zipped up in my sleeping bag I tumbled from the cot with a crash. Discovering my company, 'Rocky' offered me cookies, *Schrafft* chocolates, and a cold beer."⁴⁵ Life in the field in Korea was tough; bathing was a luxury as were hot meals.

"It was a real treat to have dinner with the press corps. I had not taken a shower for seven or eight weeks, but no one seemed to notice," explained Front. "There were eight Americans at *Radio Seoul* for almost five months before the 4th MRBC main body and mobile radio broadcast equipment arrived. In the meantime 1LT Glowacki was feeding the forty Korean station workers and their families with local rice acquired by SGT Roberts on the black market."⁴⁶ Technical assistance, like that provided at *Radio Pusan*, often included food, potable water, fuel, tires and parts, as well as transportation for KBS personnel when deemed critical to broadcast operations. This was categorized as "aid in material goods."⁴⁷

The *Radio Seoul* team had four major tasks: (1) supervise and advise KBS personnel on the installation and operation of radio broadcast equipment; (2) take the lead for all programs aired over the network, not just Psywar; (3) promulgate FECOM and UN Command policy with ROK government and KBS officials; (4) sell Psywar by developing a close working relationship with the Koreans.⁴⁸ This was initially done by one officer, a Korean DAC interpreter-translator, and two enlisted men in the Psywar program section. Tubes and replacement components for the 300 watt transmitter and power units to supply electricity were critical to broadcasting.⁴⁹ Most of these requirements were coordinated by TELEX with the 1st RB&L staff in Tokyo.

Supporting the constant needs of independent radio broadcast detachments in Korea soon became burdensome for the Psywar group staff. Since the South Korean capital had been seized twice by the Communists and repatriated two times by UN forces in less than a year and bombed regularly while the enemy held the city, *Radio Seoul* was in the worst shape and needed the most help. The possibility that Seoul would again become the seat of government

prompted the group S-3 Radio staff to augment them in order to retain the policy influence enjoyed in Pusan.⁵⁰ It was time for the MRBC headquarters to assume support responsibility for its radio detachments at the KBS stations.

The remaining 4th MRBC personnel with the exception of broadcast script writers were being prepared to move to Korea. The company clerk, PFC Herb Stevens, got his second stripe on 29 January 1952, almost doubling his pay (\$130.60 per month), and just in time to file federal income taxes. The daily routine had changed. "Now we are taking PT on the roof at 6:00 [A.M.] three mornings a week so I guess I'll get more exercise. I don't mind the

PT but it sure is cold & early. I shouldn't complain as it could be a lot worse," lamented the new corporal.⁵¹ About two weeks later, CPL Stevens was in Korea.

It was St. Valentine's Day, 14 February 1952, when the 4th MRBC main body (personnel) led by 1LT Frank H. Preston, Jr., the company executive officer, and 1LT Richard M. White, the unit administrative officer, reached

Seoul. They left Yokohama aboard a WWII troop ship, the USNS *Marine Phoenix*, for In'chon. There, they sat for six hours awaiting transportation to Seoul.⁵² 1LT Glowacki had found a small compound that could be secured and arranged to lease the facilities with the Seoul Area Command.⁵³ The mobile radio broadcasting systems with their antennas had arrived earlier. Two were stored in the gated, half-acre, walled-in complex. The third AN/MRT-5 unit had already been set up adjacent to the damaged *Radio Seoul* studio. It was being used for tape recording, live broadcasts, and master control work.⁵⁴ Access to the "new 4th MRBC home," originally a small truck and bus repair facility, was controlled by armed Korean gate guards reported CPL Stevens, the company clerk.⁵⁵

*Having been given a cot in the dark, he woke me at 4:30 A.M. by shooting a foot-long rat with a .45 automatic. Still zipped up in my sleeping bag I tumbled from the cot with a crash. Discovering my company, 'Rocky' offered me cookies, Schrafft chocolates, and a cold beer."*⁴⁵

— PFC Sigmund S. Front



1st Marine Division SSI



1st ROK Marine Regiment lapel insignia and coin



The WWII troop ship USNS *Marine Phoenix* T-AP-195 was acquired from the Maritime Commission Reserve ("Mothball") Fleet in Suisun Bay, California by the U.S. Navy. Operating out of San Francisco and Seattle, the *Marine Phoenix* carried troops and supplies to Sasebo and Yokohama, Japan, and Pusan and In'chon, Korea during the war. The ship is pictured in Elliott Bay, Seattle, WA in the 1950s.

4th MRBC Compound, Seoul, Korea 1952



CPL Sig Front (Radio Seoul jeep) and CPL Herb Stevens (4th MRBC jeep) are posed inside the company compound in Seoul.



The 4th MRBC compound was originally a small truck and bus repair facility.

"We don't have running water here yet, but they're working on it."

— CPL Herbert A. Stevens



Koreans relax outside *Radio Seoul*.



1SG Preston Owens and the company clerk, CPL Herbert A. Stevens, ran the 4th MRBC in Seoul.



CPL Sig Front is sitting inside the recording studio of the AN/MRT-5 adjacent to *Radio Seoul*.

The recent arrivals had some adjustments to make. Gone were “the good old days” in Occupied Japan. In a letter home CPL Herb Stevens wrote: “We don’t have running water here yet, but they’re working on it. We can go to the 8th Army Headquarters and take showers any time. The latrine is outside, but there’s an oil heater in it so it isn’t so bad. We have a regular mess hall and the food is very good.”⁵⁶ A motor pool truck was available to take soldiers to the movies every night. “We are supposed to carry a loaded weapon after dark if we’re out running around, but I don’t intend to do much of that. The orderly room is on the second floor of *Radio Seoul*. We have a large room with plenty of windows. In fact it’s a nicer office than we had in Tokyo. We work 6 ½ - 7 days a week. Korean laborers do most of the dirty work, K.P., cleaning and janitor work, etc.,” added Stevens.⁵⁷ Outside the compound, the city was still badly torn up, but the street cars were running and daily life continued. Since the closest battle lines were 35-40 miles away, CPL Herb Stevens assured his Aunt Mabel in Pittsburg, KS that “we’re not up here to fight but rather to broadcast propaganda.”⁵⁸ Combat time in Korea had not been a priority for everyone in the MRBC.


The administrative 1SG, a master sergeant and a WWII Italian campaign veteran, elected to stay in Tokyo because his tour ended in less than six months. CPL Stevens and the field first sergeant shared a room in *Radio Seoul* adjacent to the orderly room. The nominal MRBC commander, CPT Leadley, only visited Korea periodically. His primary duty as 1st RB&L S-3 Radio Officer took precedence. *Radio Tokyo* was the unit’s top priority. But, Leadley’s brother-in-law, PFC Jerry Swanson, another University of Nebraska grad, did come to Korea.⁵⁹ Visits by 1st RB&L leadership were normally bi-monthly, overlapping two months to accrue combat pay for the senior Psywarriors.⁶⁰

“Several officers from Tokyo including the Company Commander [CPT Leadley], Group Commander [LTC Homer Shields], and the CO at Riley [Commanding Officer, 1st RB&L Rear Detachment, CPT Victor U. Trevola], are here and of course stirring up things,” confided CPL Stevens in late February 1952.⁶¹ CPT Trevola stayed in Korea to inspect, test, and evaluate the mobile radio broadcast systems and antennas.⁶² The visit was part of a whirlwind command visit to the 4th MRBC sites in Seoul, Taegu, Taejon, and Pusan.

“They brought along a new 1SG as things haven’t been running according to Hoyle lately,” Stevens wrote.⁶³ “The whole administrative set-up of the company and group is pretty badly fouled up, but that gives us something to think about and keeps our minds occupied. The 1SG [Owens] was going to straighten things out. But, he ran into complications and soon gave up,” explained the company clerk.⁶⁴ By mid-March 1952, there were telephone lines connecting the four 4th MRBC sites and Stevens felt “a little nearer to civilization” talking with his buddies. Individual mess kits had been replaced by metal trays. The group had a photographer visiting to take pictures for a yearbook (*1st RB&L Life and Times*) scheduled for publication in June 1952.⁶⁵



Visiting officers of the 1st RB&L pose with 4th MRBC personnel following the official opening ceremony for *Radio Taegu*: (Back L to R): 1LT Jack F. Brennan, CPT Robert A. Leadley, LTC Homer E. Shields, 1LT Jerry Stose, and 1LT Jack G. Morris; (Front L to R): 1LT Ray Guth, 1LT William J. Eilers, 2LT Eddie Deerfield, and 1LT Ernest H. Luick.



Cover of 1st RB&L *Life and Times* 1952.


"We're getting things fixed up here pretty good. We have a one-stall shower with hot & cold water. We all have air mattresses too. Between 2 houseboys I get my boots shined at least once a day, sometimes twice. Yesterday, one of them cleaned my carbine. The wife of one of the Korean workers here does the laundry for most of the fellows. It only costs about \$2 a month or the equivalent in *won*," CPL Stevens explained. "We now have teletype service from the orderly room in Seoul to Pusan and the Empire House in Tokyo."⁶⁶



UN soldiers were paid in Military Payment Certificates (MPC) or "script" instead of U.S. dollars or South Korea *won* during the war. This example is a Ten Dollar MPC.

Infantry 1LT Robert L. Darcy, the S-3 Radio Propaganda Officer, described the MRBC set-up in a "Circuit Tour" report: "The company, located in the northeast corner of the city, not far from the 1st L&L [Loudspeaker & Leaflet] Co [EUSA], is comprised of 45 men, about a dozen vehicles, a first-rate company mess, a private club, a half dozen houseboys, and three or four untouchable morale boosters. *Radio Seoul* operations has LT Don [2LT Donald E.] Smith, a pair of CPLs in Vic [Victor] Lee and Sig [Sigmund S.] Front, and the usual indispensable staff of translators, a typist, etc. Between broadcasting bomb warnings and making tape recordings, they manage to keep busy and do a fine job."⁶⁷

By the end of March 1952, 4th MRBC headquarters in Seoul and *Radio Seoul* had sixty-eight personnel; 3 officers, 36 enlisted men, a bilingual Korean DAC (Chief Interpreter and Translator), and 28 local workers (from a female stenographer to guards and KPs). *Radio Pusan* had forty-four personnel. The antenna riggers in the Repair & Services Section of the three MRB platoons had been spread among *KBS* radio stations with fewer assigned to the more developed sites: Pusan (1); Taegu (1); Taejon (4);



and Seoul (3).⁶⁸ 1LT Darcy's "keeping busy" comment was a misleading description of the frantic daily broadcast production at the stations.

While the 4th MRBC headquarters focused on everyday military administration, supply, and support for the four radio detachments, the daily "routine" in the radio stations, though somewhat established, was a hectic scramble to fill three broadcasting windows: 0600-0830 hours; 1130-1430 hours; and 1700-2315 hours. After scanning news teletypes, *The Korea Times*, *USIS* (*United States Information Service*, the overseas name for the *United States Information Agency*) daily news bulletins, and the U.S. Embassy press translations, typically three enlisted broadcast script writers typed (wrote) multiple assigned fifteen minute presentations, had them edited and approved by the station OIC, got them translated, assigned to Korean and Chinese announcers, briefed their announcer just before air time, and then got back to their associated writing assignments. There were no days off; they did this "routine" seven days a week.⁶⁹

Kun Ha Kim, one of the bilingual translators who worked at *Radio Pusan* and *Radio Seoul* after the Armistice, was born in Seoul, but raised in North Korea. In August 1945, his family fled south when the Russians drove the Japanese military from Chung'gin. His family, living north of the Han River, were trapped between the fighting forces when the ROK Army blew up the bridges. They survived the North Korean and Chinese occupations of the capital. Kim, a

high school graduate with a couple of years at the Seoul and Pusan Universities, was a welcome asset. Daily he translated the *AP* and *United Press International* (*UPI*) wire service news that came by teletype to the 4th MRBC-supported *KBS* stations.⁷⁰ Daily programming tasks also included sending broadcast material to the 1st RB&L in Tokyo.

Interspersed among these broadcast writing duties at *Radio Seoul* was the requirement to courier four copies of *The Korea Times* and translations of Seoul *KBS* radio station broadcasts to Tokyo every day. This was their compilation of local activities/events or "local news budget" which could be used immediately in Tokyo or give sufficient information immediately useful in the overall situation. "While it is a good to keep the 'budget' within these limits, remember also that a good-size chunk of news going over the wire to Tokyo is fine eye-wash," explained CPL John L. "Stod" Stoddard in the *Radio Pusan* SOP. (Standing Operating Procedures).⁷¹

"A weekly Progress Report had to be sent to Tokyo by teletype by Tuesday noon. Every Monday someone had to collect the weekly report from the UNCACK PIO. This roundup of the week's news in and about South Korea stressing reconstruction, UN cooperation, and progress was recorded. That tape recording with three copies of the script had to be couriered to Tokyo to SGT [George K.] Menkart, S-3 Radio Section by Tuesday morning."⁷²

Seven to ten-day visits to 4th MRBC radio stations in Korea were made by group S-3 and S-2 officers to

assess the viability of programs and to “show the flag” reminding the “forgotten company” that the command appreciated the fine work that the “creative” broadcast people and technical specialists were doing in Korea. Courtesy calls with the EUSA G-3 Psywar at Seoul University and the 1st L&L gave the officers a better understanding of the differences between tactical and strategic Psywar.⁷³ LT Robert Darcy was fortunate to participate in the interrogation of a North Korean defector, but what he learned was somewhat unsettling.


The highlight of LT Darcy’s 1952 trip was “interrogating” a North Korean Army (NKA) security officer who defected at Panmunjom on 5 September. Darcy accompanied EUSA interrogation officer, LT Robert Greenman, to the “cage” (transient POW camp) at Yongdung-po. After two hours of listening to the questioning, Darcy was anxious to have the POW to tell “the people of Korea what he thought about the Communists.” Hawaiian-born, Korean (P’yongyang) raised, CPL Victor Lee taped his comments for possible use in a Psywar radio broadcast.⁷⁴ But, often the best laid plans go awry.

The twenty-nine year old NKA defector, LT Lee Dong Yup, dispelled a few myths about the effectiveness of UN Psywar. While he admitted listening clandestinely to *VUNC* as well as other broadcasts from the South, LT Yup particularly enjoyed newscasts, but felt that the combat losses were vastly exaggerated. Surrender leaflets promising candy and cigarettes were laughed at by the soldiers. Yup thought that political propaganda was much more effective. Of the UN Psywar leaflets he had seen, he liked those best that contained stories of North Korean deserters with photos showing them being treated like heroes.⁷⁵

After cross-checking other interrogations it became apparent that LT Yup deserted for personal reasons (untrusted by superiors and slow promotions) rather than for having seen the “light of freedom and democracy versus the dark world of Communism.” He was simply an opportunist. There was nothing to indicate that Psywar prompted his defection. However, the North Korean lieutenant did confirm that a special team had

briefed his unit that the UN was using biological warfare against them. Bottles filled with dead insects were proof that germ warfare had been used. Yup did not believe it, but also admitted that he did not know how the war started until he got to Kaesong. LT Yup was insulted by his treatment as a “common POW.” He expected to be released in the South much like a civilian tired of a job, leaving to seek better employment elsewhere, according to Darcy.⁷⁶ While the results were not what he anticipated, the Radio Propaganda officer returned to Tokyo more aware of the effectiveness of some strategic Psywar programs and products and recognized “value added” of the 4th MRBC headquarters in Korea.

With the company administration and support and the mobile radio broadcast systems in country, the 1st RB&L could more easily expand coverage to additional *KBS* stations. Because *Radio Pusan* was the best established, it remained the “mother station” for Korea, getting radio Psywar guidance direct from Tokyo. The MRBC provided administrative command and control and was responsible for shifting organic personnel and equipment assets where most needed to best accomplish *KBS* technical and program support. In March 1952, *Radio Taegu* had an eight man element while the newest station, *Radio Taejon*, had eleven personnel counting an antenna rigger team. Radio repair and parts were being provided to *Radio Iri* at Kwanju. After setting up an interim *Radio Namwon* to support of the ROK anti-guerrilla Operation RAT KILLER, the 4th MRBC detachment convinced the local government of its value, secured approval from the ROK Office of Public Information, Minister of Communications, and *KBS*, and prepared construction plans and specifications for a 50M *won* facility. And, the MRBC helped *KBS* identify capabilities and equipment needed expand facilities at *Radio Kangnung*, arranged transport of the new radio equipment, and coordinated with UNCAK to acquire and ship construction materials to expand the station.⁷⁷ It was the MRBC headquarters in Korea that linked the radio stations together with teletype and telephones.⁷⁸ Psywar radio reality in Korea was well-documented officially and by *The Broadcaster*, the



The cooperative North Korean and Chinese Communist POWs readily agreed to tape-recorded radio broadcasts encouraging defections by their fellow comrades.



1LT Calvin J. Sing (glasses) interviews a Chinese POW while SGT Sol S. Gamis records the session for future broadcast.



CPL Sigmund S. "Sig" Front,
4th MRBC, Radio Seoul, Korea

Born in 1928 and raised in Wheeling, West Virginia, Sigmund S. "Sig" Front, the son of a WWI veteran and Ohio State University graduate, finished Linsley Military Institute in 1947. While announcing specials on the local Kresge ("Five & Dime") store public address system, fourteen year-old Sig Front was informed by the WWVA radio manager that he had a "perfect voice"

for broadcasting. During his two years of journalism at the University of West Virginia, he was a local ABC radio announcer. In May 1950, Front left for New York City to attend the NBC Radio & Television Institute. Afterwards, the credentialed broadcaster returned home to work as a radio news announcer and disc jockey at WKWK ABC Radio in Wheeling, WV until drafted in 1951.⁸¹

Eight months of Basic Combat Training (BCT) in the mobilized 31st Infantry Division (ID), South Carolina Army National Guard (ARNG), produced an infantry rifle platoon RTO (radio telephone operator). When the 40th ID, California ARNG, was sent to Korea instead of the 31st ID, Private First Class (PFC) Front was dumped into the infantry replacement pipeline. As luck would have it, Front was sent to 1st RB&L at Fort Riley, Kansas, in the summer of 1951.⁸²

PFC Sig Front, like many of the "Ganders" who fell asleep as the USNS *General John Pope* sailed out of San Francisco harbor on 28 September 1951, woke up seasick. To escape the hold and stay busy, he volunteered, along with Privates Jerry Feldscher, Thomas Klein, and Ed Smith to write articles for the ship's bulletin produced twice daily. *The Four Winds & Seven Seas* was sometimes referred to as the "Seasick Edition" of *The Proper Gander*.⁸³ "It allowed me to roam the ship to write stories about the crewmen. We were not to talk with other passengers. I did manage to 'liberate' some oranges for our sickest guys," remembered Front.⁸⁴ In Tokyo, the infantry PFC was put to work producing a Chinese news show for broadcast three times a week from the Radio Tokyo facilities.⁸⁵



CPL Herbert A. Stevens,
4th MRBC Clerk



Herbert A. Stevens, born 31 July 1928, grew up on a 160-acre Pittsburg, Kansas, farm raising wheat, corn, beans, hogs, chickens, and cows. After graduating from Cherokee High School in May 1946, he started classes at Kansas State Teachers College. Completion of a Bachelor of Science in accounting and commerce (May 1950) led to a job at the National Bank of Pittsburg. Stevens was drafted in March 1951, and sent to the 10th Infantry Division (ID) at Camp Funston, Fort Riley, KS for basic combat training (BCT) until June 1951. A short stint of filling sandbags during the flood of 1951 was followed by overseas orders. PVT Stevens, a clerk by military occupational specialty (MOS), was to be one of ten individual replacements for the 1st RB&L that left San Francisco aboard the USNS *General John Pope* (T-AP-110) straight to Yokohama. The Army clerk typed actions for the troop commander to break the monotony of the voyage. In Tokyo, PVT Stevens was assigned as the unit clerk for 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) led by WWII infantryman Captain (CPT) Robert A. Leadley.⁶⁶



Infantry 1LT Robert L. Darcy,
1st RB&L Group, S-3 Radio Propaganda Officer

Robert L. Darcy was born 21 May 1928 in Chicago to a former Nebraska farmer-turned truck driver and his wife. Baseball, track, and cross country dovetailed with duty as the sports and copy editor of the J. Sterling Morton High School (Cicero, Illinois) newspaper. Still sixteen on VE Day, Darcy went to Morton Junior College and worked before enlisting in 1946 to follow his older brother into the service.⁶⁷

After basic training at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with a couple of school buddies, Private Darcy was sent to Japan. 11th Airborne Division recruiters from Hokkaido promised a sports program and parachute pay. After jump school in December 1946, Private First Class (PFC) Darcy was assigned to the division Public Information Office (PIO), Sapporo, Japan. There, he trained unit PIOs on the principles of journalism, collected hometown news releases prepared by the airborne regiments, and covered the first U.S. Army Air Force helicopter on Hokkaido.⁶⁸

After being released from active duty in October 1947, Darcy took advantage of his G.I. Bill benefits, returning to Morton Junior College before beginning the fall semester at Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois. As a veteran the economics major qualified for advanced ROTC and \$37.50 a month. Darcy was editor of the college newspaper. After graduation in June 1950, he accepted a U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) commission in Infantry. Since he had been accepted for a Masters program at Indiana University in the fall, Second Lieutenant (2LT) Darcy agreed to go TDY (temporary duty) to Camp Carson, Colorado, with the 10th Mountain Division. Called to active duty in June 1951, the newly-married USAR Infantry lieutenant was assigned to the 10th Mountain's 86th Infantry Regiment, Fort Riley, Kansas, to instruct basic trainees at their Camp Funston site.⁶⁹

2LT Darcy supervised sandbag operations and led patrols in the flooded downtown section of Manhattan, KS to deter looting. In August 1951, Darcy was sent to the U.S. Army General School Psywar Unit Officers Course (30-0-14). He was pulled from the Psywar course on 10 September to attend the Associate Infantry Company Officers Course for USAR officers at Fort Benning, GA. By graduation in mid-February 1952, 2LT Darcy had orders to FECOM. The junior officer flew from Travis Air Base, California, to Japan where First Lieutenant (1LT) Alvin S. Yudkoff recruited him for the 1st RB&L.⁹⁰



Kun Ha Kim,
Radio Pusan & Radio Seoul Translator



Kun Ha Kim, born in Seoul, Korea, 20 July 1930, was the oldest son of five children in a small home builder's family. Work caused his father to move the family north to Unggi, near the Tumen River, bordering the Soviet Union. They were living in Chung'gin in August 1945 when Russian forces attacked the Japanese military at the seaport. The city became a battleground. The Kim family, like thousands of Koreans, abandoned their home and fled into the mountains. After the Russians captured the port, they returned to discover that there was nothing left. They joined other refugees heading south atop railroad freight cars. At the 38th Parallel, the family exhausted their money on a guide to cross the frozen river at night. North Korean border guards fired on the family fleeing Communism.⁹¹

After walking to Seoul, the Kim family sought temporary refuge in a UN refugee camp. After being deloused with DDT, they were given shelter and food, registered and released. His father built them a home on a hillside outside the city. Kun Ha Kim finished high school in the winter of 1949 and started classes at Seoul National University the following spring. When the South Korean military blew up the Han River bridge north of the capital, the Kims were trapped by the invading North Koreans. Kim and his brother were among those South Koreans rounded up to listen to North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung's national unification speech in Seoul in early July 1950. Fearing military conscription, his father built an underground shelter below the house where his two sons spent three months hiding from North Korean Army (NKA) patrols. News of UN landings at Inch'on prompted his brother to emerge prematurely. Captured by the NKA, he escaped a week later after the truck convoy in which he was riding was strafed. Kun Ha Kim was drafted by the ROK Reserve Army. But, after several weeks training at Taegu, the soldiers were released because the general had stolen the command's money.⁹²

Several weeks of stevedoring at night in Pusan harbor convinced Kim to seek other work. Tutoring the sons of Mr. Choon Sun Yang, President of Heung Hwa Manufacturing company in Seoul, opened the way to Pusan University. When this job ended, an uncle told him that the Americans operating *Radio Pusan* needed translators. Kim worked at the *KBS* facility until he moved back to Seoul after the Armistice. He translated *AP* and *United Press International (UPI)* wire service news.⁹³ Before returning to the States, West Virginian 1LT William C. Shepard, 4th MRBC, had agreed to sponsor Kim if he was accepted at an American university. The *Radio Seoul* worker submitted a university application that a friend was not going to use. Quite poor, Kim explained in his application that he could not attend without financial assistance. Much to his surprise, a month later, Duke University offered him a full scholarship. Pledging to honor his mentor (Mr. Choon Sun Yang), Kun Ha Kim set off for Durham, North Carolina, in 1955. Three and a half years later he finished a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering. To show his gratitude to Mr. Yang, Kim accepted an Industrial Engineering graduate fellowship at Columbia University.⁹⁴ Dr. Kun Ha "Ken" Kim is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 William F. Brown, II, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 2 Brown interview, 27 September 2010.
- 3 Retired LTC Eddie Deerfield, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as *The Proper Gander* with date and collection; Field Artillery 2LT William F. Brown II was made the Group S-2 (Intelligence) by LTC Homer A. Shields shortly after his arrival. He was forthwith dispatched to the Pentagon to be briefed on Yugoslavia. When he returned the Princeton graduate and former *Look* magazine writer joined a group preparing Psywar classes and developing Programs of Instruction (POI) for the officer and enlisted Psychological Warfare Courses at the Army General School, Fort Riley. He was attending the Psywar Unit Officer Course No. 1 when drafted for the 1st RB&L Advance Echelon (ADVON) to Japan. Brown interview, 27 October 2010; On 19 October 1951, the 4th MRBC Radio Section supporting the Far East Command (FECOM), G-2 Psywar Section was praised by MSC LTC Thomas O. Mathews, for "the quality of programming, script content, and style." U.S. Army, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command, Psychological Warfare Section memorandum, SUBJECT: Commendation for 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company dated 19 October 1951.
- 4 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1, Broderick Collection; Brown interview, 27 October 2010.
- 5 Army Field Forces. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1202, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950, Robert L. Darcy Collection, U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center, Carlisle, PA, hereafter cited as T/D 250-1202, Darcy Collection.
- 6 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 7 "Tokyo-Korea Traffic Heavy With Groupers: Radio Ops Keep Men Between Japan-Korea," *The Proper Gander*, 1:27 (8 November 1951), 1, Broderick Collection.
- 8 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Nelson, Brembeck Invade Radio Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 1, 18 August 1951, 2 and "Don't Get Blinded! Mickelsen, Sing, Wearing Silver Bars," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 4 October 1951, 1, Broderick Collection; Thomas M. Klein, Robert J. Herguth, and Robert McConaughy, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: 1952 Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group...50 Years Later 2002* (Round Hill, GA: Round Hill Productions, 2002), 148, hereafter cited as *Life & Times 2002*.
- 9 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Nelson, Brembeck Invade Radio Pusan," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 1, 18 August 1951, 2 and "Don't Get Blinded! Mickelsen, Sing, Wearing Silver Bars," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 4 October 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 10 *Life & Times 2002*, 167.
- 11 SB, "New Weapons, Complementing Bombs and Bullets Go Forth to Wage A War With Words," GHQ Headquarters and Service Command's Weekly Publication, *The Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 28, 11 April 1952, 3, Broderick Collection.
- 12 HQ, U.S. Army Forces Far East Command, APO San Francisco 343. Table of Distribution Number 80-8239-2, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit, APO 301 dated 1 May 1953 in retired Major Nevin F. Price Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Price Collection.
- 13 "Goslings See Frisco; Blue Pacific, On Trip," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 24, 1, 2, 18 October 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 14 "Gigantic Battle in Hama Park; Beckwith Awarded Purple Gander," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 23, 2, 19 September 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 15 Gary Thalheimer and Bill Sloyer, "Personal Remarks," in *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 26, 30, hereafter cited as *57th Year Reunion*.
- 16 "The Gander Meanders: Big-City Life Offers Plenty to See and Do; Social Ganders Never Had it So Good," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 23, 3, 19 September 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 17 Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 14 October 1951.
- 18 Jim McCrory, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 33. **While there were changes after General Douglas A. MacArthur's relief, it was the end of the Occupation period on 28 April 1952 that terminated "the good life" in Tokyo for the Allied victors.**
- 19 Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 28 October 1951; "79 Groupers Sign in Blood Drive," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25, 25 October, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 20 "Psywar Story" Stars 1st RB&L," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25, 3, 25 October 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 21 "Toda Transfers Camp Yokohama," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25, 19 September 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 22 "Reserves Return to States; HQ Co Has New First Sergeant" and "Two Leave Group," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 27, 1, 4, 8 November 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 23 Charles R. Broderick letter (Yokohama) to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 5 January 1952 in Broderick Collection; "Personnel Changes Hit Group: Job Switches, Transfers, Keep Men Moving," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 3, 17 January 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 24 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 1, Broderick Collection; 1st RB&L Group, *Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group 1952* (Tokyo, 1952), hereafter cited as *1952 Life and Times*; Broderick interview, 3 October 2010. CPL Broderick was tasked to write up local sports and entertainment events, like the "Powder Puff Football Game," visiting jazz artists, and the ongoing combat in Korea based on Army teletype reports and POW interrogations which were classified SECRET. GHQ headquarters (Dai Ichi building) had a good library for regional research.
- 25 Sigmund S. Front, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 June 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; **Shortly before PFC Sig Front arrived at Radio Seoul in Korea, 2LT Robert B. Shall, the original advance party OIC, had returned to Japan. "Tokyo-Korea Traffic Heavy With Groupers: Radio Ops Keep Men Between Japan-Korea,"** *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 27, 8 November 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 26 Front interview, 2 June 2010.
- 27 LT William Brown, "History in the Making: Tales from South Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 16 August 1951.
- 28 Front interviews, 2 and 3 June 2010; Sig Front, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 13.
- 29 Front interview, 3 June 2010; Front, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 13.
- 30 Stevens letters (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 28 October 1951 and 2 December 1951.
- 31 Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 5 December 1951.
- 32 Broderick letter (Tokyo) to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 18 October 1951, Broderick Collection; Anthony Severino and Larry Meyer. "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 6, 20.
- 33 Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 27 December 1951.
- 34 Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 6 January 1952; Bob McCrory, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 33.
- 35 Front interview, 3 June 2010. **COL Thomas McNamara, the FECOM PIO, the former general manager of a radio station in Los Angeles, CA, helped CPL Sig Front publish several stories discovered by the Radio Seoul "Tape Team."**
- 36 UNCACK. Civil Assistance Team, Kyonggi Province, APO 59 letter, SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Group Supports UNCACK Program, 2 April 1952 (**This letter was signed by COL Charles R. Munske, the former CA team leader in P'yongyang, North Korea, from October-December 1950;** 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, APO 500, Radio Operations Division. "Report on Psywar Radio Operations in conjunction with the Korean Broadcasting System August 1951 – March 1952," USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter referred as "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952." **CPL Sig Front became the star of a UNCACK- sponsored film, the House Boy, made in Seoul in the spring of 1952. He played an American MP (military police) who helped a Korean house boy and his family.** Front, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 67.

- 37 Front interview, 3 June 2010; Front, "Personal Remarks," in *57th Year Reunion*, 13.
- 38 Front interview, 3 June 2010; Sig Front, "Personal Remarks," in *57th Year Reunion*, 13.
- 39 "Today's Heroes: Korea Christmas Story," *Chicago Times*, 10 December 1951; "Hospitalized Korean Girl Eats Solid Food Again," *Stars and Stripes Pacific*, 14 December 1951, Deerfield Collection; Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; Charles H. Briscoe, "Radio Pusan: Voice of South Korea," *Veritas*, Vol. 7. No. 2, (2011).
- 40 Front interview, 3 June 2010.
- 41 "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) undated, James B. Haynes Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 42 "Report on Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951 – March 1952."
- 43 Front interview, 3 June 2010; "Report on Psywar Radio Operations, 1951 – March 1952."
- 44 "Report on Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951 – March 1952."
- 45 Front interview, 3 June 2010; **PFC Sig Front probably missed the 1st RB&L Group executive officer's advice when he returned from Korea in late October 1951. MAJ William H. Buckley said, "Anyone making the trip in the future had better have 'long-handles,' two blankets, and a sleeping bag. It is definitely getting cold in Korea."** "Cramped, Cold and Weary Officers Return to City," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25, 1, 2, 25 October 1951, Broderick Collection. **Who "Rocky" was cannot be determined. However, no Navy Cross or Silver Star was awarded to a U.S. Marine named Rockefeller during the Korean War.** "Full Text Citations for Award of The Navy Cross to U.S. Marine Corps Personnel Korean War 1950-1953," http://www.homeofheroes.com/members/02_NX/citations/05_Korea-nc/nc_08korea_usmc... Accessed 11/1/2011; "U.S. Marine Corps Awards of the Silver Star for Conspicuous Gallantry in Action During the Korean War," http://www.homeofheroes.com/members/04_SS/3_Korea/indexes/index_USMC.html accessed 11/1/2011.
- 46 Front interview, 3 June 2010.
- 47 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 48 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 49 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 50 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 51 Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 30 January 1952.
- 52 *Life & Times* 2002, 189-191.
- 53 Stevens interview, 15 September 2010; "4th MRB Moves Company Headquarters to Seoul," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 5, 4, 1 March 1952, Broderick Collection; Marine Phoenix T-AP-195" at <http://www.historycentral.com/Navy/ap/marine%20phoenix.html> accessed 11/7/2011; "USNS Marine Phoenix (T-AP-195)" at <http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/22/22195.htm> accessed 11/7/2011.
- 54 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 55 Stevens interview, 15 September 2010; "4th MRB Moves Company Headquarters to Seoul," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 5, 4, 1 March 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 56 Stevens letter to Mabel Stevens from Korea, 24 February 1952.
- 57 Stevens letter to Mabel Stevens from Korea, 24 February 1952.
- 58 Stevens letter to Mabel Stevens from Korea, 24 February 1952.
- 59 Stevens interview, 15 September 2010; Stevens letter (Tokyo) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 20 January 1952; Herb Stevens, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 16.
- 60 Arnold Tepfer, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 November 2010, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 61 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 29 February 1952; Stevens interview, 15 September 2010.
- 62 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 29 February 1952; Stevens interview, 15 September 2010; "'Brass' on Tour of Korean Radio Plants," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 5, 4, 1 March 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 63 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 29 February 1952; Stevens interview, 15 September 2010.
- 64 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 13 March 1952.
- 65 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Steven, 13 March 1952.
- 66 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 19 April 1952.
- 67 1LT Robert L. Darcy, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Far East Command, "Circuit Tour" Report, September 1952, Box 2, Folder 6 and "U.N. Swaps Warnings and Bombs For Peace Table at Panmunjom," *Newsweek*, 18 August 1952 in Box 2, Folder 10, Darcy Collection.
- 68 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 69 John Stoddard, Radio Pusan S.O.P. undated, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company in Box 2, Folder 11, Darcy Collection.
- 70 Dr. Ken Kim, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 11 August 2010, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 71 Stoddard, Radio Pusan S.O.P. undated, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company in Box 2, Folder 11, Darcy Collection.
- 72 Stoddard, Radio Pusan S.O.P. undated, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company in Box 2, Folder 11 Darcy Collection.
- 73 Darcy, "Circuit Tour" Report, September 1952, Box 2, Folder 6, Darcy Collection.
- 74 Darcy, "Circuit Tour" Report, September 1952, Box 2, Folder 6, and "Psychological Warfare Interrogation of North Korean Security Officer Who Defected at Panmunjom, 5 September 1952," Box 3, Folder 8, Darcy Collection.
- 75 Darcy, "Psychological Warfare Interrogation of North Korean Security Officer Who Defected at Panmunjom, 5 September 1952," Box 3, Folder 8, Darcy Collection.
- 76 Darcy, "Psychological Warfare Interrogation of North Korean Security Officer Who Defected at Panmunjom, 5 September 1952," Box 3, Folder 8, Darcy Collection.
- 77 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 78 Stevens letter (Seoul) to Margaret and Mabel Stevens, 13 March 1952.
- 79 4th MRBC, 1st RB&L Group, Seoul Korea, *The Broadcaster*, 8 April 1952, Herbert L. Stevens Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **The 8 April 1952 Broadcaster announced that Radio Seoul began broadcasting on 6 April 1952.**
- 80 "Report of Psywar Radio Operations, August 1951-March 1952."
- 81 Front interview, 2 June 2010.
- 82 Front interview, 2 June 2010.
- 83 "Goslings See Frisco; Blue Pacific, On Trip," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 1, 4 October 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 84 Front interview, 2 June 2010.
- 85 Front interview, 2 June 2010.
- 86 Stevens interview, 15 September 2010; <http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/22/22110.htm> accessed 28 September 2010.
- 87 Robert L. Darcy, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 10 August 2010 and 10 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 88 Darcy interviews, 10 August 2010 and 10 September 2010.
- 89 Darcy interviews, 10 August 2010 and 10 September 2010.
- 90 Darcy interviews, 10 August 2010 and 10 September 2010.
- 91 Kim interview, 11 August 2010; Fred Brown, "Local man recalls Korea," Knoxville (TN) *News Sentinel*, 2 August 2010, A1, A9.
- 92 Kim interview, 11 August 2010.
- 93 Kim interview, 11 August 2010.
- 94 Kim interview, 11 August 2010; *Life and Times* 2002, 29; **2LT William C. Shepard had been the commanding officer of the 2nd Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company when the 1st RB&L was at Fort Riley, Kansas.** "Old Friend Visits 1st," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 17 January 1952, Broderick Collection.



Full Spectrum

Strategic Psywar 1952

UN Psywar Aligns with Allied Bombing Campaign in Korea

by Charles H. Briscoe

In early 1952, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) integrated its organic Psywar capabilities to complement UN strategic air operations. Far East Air Forces Command (FEAF) had to keep pressure on Communist military units, try to influence UN Command (UNC) armistice negotiations, minimize enemy air attack threats, provide close air support (CAS) for UNC forces, and interdict enemy logistical and communications systems.¹ Bomb warning leaflet drops coupled with radio broadcasts were natural Psywar operations. It prepared the 1st RB&L to execute Plan PATRIOT emphasizing Korean Independence.² These two efforts provided good examples for depiction in Operation EYEWASH, a traveling public information display that explained strategic and tactical Psywar operations in Korea to a variety of audiences in Japan.

The purpose of this article is to show how 1st RB&L expanded the UN air, sea, and ground power Psywar theme to exploit the Allied strategic bombing campaign in Korea. It will describe how that integrated effort prepared the Psywar group for Plan PATRIOT, a dramatic, full spectrum documentary that commemorated Independence Day in South Korea. These two missions brought all 1st RB&L capabilities into play and provided good material to illustrate tactical and strategic Psywar operations for Operation EYEWASH. These major successes earned accolades from the Far East Command (FECOM) G-2 Psywar Section and the South Korean president, Syngman Rhee. Though the 1st RB&L Operations and Intelligence Sections unilaterally developed the bomb warning leaflet mission, its well-coordinated linkage to the FEAF strategic bombing campaign was a Psywar coup. Identifying key players will promote better understanding and appreciation of these accomplishments.

The 1st RB&L Operations section responsible for Psywar leaflet operations was headed by two WWII veterans, Signal Corps Captain (CPT) Edward C. Janicek and Field Artillery First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert D.B. Carlisle.



CPT Edward C. Janicek (center, seated), 1st RB&L S-3 Operations Officer, provided guidance on the latest Psywar leaflet to (L to R) 1LT Elwin D. Hatfield, Chief, Leaflet Section, the Chinese cultural advisor, retired Nationalist Chinese Brigadier Zeng-tse Wong, 2LT Roy A. Gallant, Operations Section, and 1LT Frank R. Mickelsen, Chief, Art Section.

Another artilleryman, Second Lieutenant (2LT) James B. Haynes, Jr., Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Information & Education (I&E) Section, developed the Psywar bomb target list. Veteran CPT Robert A. Horn and Corporal (CPL) Thomas M. Klein were the Intelligence Section. Sergeant (SGT) Henry "Hank" Cavanaugh served as Operations Sergeant in the S-3. The Operations, Leaflets, I&E, and Graphics Sections of S-3 collaborated closely with the S-2 researching bomb targets and developing weekly leaflet target lists based on industrial studies of North Korea and the FEAF strategic bombing priorities. The Radio Section, S-3, composed the broadcast warnings for dissemination by *Radio Pusan*.³

With input from the RB&L staff elements a Psywar leaflet bomb target list was prepared and updated weekly. It supported the priorities of the strategic bombing campaign. 2LT Haynes, the chief coordinator, became *de facto* Liaison Officer to FEAF. As such, weekly he presented a list of seventy-eight leaflet targets to the 1st RB&L commander, Military Police Corps (MPC) Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, a WWII North Africa and France Psywar veteran, and Colonel (COL) C. Woodall Greene, Director, G-2 Psywar, FECOM for approval. Greene had served as General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur's Psywar Officer in the Southwest Pacific. There was nothing "magic" about the number "78"; it just happened to be the number of planned FEAF bombing missions at the time Psywar began compiling leaflet target lists.⁴

Once approved, LT Haynes hand-carried the list several blocks down the street to the FEAF headquarters for mission scheduling. There, the FECOM air component command staff that controlled all UN and U.S. air assets in theater turned the Psywar leaflet target list into air mission requests. That simple, routine "joint" staff action changed after the Secretary of the Air Force, Harold K. Finletter, praised FEAF for its "humanitarian bombing campaign in Korea."⁵



WWI Field Artillery Captain, Harold K. Finletter, succeeded William Stuart "Stuart" Symington as the second Secretary of the Air Force (24 April 1950 to 20 January 1953).



2LT James B. Haynes, Jr. became the 1st RB&L liaison officer to Far East Air Forces Command (FEAF) in Tokyo.

4th MRBC Bomb Warning Announcement for Radio Seoul

ANNOUNCER: We interrupt this program to bring a special bomb warning to the citizens of Sinchon (a North Korean rail and highway crossroads). This is URGENT.

United Nations bombers will destroy Communist war supplies, industries, and military targets in your town tonight. I'll repeat that. United Nations bombers will be over tonight to destroy military targets. Leave Sinchon now. Seek shelter! Get out of the danger area! The United Nations wants to save your life. The UN Air Force seeks only to destroy the war materials of the Communist aggressors. Don't be destroyed with them! Leave Sinchon now!⁸



Korean translator Chang Sang Moon (L) listens as the Radio Seoul production man, CPL Sigmund S. "Sig" Front (R), explains a broadcast.

The *ad hoc* joint integration accomplished by the 1st RB&L suddenly took on more importance. COL Greene, G-2 Psywar, adroitly deflected FEAF Lieutenant General (LTG) Otto P. Weyland's "lightning bolt" to LTC Shields. LT Haynes was directed to deliver his list of seventy-eight targets to FEAF headquarters as soon as possible. "When I got there, a red-faced Air Force colonel was waiting inside the entrance. He snatched the list from me, mumbled something about second lieutenants, and stormed off," remembered Haynes. "I knew then that my leaflet target list would no longer be treated routinely by the Air Force...and fortunately I had already flown a B-29 *Superfortress* leaflet mission in September 1951."⁶

With the UN humanitarian bomb raid warnings the Psywar leaflet and radio themes were able to expand beyond the threat of artillery and naval gunfire barrages. The art staff worked on leaflet designs, while the 3rd Reproduction Company, at the FECOM Publication Center facilities in Motosumiyoshi, mass printed leaflets on Webendorfer Offset and Harris LTV Stream-Fed presses.⁷ Then, the leaflets were packaged in door bundles for C-47 *Skytrain* delivery in Korea or loaded as rolls into M129E1/E2 500 lb. leaflet bombs for B-29 squadrons stationed in Japan and B-26 *Invader* elements on the peninsula. Dates, times, and sites of the FEAF bombing targets were contained in teletype messages to the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) stations in Korea. The U.S. Army radio officers at each KBS station were responsible for writing and broadcasting humanitarian bomb warnings an hour before the air attacks.

The radio warning announcement shown in this article was one of several hundred broadcast into North Korea in support of Operation "HOAX," the FECOM deception plan executed in mid-October 1952 to force the Communists back to the Armistice negotiation table.⁹ FEAF medium and light bombers combined with Allied, U.S. Navy, and FEAF fighter bombers averaged 1,000 sorties a day based

on Plans DEADLOCK and STRIKE supporting "HOAX." Military and industrial targets in North Korea were bombed, rocketed, napalmed, and machine gunned day and night when Communists stalled Armistice talks at Panmunjom.¹⁰ This combined UN-Army-Air Force-Navy effort employing the full spectrum of 1st RB&L capabilities prepared the unit for a special mission--highlighting Korean Independence Day, 1 March 1919.

In conjunction with the bomb target warning campaign, the 1st RB&L mounted a two-pronged Psywar operation called Plan PATRIOT in early 1952. It was to remind South Koreans that the Proclamation of Independence from Japan on 1 March 1919 was a defiant manifestation of nationalism. Preserving their independence was portrayed as a symbol of pride for the South Korean people. The 1st RB&L capitalized on this Psywar opportunity.

Plan PATRIOT depended upon leaflets from Japan and radio broadcasts originating in Korea. Since the 3rd Reproduction Company had just received the "Cadillac" model of printing presses from the States, PATRIOT provided an opportunity to demonstrate its worth. This state-of-the-art printing machine was the 35" x 45" Harris LTV Stream-Fed Multi-Lithograph press, capable of printing four-color leaflets in a single run. The older 17" x 22" Webendorfer Lithograph presses required separate print runs as each color was layered onto a paper product. This was tedious, demanding, and time-consuming because separate lithograph plates had to be "cut" for each color in the design. Print men had to fastidiously align the paper between color runs.¹¹ The leaflet "test run" prior to preparing the Plan PATRIOT products combined the UN flag with the national colors of the fifty-four member states.¹² As plans were made to print the flag leaflets, research on the 1 March 1919 activities was being done by the Group S-2 and S-3 Information & Education Sections to help artists portray Independence activities.

Operation HOAX: The Kojo Invasion Deception of 1952



At Taegu 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) paratroopers boarded C-119s and were flown to Japan. They donned parachutes and “Mae West” life preservers before boarding a 483rd Troop Carrier Wing U.S. Air Force C-119 Flying Boxcar.



Practice mass airdrops of the 187th ARCT were made in the Naktong Valley of Korea with C-119 aircraft in October 1950. (AP Photo)

It was suggested that infantry pre-deployment amphibious training be used as part of the deception. LCMs unloading and LVTs standing by on the Kalma Pando beaches, near Wonsan, North Korea, 26 October 1950 was typical of the amphibious training done in Korea.

During an interview First Lieutenant (1LT) James B. Haynes, Jr., 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) S-3 Liaison Officer (LNO) to Far East Air Force (FEAF) for Psywar leaflet targeting, mentioned a classified operation in the fall of 1952. He did not remember the codename and simply referred to it as Operation “HOAX.” Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) commander, established a temporary operations center. A Military Policeman (MP) was posted outside to control access to the room. All materials were locked in a safe nightly.²⁵ The 1st RB&L team formulated a special Psywar leaflet, got it approved, and printed in Yokohama.²⁶ It became part of the Psywar Annex to a very sensitive Far East Command (FECOM) deception plan.

UN naval surface operations in the summer of 1952 were routine blockade and patrol of the Korean coast, mine sweeping, and bombardment of coastal infrastructure (railways, roads, and shore batteries).²⁷ A coincidental assembly of Combined Task Force (CTF) 90 gunnery ships, the Naval Forces Far East (NFFE) Amphibious Force, and four fast attack aircraft carriers in September 1952 prompted Rear Admiral (RAdm) Francis X. McNerney, the CTF 90 commander, to suggest that the infantry regiment pre-deployment amphibious training be used as part of a major deception.²⁸ Vice Admiral (VAdm) Robert P. Briscoe, the NFFE commander, supported the idea.

General Mark W. Clark, the UN Commander, had been looking for an opportunity to “alarm” the Communists. The NFFE recommendation fit his needs and Clark directed the preparation of an operation plan. Two separate amphibious assault options at Kojo, a coastal village halfway between Wonsan and the bomb line, were planned: the biggest was a landing by two infantry divisions in column; and the smallest, an assault by a single regimental combat team (RCT). The planners were kept in the dark; only senior leaders knew that it was a deception. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, loaded amphibious ships in Hokkaido, Japan, bound for Korea. On 12 October 1952 [D-Day minus 3 (D-3)], amphibious assault landing rehearsals were conducted at Kangnung in 25 knot wind-whipped seas.²⁹

Simultaneously, the Naval Advance Force (Battleship *Iowa*, two heavy cruisers, and a flotilla of destroyers) bombarded the Kojo landing zone with naval gunfire while the four fast attack aircraft carriers launched airstrikes. General Otto P. Weyland, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) commander, ordered ten days of intensified air attacks against eastern North Korea to coincide with the NFFE efforts. Psywar warning leaflets would precede major airstrikes. A remarkable 667 sorties were flown by the two air fleets on D-3.

For three days mass parachute drops by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) were made in the Naktong Valley using C-46 *Commando* and C-119 *Flying Boxcar* aircraft. The airborne assault objective was Simpo-ri. During the night of 13-14 October (D-1), two U.S. IX Corps infantry battalions launched attacks to seize "Triangle Hill" and "Sniper Ridge" along the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) near Kumwha (Operation SHOWDOWN). The preparations were done, but poor weather on D-Day (15 October 1952) delayed airstrikes and the amphibious assaults.³⁰

Low clouds hindered the naval bombardment before the amphibious deception and the close air support (CAS). High, 50-knot seas threatened the boat landings. But, the airborne assault feint was executed on D-Day. Before dawn thirty-two C-119s had taken off from Ashiya Airbase in Japan heading to Korea. As they landed sequentially at Taegu, 187th ARCT paratroopers clambered aboard while a second airborne assault echelon was trucked to an airfield closer to the MLR. The air transport fleet assembled in formation over Taegu, then dropped down to 800 feet (parachute drop altitude) over Chorwon. Just short of penetrating North Korea, the air flotilla wheeled to the east and headed for Japan with thirty planeloads of disgruntled combat ready paratroopers.³¹

About 2 P.M., seven waves of landing craft (minus troops) set off in high seas for the line of departure (LD) offshore Kojo. After crossing the LD, the vessels swung back seaward to mask their lack of occupants. By nightfall the amphibious fleet was docked at Pohang, unloading the 8th Cavalry Regiment. On D+1, the remainder of the 187th ARCT paratroopers, their vehicles, and equipment was loaded aboard those same ships to go to Japan.³²



A Landing Ship, Tank (LST) approaching Pusan Harbor in the summer of 1950. (Photo courtesy of John Rich)

The question was: "Who was deceived?" Most American participants were fooled. The special Psywar leaflets printed to support the deception were destroyed. However, the standard Psywar warning leaflets continued to be dropped before scheduled bombing raids and the naval bombardments. Some of the unknowing air commanders were quite upset. Their pilots had assumed risks acceptable for a major amphibious landing. Five aircraft were shot down and two minesweepers damaged. Belief that the war was finally getting off dead center raised hopes and created excitement as the feint operations escalated. But, that elation was short lived especially after reality hit home with the American troops, airmen, and sailors. The 1st RB&L planners and leaflet preparers were among the "unwitting players."³³

No enemy movements of magnitude were detected around Wonsan to counter airborne and amphibious assaults during the preparatory and execution phases of the deception. However, on D+1, North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung and Minister Peng The-huai from Communist China sent a strongly worded protest to General Mark W. Clark complaining about the recess in the Armistice negotiations.³⁴ Allied bombing attacks, airstrikes, and naval bombardments had some effect.



Two soldiers from the 3rd Reproduction Company, Corporal (CPL) Seguisfredo Mercado (L) and Private First Class (PFC) Wilfred Lopez, carefully stack rolls of leaflets into a M129E1/E2 500 lb. leaflet bomb.

While 1st RB&L Korean artists in Tokyo sketched leaflet proposals supporting the Independence Day theme, radio broadcast writers worked on dramatic commentaries for Plan PATRIOT which were to be ready by 19 February 1952.¹³ In the meantime, 2LT Frank R. Mickelsen, the S-3 Graphics Section leader, and CPL Francis J. “Frank” Jackmen, a 3rd Reproduction Company soldier, visiting POW (prisoner of war) camps around Pusan to interrogate prisoners on the effectiveness of the 1st RB&L surrender leaflets, were enlisted by 2LT Eddie Deerfield at *Radio Pusan*. He wanted the port city searched for original signatories of the Proclamation of Independence. With help from the police, government officials, *Radio Pusan* interpreters, and interested citizens, the American soldiers managed to find three of the original thirty-one signers: two in Pusan (Assemblyman Lee Kap Sung and La In Hyop) and a third, O Se Chong, in Taegu, living in abject poverty, forgotten. The *Radio Taegu* detachment personnel recorded O Se Chong’s recollections. The commentaries were completed on 23 February 1952 for airing on the *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC) from *Radio Tokyo* studios and rebroadcast from *KBS* stations in Korea.¹⁴ This initiative prompted more ideas.

Special speeches by President Syngman Rhee and Lieutenant General (LTG) James A. Van Fleet, the EUSA commander, reinforced the significance of Korean Independence Day in 1952. Their recorded proclamations (LT Deerfield did President Rhee in Pusan and CPL Sigmund S. “Sig” Front did LTG Van Fleet in Seoul) connected the independence theme to war against the Communists. These recordings, one of which highlighted the sound of the Independence Gong (like our Liberty Bell), were sent to Tokyo to be incorporated into the broadcast programming.¹⁵ Deerfield reviewed the recording of President Rhee’s speech with U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio and his staff on 26 February 1952. The ambassador commented that the “speech was extremely mild compared to previous remarks” and left LT Deerfield to negotiate



Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee



LTG James A. Van Fleet, EUSA commander

redaction of “two offensive paragraphs” with Mr. Minn Tuk Ki.¹⁶ This completed the preparations.

Just twelve days after being alerted to prepare Plan PATRIOT, 1st RB&L was ready to execute. Six special multi-color propaganda leaflets that commemorated Korean independence had been produced, printed, and packaged for air delivery (24,445,000 were printed in eight days).¹⁷ The Korean weekly news sheets for 29 February had a color headline connected to the Independence Day celebration.¹⁸ An hour and a half of daily radio programming was dedicated by VUNC broadcasting from *Radio Tokyo* facilities. Plan PATRIOT, showing the solidarity of the UN alliance behind South Korea’s fight against Communism, was approved to run from 27 February through 2 March 1952.¹⁹

Considering that the execution would originate from *Radio Pusan* with reprogramming by all other *KBS* radio stations and VUNC, Plan PATRIOT demonstrated full spectrum exploitation of a Psywar theme. It epitomized the “most powerful Psywar program, a dramatic commentary that smoothly blended news and drama into something more easily digested and retained longer by the primary ‘target audience,’ the South Koreans”²² According to 1st RB&L Command Report No. 7, Plan PATRIOT turned February 1952 into a “banner month” for the Psywarriors because all elements in Japan and Korea contributed to the success.²³

These well-executed missions caused the FECOM staff to enlist the assistance of the 1st RB&L in a deception plan called Operation “HOAX.” Continued recalcitrance of Communist negotiators at the Armistice negotiations despite increased air and naval bombardment of North Korea prompted drastic measures—threat of UN amphibious and airborne invasions behind enemy lines. (See Operation “HOAX” sidebar). The deception plan, rehearsed and executed, however, did not cause the Communists to reinforce Wonsan to block an Allied “invasion.” Successful or not, the Chinese and North Korean delegates did return to Panmunjom shortly afterwards.²⁴ Despite these successes, promoting Psywar capabilities was a constant for the 1st RB&L.

The arrival of two Army National Guard infantry divisions, the 45th and 40th, in Japan was the impetus behind

the 1st RB&L Operation EYEWASH, an impressive Psywar public information briefing with an illustrative traveling display of tactical and strategic capabilities. Designed to promote better understanding of, and appreciation for Psywar, the visual "story boards" contained operational photographs and actual propaganda leaflets. While the mission was shelved in January 1952, it was resurrected later in the year.³⁵

"FEC Psywar's most ambitious production-piece to date hit the boards in a cleverly written, smoothly directed dramatic presentation designed to tell the story of Psywar," said *The Proper Gander*. The hour-long drama, "The Psywar Caper," directed by CPT Robert A. Leadley and 1LT Jack F. Brembeck, incorporating modern radio

and visual techniques, was capped by a "stupendous leaflet-drop finale."³⁸ "The Caper" was along the lines of a popular American radio program, "Sam Spade: Private Eye." SGT Leon H. "Lee" Nelson played "'Bogie,' a shamus with a past" while CPL Hanno Fuchs took Kay Dale [*Armed Forces Radio Station (AFRS) Tokyo*], acting as "Bogie's" co-worker/secretary, through all the steps of writing and producing Psywar radio shows broadcast in Korean. Then, leaflet production was explained by more Psywarrior "actors." Ideas, target audience, artwork, calligraphy, and press work were "whipped out in brisk fast-paced" dramatically-lighted scenes with realistic sound effects. The darkened finale started with a rising drone of B-29 *Superfortresses* approaching overhead. As the B-29 sounds

KBS "Proclamation of Independence" Programming (via Radio Pusan)

Wednesday, 27 February

0800	Memo to Home	Historical background of March 1 st
1830	Children's Hour	Patriotic poem about March 1 st
2130	Microphone Interview	Discussion of hopes for future

Thursday, 28 February

0800	Home Hour	Women in the March 1 st Movement
1830	Children's Hour	Songs of March 1 st

Friday, 29 February

0800	Memo to Home	Spirit of March 1 st
1830	Children's Hour	Drama on March 1 st Movement
1845	Round Table Talk	Historical significance of March 1 st
1900	Special	ROK Gen Lee Han Lim on Independence

Saturday, 1 March

0645	Special	Reading of original Proclamation of Independence
0800	Home Hour	Plans for March 1 st observance
1000	Special	Remote pickup of March 1 st
		Anniversary Ceremony in Korea
1745	Special	Speech by Defense Minister Lee Ki Bong
1815	Special	Speech by President Rhee to school children
1830	Children's Hour	Drama on March 1 st movement
1845	Special	Speech by Park Cong Hwa, president, Seoul Press
1915	Special	Speech by Assembly woman Mrs. Pak Sun Chun
1930	Special	Drama to commemorate March 1 st
2130	Special	Reading of President Rhee's proclamation

Sunday, 2 March

1745	Special	Patriotic songs
1845	Special	Chorus in spirit of Independence ²⁰

Note: Yun Chul Sung (the "Voice of Philosophy"), a commentary reader at Radio Pusan, built up a large following among South Korean listeners. Mimeographed copies of his presentations were mailed to listeners who requested them (750 sent by 29 February 1952). Yun Chul Sung explained in his 29 February Korean Independence Day commentary how the UN was helping Korea help herself. He also described how various UN agencies were working with the ROK government on a huge rehabilitation program that would repair war damages countrywide.²¹


Mr. Yun Chul Sung, the most popular broadcaster at Radio Pusan, did three commentaries daily.



Operation EYEWASH

Operation EYEWASH entailed designing and producing a twelve-panel traveling Psywar field exhibit. It was to demonstrate how Psywar used various media (print, radio broadcasting, and loudspeakers) at the tactical and strategic levels. The exhibit was to educate personnel

on capabilities and show how Psywar complemented combat operations.³⁶ EYEWASH was first demonstrated to the FECOM Women's Club on 15 May 1952 in the Tokyo Officers' Club.³⁷



Psywar Planning Display, Tokyo, 1952.




Psywar Broadcast Display, Tokyo, 1952.

Charged with telling the Psywar story that demonstrated tactical and strategic capabilities with operational examples, Sergeants John A. Davenport, Larry Meyer, and Robert C. McConaughey did an outstanding job laying out a very complicated, educational exhibit using

graphics, illustrations, and photographs. The verbiage explained everything concisely and clearly. These period photos demonstrate the quality of the production and show why the three sergeants were specifically commended by LTC Shields, the 1st RB&L commander.



Psywar Deployment Display, Tokyo, 1952.



Operation RAT KILLER



Psywar Employment Display, Tokyo, 1952, misnamed Operation RAT KILLER.



1st RB&L Group leaflets to encourage civilian support during Operation RAT KILLER.



Major General (MG) Paik Sun-yup conducted the largest anti-guerrilla campaign of the war in southwestern Korea from December 1951 to March 1952. With loudspeaker teams from the Eighth Army 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company and leaflets and a mobile radio station from 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (RB&L) broadcasting surrender appeals in conjunction with his 'cordon & search' tactics, great success was achieved. After two operational phases, nearly 6,000 guerrillas/bandits had been captured

and 4,500 killed. By the end of RAT KILLER, Task Force Paik had managed to kill or capture 19,000 insurgents.¹

Endnotes

- 1 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group leaflet #8377, "Dissident Elements in South Korea," 13 December 1952, Robert L. Darcy Papers, Box 4, Folder 4, Manuscript Collection, U.S. Army History Institute, Carlisle, PA; John A. Squicciarini, 1st L&L, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 November 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 182-183.

faded thousands of specially-designed Psywar leaflets fluttered down on the delighted, applauding audience. It was plain that Psywar sold itself that afternoon.³⁹ "Mom (Mrs. Homer E. Shields) was the 'hit for the day' among the FECOM ladies. Dad had already taken my younger brother, Joe, and me to lunch at the Club to see the display," remembered Timothy L. Shields. "It was really done well."⁴⁰

Operation EYEWASH was a collective effort. More than fifty people were involved in "The Psywar Caper" and "untold hundreds of hours" were invested to prepare and validate the presentation.⁴¹ The key architects of the mobile Psywar display, Sergeants John A. Davenport, a Franklin School of Professional Art [New York City (NYC)] graduate, Larry Meyer, a Pratt Institute (NYC) artist/illustrator, and Robert C. McConaughy, a University of Nebraska journalist, received Certificates of Achievement and Letters of Commendation from LTC Shields.⁴² EYEWASH was ready to educate the U.S. Army infantry divisions in Japan on Psywar.

The successful accomplishment of these missions demonstrated that the 1st RB&L was fully capable of coordinating and executing a variety of missions simultaneously with FEAF and the South Korean government. Unintentionally, the 1st RB&L had demonstrated

how strategic Army Psywar could improve the UN air campaign. The Korean Independence Day programs that personally involved President Syngman Rhee were a UN Psywar coup because it boosted the ego of the longtime nationalist and gave Washington and New York a temporary respite from his reunification rhetoric. After surpassing the one billion mark for Psywar leaflets dropped on North Korea in December 1951 and with well-established broadcast programming at VUNC and *Radio Pusan*, the G-2 Psywar Division shifted from direct involvement in all aspects of Psywar to simply providing strategic Psywar guidance and approving 1st RB&L products. The bomb warning leaflets and Plan PATRIOT showed that Psywar was 'value-added' to UN combat operations in Korea. Operation EYEWASH illustrated how the 1st RB&L applied all of its Psywar capabilities to support UN and FECOM war efforts. ♣

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.



SGT Robert C. McConaughy,
S-3 Information & Education Section,
1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group

Robert C. McConaughy was born 23 March 1928 in Lincoln, Nebraska to a banker father and a mother who managed the university bookstore. He wrote for the newspaper and yearbook before graduating from Lincoln High School in 1945. Majoring in journalism at the University of Nebraska, McConaughy worked summers for KLMS. After completing his degree in 1949, he was a news and sports commentator and late night disc jockey at KLMS until drafted in the fall of 1950. Six weeks of infantry basic training at Fort Riley, KS preceded six weeks of chemical warfare schooling at Edgewood Arsenal, MD. Then, the smoke generator operator with a college degree was sent to Fort Myer, VA to be evaluated for Psywar. Private (PVT) McConaughy was among the first three sent to the 5021st ASU (later 5021st Psywar AU) at Fort Riley, KS. There, he began researching and writing lessons plans for Psywar Courses. When Private First Class (PFC) Frank A. Tennant, a UCLA journalism graduate, started the 1st RB&L newspaper, *The Proper Gander*, at Fort Riley, PFC "Magoo" McConaughy was drafted as a writer and later became co-editor. As a Sergeant (SGT) he was NCOIC (Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge) of the S-3 Information & Education Section, the impetus behind the unit Christmas card in 1951, a key player in Operation EYEWASH, and co-editor of *The Life and Times* in 1952. 1LT James B. Haynes, Jr. said it best: "SGT 'Magoo' ran the I&E Section; he was really the one in charge, especially so when I was the liaison Officer to FEAF."⁴³

Endnotes

- 1 Far East Air Forces Command Report, November 1952, Volume II from Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 397.
- 2 James B. Haynes, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 17 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 3 Haynes interview, 17 September 2010.
- 4 **Having a very competent SGT Robert C. McConaughey, as the I&E Sergeant, LT Haynes filled the *ad hoc* position of 1st RB&L Liaison Officer to the Far East Air Force in Tokyo.** Haynes interview, 20 September 2010.
- 5 Haynes interview, 17 September 2010.
- 6 Haynes interview, 17 September 2010. **LTC Homer E. Shields flew on a B-29 leaflet drop over North Korea on 29 August 1951. 343rd Bombardment Squadron (M), 98th Bombardment Wing (M) ADVON, APO 328 Memorandum for Record, SUBJECT: Tax Exemption dated 1 September 1951. COL Homer E. Shields Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter referred to as Shields Collection.**
- 7 Charles R. Broderick letter (Yokohama) to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 22 January 1952 in Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Broderick letter and date.
- 8 Robert L. Darcy Collection, Box 2, Folders 10 and 13, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, news clipping, "U.N. Swaps Warnings and Bombs For Peace Talks at Panmunjom," *Newsweek*, 18 August 1952 hereafter cited as Darcy Collection with appropriate box and folder therein.
- 9 U.S. Department of the Navy. James A. Fields, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations KOREA* (Washington, DC: Naval History Division, 1962), 444; Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), 494.
- 10 "U.N. Swaps Warnings and Bombs for Peace Table at Panmunjom," *Newsweek*, 18 August 1952 and unsourced "Pyongyang Target Blasted in Hour-Long B-29 Raid," in Box 2, Folder 10, Darcy Collection.
- 11 Broderick letter (Yokohama) to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 2 February 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 12 "Psywar Pushes Independence Theme" and "Mickelsen, Jackman Return from Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 5, 1, 2, 4, 1 March 1952, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Broderick Collection.
- 13 Command Report, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, 8239 AU, APO 500, Headquarters and Service Command, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 1-31 January 1952, National Archives (NARA) Record Group (RG) 319, Box 5840, Folder 1: 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, Jan-Mar 1952, hereafter cited by NARA Record Group, Box, and Folder; *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 5, 1, 2, 4, 1 March 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 14 Command Report, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, 1-29 February 1952, NARA Record Group 319, Box 5840, Folder 1: 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, Jan-Mar 1952; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Psychological Warfare Section, First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, APO 500. Psywar Leaflet #1162, "The Meaning of March 1, 1919," in Korean dated 20 February 1952, Haynes Collection; "Psywar Pushes Independence Theme," *The Proper Gander*, 1 March 1952, 1, 4, Broderick Collection.
- 15 Command Report, 1st RB&L Group-29 February 1952, NARA, Record Group 319, Box 5840, Folder 1: 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, Jan-Mar 1952, retired LTC Eddie Deerfield, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Sigmund S. Front, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 3 June 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 16 Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Gp, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Co, Radio Pusan, APO 59, 1LT Eddie Deerfield letter to CPT Fred Laffey, SUBJECT: Report on American Embassy Reaction to Syngman Rhee Declaration of Independence Speech, 27 February 1952; Deerfield letter to CPT Robert A. Leadley, SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Radio Operations on Korean Broadcasting System from Pusan, Korea, 31 March 1952, Eddie Deerfield Collection, Box 4, Folder 1: Reports to Psywar HQ, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, hereafter cited as Deerfield Collection.
- 17 Command Report, 1st RB&L Group, 1-31 January 1952, NARA, Record Group 319, Box 5840, Folder 1: 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, Jan-Mar 1952.
- 18 Command Report, 1st RB&L Group, 1-29 February 1952, NARA Record Group 319, Box 5840, Folder 1: 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, Jan-Mar 1952.
- 19 GHQ, FECOM, 1st RB&L Group Psywar Leaflet #1162, "The Meaning of March 1, 1919," in Korean dated 20 February 1952, Haynes Collection; "Psywar Pushes Independence Theme," *The Proper Gander*, 1 March 1952, 1, 4, Broderick Collection.
- 20 1LT Eddie Deerfield excerpted portions of the recorded speeches by President Syngman Rhee, Assemblyman Lee Kap Sung, BG Lee Han Limb, and *Seoul Press* president **Park Chong Hwa**. Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Gp, 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Co, Radio Pusan, APO 59, Deerfield letter to CPT Robert A. Leadley, SUBJECT: KBS Declaration of Independence Programming, 2 March 1952, Deerfield Collection, Box 4, Folder 1: Reports to Psywar.
- 21 1st RB&L Group, 4th MRBC, Radio Pusan, Deerfield letter to CPT Robert A. Leadley, SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Radio Operations on Korean Broadcasting System from Pusan, Korea, 31 March 1952, Deerfield Collection, Box 2, Folder 2: Radio Script, Psywar in Combat.
- 22 "Ideas in Action," undated *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) article, Haynes Collection.
- 23 Command Reports, 1st RB&L Group, 1-29 February 1952 and 1-31 March 1952, NARA, Record Group 319, Box 5840, Folder 1: 1st RB&L Group, 8239th AU, Jan-Mar 1952.
- 24 Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, 497; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 329.
- 25 Haynes interview, 22 September 2010.
- 26 **1st RB&L, Classified Psywar leaflet #1221 for North Korea was printed in mid-September 1952. It is most likely that leaflet #1228, "UN Overwhelming Power" dated 26 September 1952 was that dropped by Far East Air Forces (FEAF) because it contained cutout photos of an aircraft carrier, battleship, a fighter-bomber aircraft, heavy artillery, and a tank.** Haynes Collection; Robert C. McConaughey, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 5 October 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 27 Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 328.
- 28 Fields, *History of United States Naval Operations KOREA*, 444; Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, 494.
- 29 Fields, *History of United States Naval Operations KOREA*, 444; Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, 494.
- 30 Fields, *History of United States Naval Operations KOREA*, 444, 445; COL Robert I. Channon, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 7 September 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; **1st RB&L Classified Psywar leaflet #1221 for North Korea was printed in mid-September 1952, but all were destroyed.** Haynes Collection; Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, 494-496.
- 31 Fields, *History of United States Naval Operations KOREA*, 445; **Contrary to Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, the 187th ARCT paratroopers had loaded aboard the C-119s at Taegu and were prepared to combat jump into North Korea, when the air transport fleet wheeled about and headed to Japan. This was related by the former 187th ARCT S-3 Plans Officer, CPT Robert I. Channon.** Channon interview, 7 September 2011.
- 32 Fields, *History of United States Naval Operations KOREA*, 445; Channon interview, 7 September 2011.
- 33 Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, 497; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 329.
- 34 Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, 497; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 329.
- 35 McConaughey interview, 5 October 2010.
- 36 Thomas M. Klein, Robert J. Herguth, and Robert McConaughey, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: 1952 Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group...50 Years Later 2002* (Round Hill, GA: Round Hill Productions, 2002), 214, hereafter cited as *Life & Times 2002*.
- 37 "Groupers Combine Acting, Technical Talents to Produce Top Notch Professional Drama," *The Proper Gander*, 19 May 1952, 2, Darcy Collection, Box 2, File 9; Timothy L. Shields, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 19 January 2011, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 38 "Groupers Combine Acting, Technical Talents to Produce Top Notch Professional Drama," *The Proper Gander*, 19 May 1952, 2, Darcy Collection, Box 2, File 9.
- 39 "Groupers Combine Acting, Technical Talents to Produce Top Notch Professional Drama," *The Proper Gander*, 19 May 1952, 2, Darcy Collection, Box 2, File 9.
- 40 Shields interview, 19 January 2011.
- 41 "Groupers Combine Acting, Technical Talents to Produce Top Notch Professional Drama," *The Proper Gander*, 19 May 1952, 2, Darcy Collection, Box 2, File 9.
- 42 McConaughey interview, 5 October 2010; *Life and Times 2002*, 160-161, 214-215.
- 43 Haynes interview, 20 September 2010; McConaughey interview, 4 October 2010.

Full Spectrum

Contrasts in Independence

March 1st and Plan PATRIOT

by Charles H. Briscoe

Korean Independence, 1 March 1919

On 22 August 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea, ending the Chosŏn dynasty. General Terauchi Masatake became the first governor-general of Korea and Japanese minister of armed forces. Religion was the only organized activity permitted by the Japanese military government. During the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, President Woodrow Wilson promulgated self-determination for oppressed peoples everywhere. Though Korean nationalists applied, attendance was denied to Dr. Syngman Rhee, head of the North American Korean delegation and to the exiled New Korea Youth Party representative who carried a petition for independence. However, Korean university intellectuals and students at home were not deterred by the rebuffs and appealed to religious leaders for support.¹



Independence Proclamation signatories gathered in a Seoul teahouse on 1 March 1919 to sign the document.

This watercolor depicts the clashes between Korean citizens and Japanese military and police after the Independence Proclamation was made public.



Thus, on 1 March 1919, Son Pyŏnggi read the Proclamation of Independence in Pagoda Park, Seoul. Secretly authored by poet Ch'oe Namsŏn, the proclamation had been signed by thirty-one Christian, Ch'ondogyo, and Buddhist leaders. The signatories and students that had rallied a crowd were quickly arrested and interrogated. Nonviolent demonstrations spread like wildfire throughout Korea as did the simple mantra, "*Mansei* (Long live) Korean independence!" The gatherings prompted Japanese authorities to respond and violence escalated. After six weeks more than 7,000 Koreans were dead, another 15,000 injured, and 40,000 imprisoned.²

The "March 1 Movement" spawned no less than five provisional governments in Seoul, Vladivostok, and Shanghai. They were finally united in Shanghai on 9 November 1919 as the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. American-educated Dr. Syngman Rhee was named president and General Li Tung Hui, the prime minister.³ Today, both North and South Korea celebrate *Samil Undong Il*—"March First Movement Day"—that symbolizes the struggle for independence.⁴



Dr. Syngman Rhee



President Woodrow Wilson



Early Provisional Government of Korea, circa 1919.



Koreans gathered in Pagoda Park in Seoul on 1 March 1919 to listen to the Proclamation of Independence from Japan.



Non-violent *Mansei* marches supporting independence from Japan took place throughout Korea in the spring of 1919.



In 1920, Korean communities in California marched in support of the independence movement at home.

Plan PATRIOT Contrasted 1919 Nationalism with Communist Aims in 1952

The 5"x 8" product (below) on green paper explaining the significance of March 1, 1919, was the first propaganda leaflet approved for Plan PATRIOT. Mr. Kyoo-Teck Kim, a Korean civilian artist working for 1st RB&L in Tokyo, did the illustration of a Korean crowd cheering as the Proclamation of Independence was read publicly on March 1, 1919. Mr. Kim took great pleasure in this project because he was among the crowd on that auspicious day.⁵ The leaflet contrasted the 1919 spirit of independence and nationalism with Communist aims in postwar Asia and promoted the slogan "Tong Il Dog Lip Mansei" just like America and Great Britain adopted the "'V' for Victory" sign during WWII.

Another leaflet for Plan PATRIOT entitled "1919 Revolt" (right) was directed towards North Koreans encouraging them to break free from Communist slavery. An illustration emphasizing the *Taikuk* flag contained a forlorn figure huddled against the cold. ▲



Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

1. Djun Kil Kim, *The History of Korea* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2005), 125-127; Andre Matles Savada and William Shaw (editors) *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, June 1990), 20.
2. Kim, *The History of Korea*, 128-130. **The Japanese casualty numbers are typically low and Korean statistics tend to be exaggerated.**
3. Kim, *The History of Korea*, 132; E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (NY: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951), 38.
4. Frank Gosfield and Bernhardt J. Hurwood, *Korea: Land of the 38th Parallel* (NY: Parents' Magazine Press, 1969), 70.
5. GHQ, FECOM, 1st RB&L Group Psywar Leaflet #1162, "The Meaning of March 1, 1919," in Korean dated 20 February 1952, Haynes Collection; "Psywar Pushes Independence Theme," *The Proper Gander*, 1 March 1952, 1, 4, Broderick Collection.
6. GHQ, FECOM, 1st RB&L Group leaflet #1162 dated 20 February 1952, Haynes Collection.



Excerpts from the leaflet (above):

"Now, during Korea's desperate life struggle against the barbarous Communists...now as this country's life blood flows in the streets and in the mountains...now the spirit of Son Pyong Hee and the Independence Declaration must burst out across the land.

Together, every Korean must again shout 'Tang Il Dog Lip Mansei.' Write it on the walls, on the buildings, in the snow and in the sands. To every friend you meet say, 'Mansei.' Together, every Korean must stand in freedom, strong against the Reds..."⁶



Full Spectrum:

FEAF's Humanitarian Bombing Campaign in Korea

by Charles H. Briscoe

The Far East Air Forces Command (FEAF) conducted and was praised for its “humanitarian bombing campaign in Korea.”¹ The Air Force Secretary publicly announced that key North Korean industrial, military, and infrastructure sites were bombed only after the civilian populace had been forewarned by airdropped leaflets and radio broadcasts. UN humanitarian bomb raid warnings allowed the expansion of the Psywar leaflet and radio themes beyond the threat of artillery and naval gunfire barrages. While the art staff worked on leaflet designs, the 3rd Reproduction Company, operating in the FECOM Publication Center facilities in Motosumiyoshi (between Yokohama and Tokyo), made the lithographic plates and mass printed leaflets on Webendorfer Offset and Harris LTV Stream-Fed presses.² Then, they were packaged in door bundles for C-47 *Skytrain* delivery in Korea or loaded as rolls into M129E1/E2 500 lb. leaflet bombs for B-29 squadrons stationed in Japan and B-26 *Invader* elements on the peninsula. Teletype messages to the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) stations in Korea contained dates, times, and sites of the FEAF bombing targets. In conjunction with this the U.S. Army radio officers at each KBS station were responsible for writing and then broadcasting humanitarian bomb warnings an hour before the air attacks were scheduled. ▲

To keep track of what specific leaflets were delivered to FEAF bombing squadrons, a copy was pasted on the casing of each M129E1/E2 500 lb. leaflet bomb with the Target Group (TGTGRP) chalk-marked on the nose. This one was Target Group “A.”



Leaflet #1069 was designed to dissuade North Korean civilians from repairing military airfields. The three panels show the bombing, repair, and return attacks by United Nations bombers.



Leaflet #1101 is a two-sided anti-morale flyer targeted towards NKA and North Korean civilians. The back side is printed with the message: "I believed that the war would end soon, that I would be able to return home safely."



Leaflet #1100 emphasizes the Communist intent to divide the country on the 38th Parallel.

1st RB&L Artillery, Naval Gunfire, and Bomb Warning Leaflets


Psywar focused simultaneously on hearts and minds to create fear, raise suspicions, seed doubt, spread confusion, and emphasize wartime hardships. By stressing overwhelming UN firepower it was reasoned that the soldiers' will to fight and civilian support of the war would be weakened.³ The warnings cited the deliberate Communist abstention from the Armistice negotiations and recalcitrance on specific points as the rationale for increased air and sea attacks.




"Naval Power" contained a photo of a UN warship firing a broadside against North Korean coastal military targets. The backside had a graphic depiction of the destruction. It was designed to warn civilians away from military targets and discourage North Korean troops.



This leaflet contained detailed pictographs for illiterate North Korean civilians.



"UN Artillery Power" depicted a North Korean soldier kneeling in the center of a large bulls eye and on the opposite side, the results: a large shell crater where the soldier used to be.



This "Bombing of North Korean Airfields" leaflet showed a bomb-pocked North Korean airfield after B-29 Superfortress raids.



This leaflet depicting aerial destruction of enemy supply lines had bombs with UN and member nation flags and the backside had a picture of U.S. Navy F-1 Phantom fighter bombers attacking a train, railroad bridge, and a North Korean truck convoy.



Designed to emphasize UN materiel superiority the sides of this leaflet had pictures of a B-29 Superfortress, F-84 Thunderjet fighter bomber and F-86 Sabre fighter jets. A 155 mm "Long Tom" and 8" heavy artillery, an M-46 Patton medium tank, a battleship, and an aircraft carrier were overlaid on a blue & white UN flag.



A B-29 Superfortress bombing North Korean industrial targets was used on one side and the back was an aerial photograph of a rail yard being hit with high explosive bombs.




A graphic depiction of bombs falling on a munitions factory was back-sided with a three-part pictograph showing North Korean police confiscating warning leaflets and civilians being forced to work despite the bomb threat.

Plan DEADLOCK & Plan STRIKE Leaflets

This Plan DEADLOCK leaflet focused on the willingness of the Communists to sacrifice North Korean lives by refusing to negotiate a just Armistice.



This leaflet supporting Plan STRIKE was one of a series that explained that Armistice stalemates by the Communists would result in retaliatory air attacks. It had a map of North Korea showing the principal B-26 light bomber targets: railroads, bridges, airfields, and troop assembly points.




Another Plan STRIKE leaflet had a map depicting key North Korean transportation-supply-communications lines with major cities identified.


Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Haynes interview, 17 September 2010.
- 2 Charles R. Broderick letter (Yokohama) to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 22 January 1952 in Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Broderick letter and date.



Bomb destruction of a rail line in North Korea was emphasized in this Plan STRIKE leaflet.



The pictographs in this Plan STRIKE leaflet illustrated bomb targets: North Korean soldiers, transportation, military supply points; and military vehicle repair facilities.

RIGHT MAN FOR THE JOB

COLONEL CHARLES H. KARLSTAD

BY MICHAEL E. KRIVDO



In mid-1952, the Army's senior Psychological Warfare (Psywar) officer, Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, faced a dilemma. As head of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), he had finally secured permission to create a center and school for both Psywar and Special Forces (SF). Now he needed the right man to bring this project to fruition, an officer with a solid reputation and the perfect combination of Army Staff and schools experience to man, fund, and resource it to make it operational. This task was daunting; the man chosen would be commander of the forces assigned to the Center, Psywar and SF units, and the school commandant who trained and educated officers and soldiers assigned to those units. And because many of the Army's senior conventionally oriented officers remained unconvinced of the necessity for special operations, the new Psychological Warfare Center and School (PWCS) had to be formed posthaste and conduct business at the highest level of professionalism. It had to survive the intense scrutiny of the Army Staff and the Army Field Forces. On 12 May 1952 BG McClure selected Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad to implement his vision of the PWCS.¹


But who was the officer entrusted with this most difficult task? Military historians have traditionally overlooked COL Karlstad and his critical role in the development of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). They have instead focused on more colorful personalities like Karlstad's subordinate, COL Aaron Bank. But it was COL Karlstad who became the first commander of the forces assigned to the Psywar Center (PWC), both Psywar and SF, establishing initial guidelines and priorities that shaped the development of each SOF unit into eventual service branches. As its first commandant, Karlstad also created and then saved the Psywar School (PWS) as an independent Army service school responsible for Psywar and SF training. A closer look at his credentials will reveal why BG McClure chose him as the PWCS's premier Commander and Commandant, and why he relied upon Karlstad to defend and preserve the PWCS and ARSOF capabilities during the post-Korea drawdown.²

Charles Herbert Karlstad was born 26 December 1894 in Castlewood, South Dakota, the middle child of seven and the second son of three boys. His parents were Norwegian immigrant farmers of modest means and they supported him through South Dakota State College, the "West Point of the Plains" where he earned a Bachelor of Science in

General Agriculture in 1917. Soon after Congress declared war on Germany in April 1917, a Regular Officer Board selected Karlstad as one of 10,000 candidates to become officers in a planned expansion of the military. He reported to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, in May 1917 to attend the First Officer Training Camp. Three months later, he accepted a reserve commission as a second lieutenant of Infantry.³

As one of the first new officers in a rapidly expanding army, Karlstad found himself tasked with training tens of thousands of Americans joining the armed forces. Reporting to the 88th Infantry Division (ID) at Camp Dodge, a National Army post that had sprung up almost overnight on the outskirts of Des Moines, Iowa, the quiet, efficient leader soon demonstrated his ability to handle tough assignments. The division commander gave Lieutenant Karlstad a company and told him to organize a machinegun school. For almost a year Karlstad trained new recruits on the art of machinegunnery, preparing them for combat in Europe. Since the 88th ID served initially as a training division for the Army, Karlstad taught hundreds of machinegunners only to watch them ship out for France.⁴ Accordingly, Karlstad became a top-notch trainer with a keen sense for mobilization issues that would serve him well later.

Serving as the officer-in-charge (OIC) of machinegun training, Captain (CPT) Karlstad played a significant role in the development of U.S. Army machinegun tactical employment. A cutting-edge military technology in 1917, the machinegun represented the application of industrial power to warfare. In Europe, this weapon changed the momentum of battle, and made the defense the stronger



COL Charles H. Karlstad

Panoramic composite photo of Camp Dodge, Iowa, in 1917.





A British sergeant trains American soldiers on the Vickers .303 cal. Mark 1 medium machinegun.



A British Vickers .303 cal. Mark 1 medium machinegun employed at the Battle of the Somme.

of the two forms of warfare. Machineguns sited to fire across division fronts broke up infantry attacks with deadly effect, causing unprecedented numbers of casualties. The U.S. military learned from the European experience. Soldiers and Marines trained with the latest Allied medium machinegun versions, the British Vickers .303 cal. Mark 1 and the French Hotchkiss 8 mm Lebel M1914. A select few became familiar with the American-made Browning 30-06 cal. M1917 heavy machinegun. By the time America entered the war both sides experimented with ways to employ machineguns offensively to break the stalemate. Assisted by visiting Allied officers, junior leaders like CPT Karlstad assessed the use of carts and trailers in crew drills to speed up the employment of those weapon systems during infantry attacks. With the success or failure of division and regimental operations so heavily dependent on the proper employment of its heavy weapons, the commanders made the training of gunners a high priority and trusted only their most capable officers to command those units and teach machinegun tactics.⁵

Just when it seemed that the 88th ID might spend the war only as a trainer of the Army's soldiers, the unit deployed to France. Major (MAJ) Karlstad, commanding the 338th Machine Gun Battalion, embarked his unit on the steam ship *Kashmir*, a contracted British vessel. They left Brooklyn, New York, on 15 August 1918 and arrived safely in Liverpool, England, thirteen days later. After the *Kashmir* took on supplies, MAJ Karlstad's unit left for Cherbourg, France, and joined the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) on 1 September. They arrived in time to fight first in the Haute-Alsace Sector and then in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the last major battles of the war.⁶

Following the 11 November 1918 armistice, MAJ Karlstad transferred to the 4th ID to command its 11th Machine Gun Battalion during the occupation of Germany. He established his headquarters in the town of Brohl, in the Rhine River Valley area east of Koblenz. There, Karlstad maintained law and order within the district by performing a number of constabulary functions (now considered as Civil Affairs [CA] duties)

in conjunction with the local Weimar government officials. The infantry major performed well and earned a Letter of Appreciation from Lieutenant General (LTG) Hunter Liggett.⁷

The rapid demobilization of the armed forces after the war meant grade reductions for those few Reserve officers allowed to remain on active duty. MAJ Karlstad reverted back to captain in 1920, but his consistently high performance also earned him a Regular Army commission.⁸ Like many of his peers, he spent the interwar period in a variety of command and staff positions throughout the U.S. (Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Douglas [near Salt Lake City, Utah]; Camp Lewis, Washington; and Fort Sam Houston, Texas), plus a two-year assignment in the Philippines in the late 1920s.⁹ Ever the professional, Karlstad placed 11th on the Army national rifle team in 1924.¹⁰ During the lean years of the U.S. Army CPT Karlstad became known as a solid, dependable leader who stood apart from his peers.

Between field commands, CPT Karlstad distinguished himself as a student and instructor at several Army schools. After attending the Officers' Infantry Course in 1922, he served as a tactics instructor for four years, a pattern he repeated throughout the interwar years. In 1933 CPT Karlstad completed the two-year U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, qualifying him for future assignment to the General Staff Corps (GSC), the equivalent of today's Department of the Army (DA) staff. School tours had other benefits. At CGSS, CPT Karlstad developed lasting professional relationships with



88th Infantry Division SSI from WWI



Command & General Staff School Crest



4th Infantry Division SSI



4th ID Commanders with GEN John J. Pershing (1). MAJ Karlstad (2) is over Pershing's left shoulder and MAJ Edward M. "Ned" Almond (3) (CG, X Corps during Korean War) is to Karlstad's left.

Majors J. Lawton Collins (future Army Chief of Staff), Daniel Noce [postwar Civil Affairs (CA) Chief], Charles A. Willoughby [G-2 and Chief of Staff for General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur], and CPT William F. Marquat [another CA/ Civil Military Operations (CMO) specialist]. His classmates at the 1936 Army War College in Washington, D.C., included Majors Robert A. McClure, Norman D. Cota (planner of the Normandy landings), and Charles B. Lyman (division commander under GEN MacArthur). After graduating, MAJ Karlstad was assigned to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, to participate in the Army's postwar reconstitution.¹¹

By then, events around the world were causing concern among American political and military leaders. The Japanese Army brutally seized Manchuria and attacked China, the Germans perfected their combined arms tactics against Republican factions in Spain, and Benito Mussolini's Italian military forces invaded Ethiopia. At less than 200,000 strong, the American military ranked seventeenth among the world's armies in terms of the number of men in uniform. Furthermore, the U.S. Army consisted of several under-strength WWI-era 'square' divisions of four regiments apiece. These units had little mobility and an unwieldy, highly centralized command and control structure. Compared to its potential enemies, the American Army still travelled predominantly on its feet and its firepower and agility in combat fell far below that of the Japanese, Germans or Italians. To fix these problems and make better use of available manpower, some Army officers advocated reorganizing into smaller, 'triangular' divisions comprised of three maneuver regiments, each having its own transportation and combat support. To evaluate a new base organization and corresponding doctrine, the Chief of Staff directed that the 2nd ID, one of the few divisions at full-strength because of its duties along the Mexican border, test those concepts through field maneuvers.¹²

The Army staff created a special observer group to evaluate, analyze, and report on the 'test division' maneuvers and MAJ Karlstad joined that team. For five long, hard months he labored as part of what has been described as "the most elaborate evaluation program conducted by the army up to that point."¹³ Evaluators accompanied the maneuver elements everywhere and provided their observations to the chain of command. The consolidated report supported fundamental changes in structuring infantry divisions and helped shape new tactical doctrine. Based on his experiences, MAJ Karlstad asserted that the new triangular structure and recommended improvements in mobility and fire support made it more "maneuverable and relatively [more] powerful" than the square division it would replace. He further remarked that other tested changes in the employment of supporting weapons and greater use of noncommissioned officers in combat leadership roles gave the triangular unit greater sustainability in modern combat.¹⁴ Based on the 2nd ID maneuvers the Army made plans to transform the infantry division structure from



BG Daniel Noce



BG Robert A. McClure



U.S. Soldiers manning a Hotchkiss 8mm Lebel M1914 medium machinegun in action.



A Machine Gun Battalion training in France.

the slow, cumbersome, foot-mobile, 'square' WWI model to the more nimble, flexible, faster, 'triangular' formation that still works well today. And Karlstad helped influence that transition.¹⁵

After the division tests, MAJ Karlstad returned to Fort Leavenworth as CGSS faculty. During his two years as an infantry instructor he taught hundreds of officers the latest infantry and combined arms tactics associated with the new 'triangular' combat formations. Essentially, Karlstad trained the WWII generation of battalion and regimental commanders, providing them with solid foundations in new infantry tactics and staff planning, soon to be tested in combat.¹⁶

Because of his previous experiences, in 1940 the Army detailed Karlstad as an umpire for the Third Army Louisiana Maneuvers, specifically with IX Corps headquarters. Building on the triangular division tests of 1937, these maneuvers focused on developing command and control procedures for larger Corps and Army-level commands "over long distances against a mobile enemy . . . under combat conditions."¹⁷ In short, the Army tasked some of its best young thinkers to produce the tactical doctrine and command and control procedures for future wars. Among the officers controlling the exercise were innovative leaders such as COL George S. Patton, Jr., who experimented with important concepts like integrating "the combined action of combat aviation and mechanized forces" to increase combat power.¹⁸ Conducted while the German *Wehrmacht* and *Luftwaffe's Blitzkrieg* smashed through France, U.S. news coverage of the American maneuvers graphically exposed the sad state of the American Army. The German, Japanese, and Italian successes added a sense of urgency to correct the identified shortcomings as the threat grew overseas.¹⁹

After the 1940 maneuvers, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Karlstad joined the G-3 in the War Department General Staff (WDGS). By the time



Legion of Merit with Oakleaf Cluster



Silver Star




Bronze Star

America declared war on the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, COL Karlstad was Chief, Army Mobilization Branch in the G-3, responsible for national conscription and integration of U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard into the wartime structure. For two critical years he managed the expansion of the Army from its small peacetime size of less than 300,000 to over 4 million soldiers, the largest the nation has ever mobilized. Between 1941 and 1943, the infantry expanded an incredible 600 percent, creating a consequent increase in the need for training capacity, new bases, weapons, and infrastructure, all requiring coordination through Karlstad's office. His Legion of Merit (LOM) citation from that time modestly understates that he "contributed materially to the best utilization of our military manpower during a critical period."²⁰

In September 1942, the WDGS rewarded COL Karlstad with command of the newly formed 62nd Armored Infantry Regiment at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. That assignment included command of Combat Command A (CCA), a brigade-size, task-organized, combined arms ground combat element of the 14th Armored Division (AD). Combat Commands generally consisted of an armored infantry unit mounted in M2 or M3 halftracks, a tank battalion of fifty-four M-4 Sherman tanks, a self-propelled armored field artillery battalion, and a troop of mechanized cavalry with M8 Scout Cars and/or MB and GPW jeeps.²¹ COL Karlstad diligently trained his unit for combat and deployed to Europe, going ashore at Marseilles on 29 October 1944. From that point on he spearheaded the Seventh Army armored assault across France and into Germany. In January 1945, counterattacking a "sudden, violent attack" by the German 21st Panzer Division that threatened to penetrate friendly lines gained him a Bronze Star Medal for valor.²² The "brilliant tactics, meticulous


'Square' vs. 'Triangular' Divisions

World War I Era 'Square' Infantry Division Structure



The 'square' division of WWI draws its name from each echelon consisting of four maneuver units. Despite a marked lack of mobility, its extra combat firepower and large size (22,000 to 28,000 soldiers) made it a good fit for the demands of static trench warfare since it could absorb high casualties and remain combat effective.

World War II Era 'Triangular' Infantry Division Structure



In the 'triangular' division structure, each echelon contains three subordinate maneuver elements and organic fire support. The addition of motorized assets and its smaller size (about 15,000 soldiers) made the triangular division more mobile and agile. In 1939 the Army formed five triangular divisions out of three square division structures.

[See Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Center of Military History, Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), 9-12; Kenneth Finlayson, *An Uncertain Trumpet: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 127-37]



A Sherman tank of the 14th AD smashes into a German camp holding Allied POWs.

14th Armored Division SSI, "The Liberators."

planning and keen foresight" displayed during the drive through the Vosges Mountains added an Oak Leaf Cluster to Karlstad's LOM.²³ Finally, he "organized and personally led two armored combat commands in a well-coordinated assault on the enemy main line of resistance [the Siegfried Line] inflicting great losses on the enemy." For opening a path into Germany, the CCA commander earned the Silver Star.²⁴ On 2 April 1945, the Army promoted Karlstad to Brigadier General (BG).²⁵

Karlstad's most significant combat action took place in late April 1945 when CCA, 14th AD successfully attacked and seized bridgeheads over the Isar River (east of Munich), near the towns of Moosburg and Landshut. BG Karlstad had served in that same region while on occupation duty following WWI. His men faced elements of the 17th *Waffen-Shutzstaffel* (SS) Panzer Grenadier Division and the *Wehrmacht's* 719th ID. To capture bridges before the enemy could destroy them, Karlstad's lead elements charged fifty miles on 28 April, getting within four miles of the town of Moosburg by dusk.²⁶

On the morning of 29 April, a German staff car flying a white flag came from the direction of Moosburg. An SS major asked to meet with the senior American officer. Karlstad obliged him in nearby Putthausen. The German officer boldly proposed a ceasefire and "the creation of a neutral zone surrounding Moosburg."²⁷ The SS officer sought a halt to all military troop movements to discuss "the disposition of the Allied prisoners of war [POWs] in that vicinity." The fact that allied POWs were nearby came as a surprise to Karlstad and he quickly radioed his division commander. The two agreed that the Germans were attempting to hold the POWs hostage until they could withdraw safely across the Isar. BG Karlstad acted immediately to free the prisoners and demanded an unconditional surrender from the Germans.²⁸ Negotiations came to an end.

Karlstad joined his lead tank battalion to break through the dug-in enemy position and headed for the POW camp. The Americans quickly surrounded it as several tanks rammed through two ten-foot high concertina wire fences. Another element captured the guard force and

isolated them from the freed POWs. BG Karlstad and his men were shocked to discover that they had liberated the largest Allied POW camp in Germany, freeing 110,000 prisoners from twenty-five nations. Among them were more than 30,000 Americans, some still listed as missing in action (MIA) from the 14th AD. Many of the prisoners had been relocated from other camps only weeks before as the Germans sought to keep them away from the advancing Allies. After calling forward support troops to care for the freed captives, Karlstad resumed his original task to seize the Isar River bridges.²⁹

Following V-J Day, BG Karlstad returned to the United States to command Camp Butner, North Carolina, and expedite the demobilization of the 4th ID. In January 1946, as part of the large-scale reduction in forces that accompanied demobilization, BG Karlstad reverted back to his permanent Regular Army (RA) grade of colonel. He also served as the South Carolina Military District commander for a year before becoming the Inspector General (IG) of Army Ground Forces, Pacific, in Hawaii. After attending several courses on atomic weaponry, he travelled throughout Pacific Command educating senior military commanders on nuclear capabilities.³⁰

In November 1949 Karlstad became Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia. This important position encompassed managing the day-to-day activities of several infantry officer and enlisted courses. COL Karlstad also oversaw all airborne training, to include the elimination of glider training at Ft. Benning, and became intimately involved in the creation of the Ranger Training Center (RTC), staffing it, and activating the Ranger infantry companies (Airborne) during the Korean War. In his capacity as Chief of Staff, COL Karlstad signed the orders resourcing those units and as a consequence played a major role in recreating of Ranger capabilities.³¹


Importantly, Karlstad provided highly creditable input in the Army's decision to operate the RTC after the deactivation of the Ranger companies in 1951 and was a key player in saving the Ranger School at Fort Benning. The Infantry School modified the original Program of Instruction (POI) to capitalize on the positive benefits of Ranger training to professionally develop junior infantry leaders. He also participated in Army and OCPW discussions to transfer the Ranger company personnel spaces to permit the forming of the new 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) in 1952. Shifting those spaces to the U.S. Army Psywar Center proved critical. Karlstad maintained a constant dialogue with BG Robert A. McClure and his staff in the Pentagon.³² This positive relationship determined Karlstad's next assignment.



Ranger Training Center Coat of Arms



The Infantry Center DUI



In early 1952, BG McClure made COL Karlstad his primary choice to be the first commander of the new Psychological Warfare Center and commandant of the Psywar School (PWCS). This proven combat leader with a career of training and education had been capably administering the Army's largest branch school before and during the Korean War. Karlstad was superbly qualified for the challenges of this new job. The Army staff approved McClure's choice and on 27 May 1952 COL Karlstad reported to Fort Bragg, NC, to form his command and to build a first class military school.³³

One of Karlstad's first major tasks involved getting the Army to recognize the PWCS as a formal service school. According to historian Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., some dissatisfaction within the Army G-3 and Army Field Forces existed due to perceptions that they had been side-stepped in the creating of PWCS. Those pockets of resistance had to be eliminated to gain formal school status that would bring increased levels of funding, personnel, authority, and higher resource priorities to survive through leaner postwar years. To accomplish that goal, COL Karlstad insisted on the writing of innovative joint and combined POIs and adhering to strict criteria in assessing and selecting SF volunteers. By establishing high standards from the beginning, the

Psywar School quickly earned a reputation for scholastic excellence. Simultaneously, Karlstad submitted solid staff actions to garner authority and proponentcy for developing doctrine, training plans, and educational standards for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces. These milestones were critical to getting the PWCS recognized by the Army as a formal institution of professional education. Having achieved that standing, COL Karlstad then submitted to the Institute of Heraldry for a distinctive unit insignia (DUI) for PWCS. It seems fitting that Karlstad's DUI remains today, representing the PWCS's legacy to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.³⁴

The requisite trappings to 'sell' the Army staff were: an approved PWCS mission statement; a public affairs program to educate the rest of the Army on what the center and school provided; and formal procedures, regulations, and directives. To accomplish this, COL Karlstad applied the same high standards of excellence that he had come to expect at The Infantry School to his new unit. In short order, the PWCS staff published an "Administrative Handbook," a "Guide for Staff and Faculty," an "Organization and Functions Manual," and other reference materials. The school staffs developed top-quality POIs with Army-standard class outlines, handouts,



**Psywar Center
DUI, 1952**

and reference materials. The PWC's 6th Radio Broadcast & Leaflet (RB&L) Group's presses produced these products for the several courses offered at the school. These efforts served two purposes: they established a high standard of professionalism within the PWCS; and the intellectual rigor behind those products educated the Army on the requirement to develop special operations capabilities. The

commander's intent was evident in all of these. Karlstad had succeeded in raising the performance bar to that of a premier Army school, thereby swaying most former critics to support the PWCS's mission.³⁵

Grumbling by some original SF veterans that they were subordinated under a Psywar-oriented command is unwarranted.³⁶ There would have been no SF without the Army granting recognition and authority to the PWCS to promulgate special operations doctrine, training, and educational standards, and that organization living up to its responsibility by producing doctrinal products in an exemplary fashion. BG McClure had the foresight to gain the Ranger Company billets used to create SF, and Karlstad assisted in that effort. And OCPW staff did the initial recruiting for SF personnel, but Karlstad formalized and legitimized the process and gained airborne school seats to train them. Furthermore, the PWCS commander leveraged the clandestine nature of SF functions as a rationale for rigidly adhering to high recruiting standards for the newly formed 10th SFG. COL Karlstad also initiated the first twelve-week SF courses to qualify men for the rigors of that duty. And while the 10th SFG commander, COL Aaron Bank, wanted ground-breaking Unconventional Warfare (UW) exercises with civilian role-players, it was Karlstad's staff that fought for and won the approval and funding that made them possible. COL Karlstad also provided the bridge between his SF Department and DA to ensure high quality applicants, to establish SF training classes and annual quotas, and to acquire the training funds, support, and resources. Furthermore, the PWCS and OCPW staffs built the SF Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and got it approved by the Army Field Forces Command. This had to be accomplished to authorize use of the Ranger company force structure spaces to flesh out the new SF units. To make all these pieces come together in a professional and competent manner required a leader who, as Bank personally characterized Karlstad, was "a lean, energetic organizer and disciplinarian."³⁷

Karlstad applied his professional and intellectual expertise to help define the role of SF in UW. He advocated the primacy of SF in a UW environment and challenged his Psywar and SF Departments to provide students with quality instruction, sound tactics, and superior equipment to allow them to "function effectively against enemy forces."³⁸ The founding commander of the PWC is also credited with producing the first widely accepted definition of UW as "a kind of war and a range of tactics," rather than

simply a subset of conventional conflict models.³⁹ Karlstad expended considerable effort to ensure that SF not only survived during this critical period, but filled a permanent, specific role in the full spectrum of warfare.

The Army's first PWCS commander and commandant retired as a brigadier general on 31 July 1953. After a few years travelling around the world he settled in Hawaii. His retirement proved short-lived. BG Charles H. Karlstad died in an automobile accident in Honolulu on 22 December 1960 and was interred at Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors.⁴⁰

In conclusion, BG Charles H. Karlstad merits classification as an ARSOF icon for the following reasons. First, he transformed the PWCS from its original provisional status to that of a recognized formal service school. Second, Karlstad insisted that quality POIs, backed by Army standard lesson plans, outlines, and handouts, be created for every course offered, thereby elevating the level of professionalism within the center and removing a potential source of friction that critics might have used to downgrade PWCS status. Third, COL Karlstad fought hard for (and won) the manpower, money, and logistics support needed to teach the various courses that provided the consistently high quality of instruction to Psywar and SF. Fourth, he advocated that the Ranger Course at Fort Benning continue to function long after the companies had been disbanded in 1951. Fifth, Karlstad insisted that only qualified soldiers be trained in SF skills and he personally helped champion the assessment and selection process. Sixth, in the short time he was the PWCS commander and commandant, COL Karlstad elevated that organization to the same level of administrative and instructional excellence as The Infantry School. Finally, he supported the effort to develop special operations doctrine and operational concepts, and he formalized the process to disseminate that information throughout the Army, educating future leaders on the emerging subjects of Psywar, SF, and UW. All of these achievements were made possible because of COL Karlstad's lifetime experiences as a superior educator and school administrator.



MAJ John D. Striegel, COL Aaron Bank, CPT Dorsey B. Anderson, and COL Charles H. Karlstad observe 10th SFG training at Fort Bragg, NC, 1952.



BG Charles H. Karlstad during WWII.


The most significant aspects about all of these accomplishments are that they were being done almost simultaneously and in just one year. It is extremely doubtful that Psywar would have lasted beyond Korea and that SF would have been established without the groundwork done by COL Karlstad under the direction of BG Robert A. McClure. Previously, the Army dismantled special operations units and training programs once a conflict ended. But through the determined efforts of these two men the Army reversed that trend and consequently formed and maintained a permanent SOF capability for future conflicts. ♣

Michael Krivdo earned his PhD in Military and Diplomatic History from Texas A&M University. He is a former Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance Officer with varied special operations research interests.

Endnotes

- For more background information on the process of establishing the PWC and School, see: Eugene G. Piasecki, "Smoke Bomb Hill: Birth of the Psywar Center, Part I," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 7:1 (2011), 94-102; Charles H. Karlstad, WD 66 Form (Officer's, Warrant Officer's, and Flight Officer's Qualification Record), Military Personnel File, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri (hereafter NPRC).
- The PWCS combined two functional entities (Psywar Center, and Psywar School) into one organization. The PWC provided command and control to both Psywar and SF units and developed doctrine, requirements, and convened a Psywar Board that focused on solving issues related to each field. The PWS served as the organization responsible for training and educating soldiers in SF and Psywar roles and missions. As Commander of the PWC and Commandant of the PWS, Karlstad assumed overall responsibility for the training, administration, fielding, and combat readiness of the Army's Psywar and SF units and personnel.
- United States, Bureau of the Census, *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900*, Microfilm Publication T623, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NARA), Roll 1550, page 8; "Charles Herbert Karlstad," U.S. Selective Service System, *World War I Selective Service System Draft Registration Cards, 1917-1918*, Microfilm Publication M1509, NARA, Roll 1877, 793; Department of the Army (DA), "Army Register, 1924," U.S. *Serial Set* 8284, Session vol. 23, 68th Congress, 1st Sess., House Document 29, 314; "Army ROTC: South Dakota State University," <http://armyrotc.com/ude/sdstate/history.htm>, accessed 18 April 2011; "First 10,000 Officers for First Army of 1917," *New York Times*, 6 May 1917; DA, Adjutant General's Office, *Official Army Register for 1922*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1922), 974.
- N.a., *The 88th Division in the World War of 1914-1917* (New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Company, 1919), 15, 30-35. **Division reports indicate that the officers of the 88th ID trained approximately 50,000 soldiers between 17 September 1917 and 1 August 1918.**
- For information regarding the influence of machineguns in WWI, see War Department, *Changes in Organization Found Necessary during Progress of the European War* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1916), 7-10; and John Ellis, *The Social History of the Machine Gun* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), passim.
- Manifest of the SS *Kashmir*, 15 August 1918, RG 92 (Office of the Quartermaster General, Army Transportation Services) Entry 2061, Box 458, Folder 579.3, NARA; Edgar J. Dwight Larson, *Memoirs of France and the Eighty-Eighth Division* (Minneapolis, MN: Published by the author, 1920), 9; *88th Division*, 35, 16-17, 157; *The Bayonet*, Columbus, Georgia, 17 November 1949, 3; "Army Register, 1924," 314; War Department, *Battle Participation of Organizations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, Belgium and Italy, 1917-1918* (Washington: GPO, 1920), v, 35, 88.
- Charles H. Karlstad WD 66 Form, NPRC; Christian Albert Bach and Henry Noble Hall, *The Fourth Division: Its Services and Achievements in the World War* (Issued by the Division, 1920), 243-45, 282, 311-12.
- "Army Register, 1924," 314.
- "Service Orders," *Washington Post*, 3 April 1927, S11; Manifest, USS *Grant*, 19 July 1929, RG 85 (Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service), Microform Publication M1410 (Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at San Francisco), NARA, Roll 251, 6; United States, Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930*, Microfilm Publication T626, NARA, Roll 2420, 1A; [Morning] *Oregonian*, Portland, Oregon, 16 April 1921, 4; *Washington Post*, 13 March 1936, 26.
- Washington Post*, 26 July 1924, S4.
- Karlstad WD 66, NPRC; *Washington Post*, 3 April 1927, S11; *Bayonet*, 17 November 1949, 3; War Department, "Army Register, 1935," *Serial Set* 9945, Sess. Vol. 33, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 January 1935, H. Doc 36, 368; War Department, *Annual Report of the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1932-1933* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1933), 4-6; "Gen. Craig to be Chief Speaker for Army Graduations in City," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1936, TM7; *Washington Post*, 13 March 1936, 26. **Karlstad had crossed paths previously with McClure, since the two officers attended both the Infantry Officer Course and CGSS together (the latter for one year before McClure graduated in 1932) [see Annual Report of the Command and General Staff School, 1931-1932 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1932), 5].**
- "Gaps in American Preparedness," *Newsweek*, 28 August 1939, 11. See Christopher R. Gable, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Center for Military History) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), 9-11, particularly the tables on 10 and 11. **The 'square' divisions of the early 20th century were typified by two brigades with two regiments each. In those units, control of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets was generally managed at the highest level. 'Triangular' divisions were characterized by three maneuver regiments of three battalions apiece with increased organic mobility assets and weaponry. Triangular divisions also generally pushed command and control down to lower levels, giving those commanders greater latitude in conducting fire and maneuver.**
- Karlstad WD 66, NPRC; Kenneth Finlayson, *An Uncertain Trumpet: The Evolution of U.S. Army Infantry Doctrine, 1919-1941* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 127-37, quote from 130.
- Quotes from War Dept., "Unit Tests: Proposed Infantry Division, Test #1, 13-14 Oct 1937," RG 394, Box 18, Entry 250, TMs, NARA, 10; also in Finlayson, *Uncertain Trumpet*, 130. Charles Karlstad to Captain Maertans, 22 December 1937, "Unit Tests: Proposed Infantry Division, 29 October 1937," RG 394, Box 15, Entry 250, TMs, NARA, 3.
- Karlstad WD 66, NPRC; Finlayson, *An Uncertain Trumpet*, 127-37, quote from 130.
- Commandant, *Annual Report, Command and General Staff School, 1938-1939* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1939), 4; Commandant, *Annual Report, Command and General Staff School, 1939-1940* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School Press, 1940), 3; Orville Z. Tyler, Jr., *The History of Fort Leavenworth, 1937-1951* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1951), 76.

- 17 Quote from Training Instruction, "Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940," Third Army Headquarters, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 18 Quote from Training Instruction, "Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940."
- 19 For further descriptions of these maneuvers and their influence on Army development before WWII, see Gable, *U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941*, 12-15. Gable particularly highlights the contrast between widely shown newsreel footage of Germany's *Blitzkrieg* tactics and the spectacle produced by newspaper coverage of American soldiers using wooden tubes and poles to simulate weapons, and trucks with "Tank" written on their sides for armored vehicles.
- 20 John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, *Army Lineage Series, Infantry, Part 1: Regular Army* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1972), 58-59; Karlstad WD 66, NPRC; Quote from Karlstad File, Citation for Legion of Merit, G.O. No. 42, War Department, 24 May 1945, NPRC. During the period Karlstad worked on mobilization issues, from July 1940 to September 1942, the peacetime Army expanded from having less than 300,000 active servicemen under arms to a robust organization of over 4 million, a remarkable increase in size of almost fifteen times. And it was still expanding exponentially [see Historical Division, *United States Army in World War II*, vol. 1 (1947); reprinted, Washington, DC: GPO, 1950], 6-13, 161].
- 21 According to Kurt Willinger and Gene Gurney, *The American Jeep in War and Peace* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1983) (and other sources), the designations "MB" and "GPW" stand for Willys' Military model B jeep, and the equivalent Ford manufactured Government Passenger vehicle, Willys design.
- 22 Karlstad WD 66, NPRC; quote from Karlstad Bronze Star Medal Citation, w.G.O. No. 16, HQ 79th Infantry Division, 27 January 1945, Karlstad Personnel File, NPRC, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 23 Quote from Karlstad Legion of Merit Citation (Oak Leaf Cluster), G.O. No. 208, HQ, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 28 August 1945, Karlstad Personnel File, NPRC, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 24 Quotes from Karlstad Silver Star Citation, G.O. No. 40, HQ, 14th AD, 8 May 1945, Karlstad Personnel File, NPRC, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 25 *New York Times*, 3 April 1945, 20.
- 26 Jim Lankford, "The 14th Armored Division and the Liberation of Stalag VIIA," *On Point: The History of Army History*, Fall 2005, (Army Historical Foundation, Arlington, VA), found online at: < <http://www.armyhistory.org/ahf2.aspx?pgID=877&id=213&exCompID=56>, accessed on 19 May 2011.
- 27 As quoted in Lankford, "Liberation of Stalag VIIA."
- 28 Charles B. MacDonald, *The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations*, vol. 9, *The Last Offensive* (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), 436-37; Lankford, "Liberation of Stalag VIIA; U.S. Army, "Combat Command A: History," New York Public Library, 21-22; Statement of former POW Frank D. Murphy to Dave Kanzler, October 2004, text online at: <http://www.moosburg.org/info/stalag/murphyeng.html>, accessed 19 April 2011.
- 29 Lankford, "Liberation of Stalag VIIA;" Timothy O'Keeffe, *Battle Yet Unsung: The Fighting Men of the 14th Armored Division in World War II* (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2011), 272-75; *New York Times*, 30 April 1945, A3; *New York Times*, 1 May 1945, A4; "Combat Command A," 22.
- 30 *Bayonet*, 17 November 1949, 3; Certificate of Death for Barbara Dale Karlstad, 7 February 1946, North Carolina State Board of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Microfilm S.123, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, NC; Karlstad WD 66, NPRC.
- 31 Headquarters, The Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA, General Orders No. 149, 7 November 1949, RG 337 (HQ, Army Ground Forces & Army Field Forces), Entry UD 83 (Infantry Training Records), Box 1 (General Orders, 1946-50), Folder 2 "List of Papers 1949," NARA; *Bayonet*, 10 November 1949, 1; *ibid.*, 17 November 1949, 3; "One Year Ago..." *Bayonet*, 30 November 1950, 25; *Benning Herald*, Columbus, Georgia (Monthly), December 1951, 23; *ibid.*, May 1952, 4; Karlstad WD 66, NPRC. Headquarters, Ranger Training Center, Fort Benning, GA, "Diary of the Ranger Training Center," 17 October 1950, Entry for 2 October 1950, RG 339, Entry 190, Folder "RTC History 50-52," NARA; Headquarters The Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA, "Selection and Assignment of Personnel for Ranger Training Section, The Infantry School, 26 October 1950, RG 339, Entry 190, Box 10, Folder "RTC History 50-52," NARA; HQ, Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA, General Orders No. 83, 27 October 1950, RG 339, Entry 190, Box 10, Folder "RTC History 50-52," NARA.
- 32 As Chief of Staff of The Infantry Center, COL Karlstad helped develop and approve a new Program of Instruction (POI) for a new 8-week Ranger Course to "provide practical field training of the highest standard for rifle company commanders, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and squad leaders . . . to improve the training capabilities and leadership of infantry units within the Army." Quote from The Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, "Program of Instruction for Ranger Course (7-OE-15)," 1 July 1952, RG 337 Box 705, Folder "350/40," 1, NARA. Several other examples of Karlstad's close involvement in Ranger training can be found in RG 337 (Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, 1916-1956), Series UD 83 (Infantry Training Records), Box 1 (General Orders, 1946-50), Folders 1 (1950 General Orders) and 2 (General Orders, 1949); RG 337, Series UD 83, Box 10 (General Records: 1950 and 1951), all at NARA.
- 33 Karlstad WD 66, NPRC; Psychological Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, "Activation of the Psychological Warfare School," PWC to OCPW, Fort Bragg, NC, 12 September 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 34 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* ([1982], revised ed., Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 140-41; Psychological Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, "Activation of the Psychological Warfare School," USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Troy J. Sacquety, "A History of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School Insignia," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 5:3 (2009), 41-45. One of Karlstad's first initiatives involved producing new POIs, Lesson Plans, Student Handouts, and other materials for each of the courses taught at the school. These were written to his exacting specifications and served to demonstrate the high level of excellence that the school staff operated at. These items accurately reflected the elevated professionalism of the staff and instructors observed by outside inspectors and students. In "Activation of the Psychological Warfare School," Karlstad proudly argued that the PWS had already graduated "334 students," from every U.S. service and from six allied nations, "with all the dignity and prestige that accompanies a diploma from a service school." One month later, the DA G-3 agreed with Karlstad's position and designated the PWS as a service school (DA Gen. Order 92, 22 October 1952, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC).
- 35 For examples of such administrative products, see HQ, PWC, "Organization and Functions Manual," 12 November 1952; HQ, PWC, "Administrative Information Handbook," Psychological Warfare Seminar, 17-19 December 1952, Fort Bragg, NC; PWS, "Guide for Staff and Faculty," April 1953, and several other publications of a similar nature, all in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 36 For example, see Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 164, 171.
- 37 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 141, 145-49; "Administrative Information Handbook," HQ, PWC, 17-19 December 1952, 2-3, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Karlstad to DA G-3, "Initial Special Forces Course at the Psychological Warfare School," HQ, PWC, 17 September 1952, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Herbert I. Abelson, et al., "Factors Related to the Effectiveness of Special Forces Personnel," 5 August 1954, George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, operating under contract with the Department of the Army, can be found on the Internet at: <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0379522>, accessed on 19 April 2011; Karlstad to Robert A. McClure, HQ, PWC, Fort Bragg, NC, 12 September 1952, RG 319, NARA; Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets*, 170-85, quote from 170. The GWU study cited above became a framework document for describing in psychological terms the type of individual believed best suited for SF, and it became the foundation for the early SF assessment and selection process. The authors of the GWU study specifically credited Karlstad with originating and supporting the study. And in the document "Initial Special Forces Course," Karlstad provides detailed guidance for administering and teaching the course, deciding that school training of SF personnel would produce better trained individuals than the alternate method of unit training, the option favored by some 10th Group leaders.
- 38 "Administrative Information Handbook," HQ, PWC, 17-19 December 1952, 2-3, quote from 2, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 39 McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 38-39, quote from 39. McClintock specifically cites Karlstad as the author of that definition of UW.
- 40 *Stars and Stripes* (Europe, Mediterranean, and North Africa Edition), 28 July 1953, 3; *Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957* (Microfilm Publication T715), Record Group 36 (Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service), National Archives, Washington, DC, Roll 8442, 283; *Army, Navy, Air Force Journal* 98 (1960), 488; Department of Veterans Affairs, "Nationwide Gravesite Locator," <http://gravelocator.cem.va.gov/>, accessed on 18 April 2011. BG Karlstad rests alongside his wife, Barbara Dale Karlstad, in Section 6, site 9312-A at Arlington.



During the almost seven years of postwar Allied Occupation, Japanese media, labor, and political parties were strictly controlled to effect a peaceful transition to democratic government. That changed on Monday, 28 April 1952, when sovereignty was restored following U.S. Senate ratification of the peace treaty. Both the old guardians of peace and Japanese officials were caught by surprise when Japanese Communists seized control of a labor-organized May Day assembly three days later (Thursday), turning it into an anti-American riot.

Over 300,000 people had gathered among the oak and willow trees of Meiji Park on 1 May 1952 for a peaceful labor rally. The largest unions, joined by Socialists, Communists, radical left-wing groups, and some 'fellow travelers,' would voice their opposition to an anti-subversion bill in the Japanese Diet. Folk dancing to traditional music entertained the working classes and their families before distinguished guests spoke.

Just as the labor union organizer, Minoru Tanako, started his announcements, a group of determined young Communists seated in the first row, jumped up, and charged forward. They quickly clambered onto the platform, grabbed the microphone, and hustled American Socialist, Norman M. Thomas, and the other scheduled speakers off the stage. Then, Japanese and North Korean Communist agitators exhorted a crowd of 10,000 to begin a snake-dance parade towards the Imperial Plaza three miles away in the heart of Tokyo. Along the way to the denied area U.S. military and

civilians were harassed. Marching rioters screamed "Yankee, go home" and hammered the sides of American cars caught by the human wave engulfing major streets. Then, well-organized teams violently rocked vehicles and methodically smashed out windows and headlights, terrifying those inside.

The assaults on U.S. automobiles were the prelude to serious street fighting. The poles carrying labor banners and flags became steel-reinforced bamboo spears, iron pipes, and wooden clubs. Awaiting the frenzied mob in the plaza fronting the Imperial Palace was a square of four hundred Japanese policemen. They were sent to disperse the primitively armed rioters. After the rear ranks pelted police with rocks and bricks, bags of offal, and tear gas, hundreds of rioters in front screamed "Banzai!" to beating drums and charged against them. Flankers felled policemen from behind. While Communist messengers carried orders into the ranks, teams of girls stood by to help the injured reach safety and first aid stations.

American military safely atop Allied headquarters buildings watched beleaguered police fight rioters hand-to-hand for two and a half hours. Among them were 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) 'Gander' soldiers taking pictures and 'rubber necking.' Reinforced to 2,000 strong, police in full combat gear managed to disperse the Communist-led rioters with tear gas and pistol shots fired close overhead. As the sun was setting, only moaning, bleeding rioters, torn banners, broken spears, and abandoned clubs littered the Imperial Plaza.

The May Day Riots

by Charles H. Briscoe

Along street curbs, overturned American automobiles set afire, glowed into the twilight. The carefully planned and orchestrated Communist May Day riot left three dead and more than 1,400 people injured. The Japanese commoners, unaccustomed to violence at home, were shocked. The next day dozens of flower bouquets were presented to American families by embarrassed Japanese neighbors.

The May Day riots in Tokyo were a 'wake up' call for all Americans who had enjoyed privileges accorded 'conquerors' during the postwar Occupation and Japanese officials unused to and unprepared for all the aspects of democracy. Gone were the days of Far East Command (FECOM) Officers of the Guard (OGs) wearing shiny helmet liners and carrying 'facsimile' pistols. American military police (MPs) and guards and Japanese paramilitary police were on 'full alert' for the traditional birthday greeting by Emperor Hirohito on 3 May 1952. The OG, Second Lieutenant (2LT) James B. Haynes, Jr., 1st RB&L, had a steel helmet on and a loaded .45 caliber automatic to check the FECOM guard posts. He was escorted by a squad of combat-equipped MPs bearing M1 carbines and .45 caliber pistols. Japanese paramilitary police units were pre-positioned out of sight in lobbies of the largest buildings surrounding the Imperial Palace. Sergeant (SGT) Cecil A. Beckman, 3rd Reproduction (Repro) Company 'pulled' his only guard duty in Japan on 2 May 1952. The steel-helmeted admin sergeant marched back and forth atop a wall surrounding the FECOM Print Plant in Motosumiyoshi


with a shotgun at port arms. His vigilant presence was highlighted by two large spotlights.

While prepared for the worse scenario, nothing happened on 3 May. The Communists went 'to ground' following the riots. After the diminutive, spectacled Emperor in 'black tails and silk topper' humbly encouraged his people to embrace the tenets of democracy, keep faith with other nations, and solidify the foundations of the state, he was surprised, but pleased by resounding choruses of "Banzai!" from 10,000 people respectfully gathered on the Plaza. It would be several days before 1st RB&L personnel, who had watched the rioting, realized that 'their' Japan was no more. But, it happened at the time when most of the original 'Ganders' were close to finishing their two-year military service obligation and thus, the Tokyo riots of 1952 provided a memorable finale for many Psywar veterans.¹ ♠

Endnotes

- 1 Michael Rougier and Jun Miki, "Rioting Japanese Reds Tee Off on the Yankees," *Life*, Vol. 32, No. 19, 12 May 1952, 24-29; "Japan: Troubled Springtime," *Time*, Vol. 59, No. 19, 12 May 1952, 29, 31-32; James B. Haynes, Jr. Cecil A. Beckman, and Timothy L. Shields, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 22 September 2010, 1 October 2010, and 19 January 2011 respectively, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Cecil A. Beckman, Peter R. Lee, Barton S. Whaley, and Marvin Werlin, "Memories" in Thomas M. Klein, Anthony E. Severino, and Robert C. McConaughy, *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group, 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 20, 21, 24, 34.

* Denotes photos credited to *Life* magazine, 12 May 1952



Lead Communist elements of the parade hurled a police barricade at a U.S. Army 6 x 6 truck by the Imperial Plaza. 1st RB&L soldiers were among those watching from the rooftop of Empire House. "The guys in the unit hit the streets with their cameras, remembered Marvin Werlin, 1st RB&L veteran.*"

Protests began...

(Right) The May Day rally in Meiji Park began with entertainment by dancing girls and music. Spectators enjoyed ice cream cones and bean curd cakes while others waved festive, colorful banners.*

(Below) Japanese Communists swarmed the speakers' platform from ringside seats.*



Young labor, left-wing political followers, and radical students snake-danced down the main street with English language signs, cursing Americans, and yelling "Yankee, go home!" until their chanting turned into a vociferous roar.*



Student and labor union members carrying protest banners continued their snake-dance into the Imperial Plaza during the May Day riot. The banner and sign poles were later used as weapons. "In the middle of this chaos, someone shouted, 'My God, that's Margaret Bourke-White!' Sure enough, standing on top of a wrecked car was the world famous *Life* photographer and journalist taking photos of the riot," said Marvin Werlin, 1st RB&L veteran. (*Life*, Photo taken by Margaret Bourke-White, 2 May 1952)

Norman M. Thomas, American Socialist Party, was among the sponsored speakers forced off the platform.*



SGT Joseph E. Dabney, 1st RB&L, related that as Communists marched and burned automobiles, many went to the top of buildings to view the police and Communists in hand-to-hand combat.



Communist leaders yelling "Banzai!" exhorted the confused crowd to fall in line for a march to the Imperial Palace, three miles away in central Tokyo.*



"I saw a luckless U.S. sailor tossed into the Imperial Palace moat," recalled Peter Lee, 1st RB&L veteran.*




A bloodied student with the Communist "dove of peace" painted on his jacket was given first aid by friends. Taking a shortcut across the park after a dental appointment, 1st RB&L veteran Barton S. Whaley walked into a Communist aid station where bloody, injured civilians were being treated. "It seemed unearthly as it had to Tolstoy's young Pierre wandering in the battlefield during Napoleon's retreat from Moscow in 1812." Eleven year-old Timothy L. Shields (the 1st RB&L commander's oldest son), riding the Army shuttle bus into the city from Grant Heights, remembered seeing bare-chested young Japanese men wearing white headbands with red-painted symbols (like those headbands in *The Karate Kid* movies) running about.*

...violence ensued.



In the midst of tear gas Japanese police break ranks to attack rioters on an American car. "As soon as a tear gas canister was thrown into the midst of rioters, it was plucked up and hurled back at the police," said Peter Lee, 1st RB&L veteran.*



A policeman holds a Communist leader in a headlock while his comrades surround the prisoner.*



A score of American vehicles, overturned and set afire, were a haunting reminder that the Occupation era was over.*



An injured, bespectacled student is helped to safety by girls stationed nearby.*



Japanese police fought back as savagely as the frenzied rioters, whose leaders exhorted them to "Kill the police! Kill the police!"*



Holding one another and loudly moaning, "Let us die! Let us die!" an injured Communist couple dramatically posed for the cameraman. Police gave them first aid.*



An injured, unconscious policeman is dragged away from the Imperial Plaza cluttered with abandoned bamboo poles, pipes, and placards.*



Emperor Hirohito

Communist rioters bearing steel spiked spears, iron pipes, and clubs storm the Japanese police on Imperial Plaza. (*Time*, 12 May 1952)

We're Asking the Reds to SURRENDER-PLEASE!

By PETER KALISCHER

The UN has opened up with a barrage of propaganda against the Communists in Korea. Our ammunition is words, and we fire a billion rounds a week

Seoul, Korea
A CHINESE Communist soldier who surrendered to an American company on the Korean front recently was asked why he gave himself up. "Four months ago," he told his interrogators, "I heard a woman broadcasting in Chinese from one of your voice-planes. I thought: If the Americans can circle a slow plane over our positions with a female in it, then I am fighting on the losing side."

The prisoner never explained why it took him four months to surrender, or what the woman had said, or even if her message had been understood. But one way or another, the incident started a delayed-action thought-bomb that achieved, in capsule form, the mission of Psychological Warfare: "To communicate ideas and information intended to affect the beliefs, emotions and actions of the enemy in order to lower his morale, destroy his will to fight and to induce him to take action beneficial to our cause."

Twenty-four hours of every day the United Nations command bombards the enemy on and behind the front lines with ideas and information—by short- and medium-wave radio stations in Japan and Korea; by leaflets dropped from planes and shot out of guns; and by airborne- and front-line loud-speakers. The material for this billion-word-a-week barrage ranges from "get-out-of-town" air-raid warnings to soap operas and disc-jockey shows designed to make a Communist GI homesick.

"Please get one thing straight," said Colonel Kenneth Hansen, new chief of the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Section. "Nobody in this shop thinks we can win this war with just words. Propaganda is a weapon, like tanks or planes or artillery. But you can't win with tanks or planes alone, and words without something to back them up are—well, just words."

From Colonel Hansen's headquarters in a Tokyo office building to the camouflaged loud-speakers a couple of hundred yards from Communist bunkers in Korea are scattered some 600 "Psywarriors"—GI and civilian planners, writers, directors, actors, artists, printers and technicians.

They include 132 Koreans and Chinese from stage stars to "leaflet kickers"—men who boot 10,000-leaflet bundles out the doors of unarmed planes over enemy territory. (A timed charge scatters the leaflets at 1,000 feet.)

The stage stars belong to "Psywar's" radio stock company in Tokyo. One of them, Miss Kim Bok Cha, played Ophelia in a prewar Korean production of Hamlet. Petite and attractive to the tips of her long red fingernails, Miss Kim acts many roles in propaganda playlets. But she is probably best known throughout North Korea as Mo Ran, a disc

Typical UN surrender leaflets appeal to Reds' emotions from all angles, depict Kremlin as real aggressor. Two million are loosed daily

16

The Reds put on a good show, too. But they can't match our advertised-in-advance

jockey with a 15-minute program of nostalgic platter and chatter reminiscent of Tokyo Rose. (Miss Kim records her program in the same studio Rose once used.) Even to someone who doesn't understand Korean, Miss Kim sounds sexy.

Her Chinese counterpart is an actress whose family still lives in Peiping and who must therefore remain anonymous. On the air she calls herself Lansu—"Flowery Grace" in Mandarin. Both Miss Kim and Lansu earn about \$50 a week as noncitizen Department of the Army civilians, and suffer from artistic frustration. They don't know audience reaction and, of course, there is no fan mail.

Broadcasters Work at the Front

There's too much audience reaction at the other end of Psywar operations—the front-line loud-speaker teams. It was a quiet day on a quiet sector when I talked to Pfc Robert C. Shaw, of Duquesne, Pennsylvania, the American half of one such team. But Shaw can qualify as the model for a recent Stars and Stripes cartoon showing two GIs crouching by a loud-speaker while shells rain all about them. "Quit griping," says one, "you mighta been in the infantry."

Shrewd, personable and twenty-three years old, Shaw has been "on call" with his loud-speaker unit—one of a dozen on the Eighth Army front—for the past several months. His partner and "voice" is Kim Myong Kwan, an ex-student who lived in Shanghai and speaks Korean, Chinese, English, Japanese and a smattering of Russian. Kim often plays the harmonica to sweeten his "commercials" prepared by higher headquarters or written on the spot by Shaw.

Shaw stashes the speaker at an advanced position at night (it can be heard clearly for 2,000 yards) and then retires with Kim, the generator and the microphone to a bunker a short distance away.

"Welcome, men of the 340th Regiment," Kim will broadcast following a rendition of Turkey in the Straw or a Korean folk tune. "After only 30 days in reserve your Communist masters have moved you to the front for the winter months..."

On the theory that direct appeals to surrender are wasted during a static war, Shaw likes Kim to needle the Communists on their enforced political indoctrination.

"Did you enjoy having your brains washed?"

Kim asks. "How was your self-criticism hour?"

Sentimental references to home and family are better left to women, and two South Korean WACs, whom Shaw calls "the bravest girls I ever met," do front-line broadcasts called Operation Heartache.

In Korea and Japan, most Psywar officers were agreed on two points: Communist psychological warfare is pretty good and both we and the enemy make plenty of bloopers.

With their front-line loud-speakers and leaflets, the Reds concentrate on the "rich man's war," the rigors of another Korean winter away from home and a "will rotation come too late?" theme. Their mistakes include broadcasting to a Dutch battalion

raids. Once a North Korean town for example—is marked for bombing following treatment:

Months beforehand leaflet-planes hung and other towns with a general warning. "This is a military target likely to be hit. We advise civilians to leave immediately." Seoul broadcasts spot announcements in Korean—"The UN command will be in communication centers and military stations. We want to protect civilians. 10 to two days before the actual bombing is showered with map leaflets of other towns in the immediate area are next."

Thirty minutes before the bombing, a radio Seoul goes on with a specific warning: "UN bombers are coming—minutes before bombs-away, a B-29 roars over the town broadcasting the message. Then come the bombers. The final warning: 'You were warned.'"

Reports trickling out of North Korea, weeks before the bombers strike, soldiers have to keep the citizenry alert under guard.

Leaflet Production Is

For the seesaw land fighting, Eighth Army headquarters in Seoul has no gimmick. It has mobile radio units, propaganda mill geared to turn out voice-cast scripts on demand. It can deliver a special leaflet on the spot after it is requested.

(Line units are stocked in advance to cover standard situations.)

"If it just took leaflets to win the war," said the operations officer, and Kleckner, of Los Angeles. "We've over about 2,000,000 a day—enough to fill every house the Air Force wing. The point is—are they doing it?"

Kleckner, who has been with Army War College since 1943, is convinced that the war is over. "We've gotten most of what we learned in World War II."

"Truth is our strongest weapon, we say is suspect—we're the enemy."

The art of applying psychological as well as physical force against a military opponent has become an accepted element of modern warfare.

As a support weapon, psychological warfare has taken its place with the tank, the gun and the airplane. Its mission is to reduce the cost in man power and matériel necessary to obtain an objective. It is here to stay.

Frank Pace, Jr.
Secretary of the Army

in bad German and to a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican regiment in English—which 90 per cent of the men couldn't understand. On one sector, they sought to entice GIs with promises of good food and left surrender leaflets wrapped around cans of powdered eggs—the bane of chow halls—as proof of their good faith. At other times, on the theory that GIs are more sex-starved than hungry, they promise girls to men who surrender. Their sharpest leaflet came two days after General MacArthur made his "fade away" speech before Congress. "Old soldiers never die," the leaflet said, "but young ones do!"

Our hardest-hitting propaganda, and one the Reds can't match, is the advertised-in-advance air



Two Paywar artists, S/Sgt. Rudolph Prefontaine, Winnipeg, Manitoba, (L.), Pfc Richard Zayac, Detroit, sketch propaganda leaflet layouts



In Tokyo Rose tradition, Kim Bok Cha, known as Mo Ran, 15-minute record show in Korean. She emphasizes nostalgic

First Lieutenant (1LT) Ivan G. Worrell, the Loudspeaker Platoon leader, 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, flew seven Psywar broadcast missions to P'yongyang in 1952 aboard a B-26 *Invader*. "The Voice," a specially-equipped WWII-era C-47 *Skytrain* with permanently-mounted loudspeakers, had gotten badly shot up and was undergoing repairs. 1LT Worrell and his radio mechanic installed a portable loudspeaker in the bomb bay. Since the Army equipment electrical system was not compatible with that of the Air Force aircraft, they fitted a gasoline-powered electrical generator into the radio section to power the microphone and loudspeaker. A 'jerry-rigged'

flexible hose vented exhaust fumes through an antenna 'well' in the top of the fuselage. A female Republic of Korea (ROK) soldier, riding in the bombardier seat, constantly read the Psywar script aloud. Since the doors of the bomb bay had to be kept open during these missions, everyone dressed warmly. All missions were night, low level. When given the opportunity to earn an Air Medal by flying three more missions aboard the repaired C-47, 1LT Worrell declined. Originally, there had been two C-47 Psywar planes; one of the slow-flying aircraft was shot down over enemy lines.¹

Endnotes

- 1 Retired MAJ Ivan G. Worrell, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 22 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

advance air

n—Yonghung,
ing, it gets the

saturnate Yong-
neral warning:
to be bombed.
liately." Radio
ts to all North
bomb all com-
supply installa-
Leave!" From
ombing, Yong-
showing it and
marked: "You

ers arrive, Ra-
arning to Yong-
get out." Five
26 voice-plane
same message.
al leaflet states:

Korea indicate
ke, Communist
at their war jobs

Fast

ighth Army Psy-
o such sure-fire
ts and a nimble
out leaflets and
can write, print
target six hours

nce with leaflets

war, we'd have
e, Captain Leon-
e drop or shoot
ugh to paper the
e has left stand-
any good?"
Army Psychologi-
ed we have for-
by the end of

, but everything
my, remember,"



Ran, conducts
gic talk of home

raids that begin softening up the enemy's will to resist months ahead of bombing dates

17

Kleckner continued. "It takes time for events to prove we're right, and results aren't always tangible. By the time results are proved, if you ask the average American combat man what effect our leaflets have, he'll tell you that a 25-pound bundle dropped from 5,000 feet will drive a Communist three feet into the ground if it hits him on the head."

Kleckner ruefully recalled how the 45th Division had alerted a platoon of MPs to be ready to take charge of the crowds of prisoners expected from one night's loud-speaker broadcasts. None came in and the MPs were disgusted. On another occasion, three Chinese surrendered to a Turkish brigade outpost. Only two of them held UN surrender leaflets. The Turks sent those two prisoners to the rear and wanted to shoot the third.

Everything in Psywar is keyed to what enemy troops think and feel *at the moment*. This goal calls for close work with Intelligence, and leaflets are often submitted to prisoners for criticism. The "surrender, please" theme is not the most important one. There was, for instance, Psywar's victory over the Chinese rockets.

The Reds Use a Secret Weapon

"We were catching rockets along the I Corps front," Kleckner recalled, "and while they weren't doing much damage, a few prisoners we picked up were cocky as hell—seemed to think they had a secret weapon from the Russians."

"It was the old Katusha, an obsolete rocket launcher the Russians used in the last war. We printed a leaflet showing we knew all about their secret weapon and had passed it up as old-fashioned. We said the Russians were peddling junk they couldn't use in exchange for good Chinese grain and cash. The reaction was sensational. In one week, the Chinese GIs gave their political commissars such a bad time the rockets disappeared from I Corps and have never showed up to any degree since."

Kleckner was called away for a conference over what to do with a voluntary testimonial to Allied good treatment from a Chinese prisoner. The testimonial was in the form of a letter to three of the prisoner's wavering buddies. It was argued that if we scattered leaflets, with the letter, on the prisoner's old unit, the names of these men would make the leaflet undeniably authentic. Use of their



Lansa, anonymous actress, conducts Chinese program with Col. Homer Shields, Indianapolis Collier's for December 13, 1952



Sound of women's voices at front have proved sure-fire surrender lure. UN uses Korean WACs, one of whom is shown here with copilot of loud-speaker-equipped voice-plane, set for flight

HERBERT AVEDON

Making Psywar a Career



by Troy J. Sacquety

On 12 April 1952, Captain (CPT) Herbert Avedon assumed command of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L), the only tactical Psywar unit in Korea supporting the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA). At the time, CPT Avedon was one of the more seasoned company-grade Psywar officers in the U.S. Army. The WWII veteran was able to use his knowledge to improve tactical Psywar operations, and through that, the effectiveness of the 1st L&L. In addition, Avedon had a considerable background in other Special Operations units. During WWII he served in both the Rangers and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). His experience illustrates the type of veteran drawn to Special Operations during its rebirth in the Korean War and who continued to influence its organization afterwards.

Avedon first entered the Army National Guard in May 1933 and served until February 1934.¹ He did not enlist in the regular U.S. Army until 30 September 1940, after which he completed his basic training as an infantryman at Vancouver Barracks, Washington. The nearly bald thirty-four year old earned the nickname "Curly." His first posting was to the Panama Canal Zone to serve with the 33rd Infantry Regiment. He later referred to this assignment as being in a "jungle-bound 8-ball unit."² He then served in the 16th Pursuit Group until 2 December 1942 when he returned to the United States.³ On 23 March 1943 Avedon graduated from Officer Candidate School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, with a Reserve Army commission in the Signal Corps and a specialty in codes and ciphers. After a brief stint in signals intelligence in the Pentagon, he transferred to the 849th Signal Intelligence Company in North Africa (April to July 1943) supporting Fifth Army. It was there that he joined the 1st Ranger Battalion as its signal officer. Avedon served with the unit in Sicily and Italy during the Salerno and Anzio campaigns.⁴ In this, its last campaign, the 1st Ranger Battalion was part of the 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional).

Specifically formed for the Anzio invasion to help the Allies consolidate their beachhead and lead the advance to Rome, the 6615th included the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Ranger Battalions, 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 83rd Chemical Mortar Battalion, and H Company, 36th Combat Engineer Battalion. On the night of 29-30 January 1944, the 1st and 3rd Rangers led the attack towards Cisterna, supported by the 4th Ranger Battalion.⁵ The Germans quickly recovered from the surprise of the night attack and counterattacked in force, surrounding the two attacking Ranger battalions, to kill or capture nearly 800 Rangers. The Germans repeatedly beat back the 4th Ranger Battalion attempts to relieve the two encircled battalions.

After Cisterna, the Rangers in Italy were combat ineffective.⁶ On 26 March, the 4th Ranger Battalion was disbanded and its soldiers reassigned. Long-term Ranger veterans returned to the United States to reconstitute a new unit while those without sufficient combat time became replacements for the First Special Service Force.⁷

Previous page: Captain Herbert Avedon at his desk while commanding the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) in Korea, 1952-53.

Avedon: A Life of Service

1933-1934: Serves in the Army National Guard

1940, September: Enlists in Army as infantryman; serves in Panama

1943, March: Graduates from Signal Corps Officer Candidate School

1943, April: Sent to 849th Signal Intelligence Co. in North Africa; July: Joins 1st Ranger Battalion

1944, January: 1st and 3rd Rangers lead attack towards Cisterna, Italy and are destroyed

1944, May: Assigned to 4th Ranger Battalion at Camp Butner, NC

1944, October: Recruited by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); head of Morale Operations in Det 101 Arakan Field Unit, Burma

1945, October: OSS disbanded, transferred to post-war successor, Strategic Services Unit (SSU)

1946: Leaves SSU but remains in the Army Reserve (USAR)

1951: Recalled to active duty and assigned as the S-3 of the USAR 306th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L)

1951, June: Joins the war in Korea; assigned as a Psywar staff officer in Eighth U.S. Army

1952, April: Assumes command of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Co. (1st L&L)

1953, May: Becomes the Assistant Projects Branch Chief, Psywar, G-3, Eighth U.S. Army

1953, June: Assigned to the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW)

1954, June: Assigned as the S-3 of the 6th RB&L Group at Fort Bragg, NC

1955: Assigned as the S-3 of the 14th RB&L Battalion at Fort Shafter, HI

1957, February: Discharged from active duty, rejoins active reserve as faculty of the USAR School in Honolulu, HI; accepts command of 329th Special Forces Detachment

1957: Completes Airborne training and becomes qualified parachutist at age 53

1958: Assigned as the G-3 Special Warfare Officer, U.S. Army Pacific Command

1960, November: Assigned to the G-2, U.S. Army Pacific Command as a Military Intelligence Operations Specialist

1962, November: Assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) as a Psychological Warfare Specialist

1966, December: Retires as a LTC in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)

1967: Becomes the historian for Sixth U.S. Army

1975: Retires from Army civilian service

The OSS Arakan Field Unit (AFU)



One of the two main elements of the AFU was the Operational Group (OG) component. Here the AFU OG is being inspected at Teknaf, India in late 1944 by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the commander of the British-led South East Asia Command.

A distinctive element in the OSS, the Arakan Field Unit (AFU) was a 175-man organization made up of all services representing several OSS branches. As a result, the AFU had numerous capabilities. Employed in southern Burma, the unit conducted reconnaissance missions along the Arakan coast and up its numerous inlets and rivers to assist the XV Indian Corps of the British XIV Army in its drive to take the capital city of Rangoon. Originally created in December 1944, the OSS first placed the AFU under the control of OSS Detachment 404, based out of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). However, on 16 February 1945, in order to deconflict OSS operations in Burma, Detachment 101 took charge. Detachment 101, which had been conducting operations in Burma since early 1943, had a more robust command and control capability in country.

Although its Operational Group (OG) and Maritime Unit (MU) components were the two main OSS branches represented in the AFU, MO played a critical role by developing several programs to induce Japanese troops to surrender. In 'EVERYBODY'S DOIN' IT,' MO created a phony order from the Japanese high command that said soldiers could surrender if they were incapacitated, cut off, or without ammunition. A follow-on project code-named 'THE WATER'S FINE' emphasized good treatment of Japanese prisoners of war.¹⁴ In April 1945, the AFU reported that they had six Japanese soldiers surrender to them.¹⁵ Unlike other Axis soldiers in Europe, getting any Japanese soldiers to willingly surrender was

a tremendous coup. The AFU assisted the British in the invasion and liberation of Rangoon by exploiting what intelligence the Japanese had left behind. After Rangoon was occupied, the AFU no longer had a valid function and the OSS disbanded the unit.



The Detachment 101 Arakan Field Unit utilized numerous OSS capabilities and branches to support the British drive on Rangoon, Burma. Here a member of the AFU publicizes the 'joint' and combined operations nature of the unit.

The other main component of the AFU was the Maritime Unit (MU). The MU used its fast boats to transport the OGs, as well as its swimmers, to conduct reconnaissance on the numerous islands, inlets, and creeks in the region. This boat is the P-564.



Insignia of CPT Herbert Avedon's Military Career



33rd Infantry
Regiment DUI



1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet
Company Patch (Unofficial)



1st Ranger Battalion Scroll



4th Ranger Battalion Scroll



Panama Canal
Department SSI



South East Asia
Command SSI



Fifth Army SSI



China-Burma-India
Theater SSI



Sixth U.S. Army SSI



XV Indian Corps
(UK) SSI



U.S. Army Pacific
Command SSI



Detachment 101
Patch

The Ranger attack on Cisterna, Italy in late January 1944 turned into a debacle. The 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions were destroyed, while the 4th sustained heavy casualties. When the Allies finally took the town on 25 May 1944, it was little more than rubble.



Returning to the United States on 6 May 1944, First Lieutenant (1LT) Avedon received an assignment to the 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion being formed at Camp Butner, NC. The OSS recruited him there on 6 October 1944 based on his combat experience, maturity, and technical skills.⁸

Born on 23 November 1906 in New York City, NY, Avedon graduated from George Washington High School in 1924. A product of the Great Depression, Avedon held a variety of jobs prior to WWII in advertising, as a writer, a real estate agent, a construction manager, and a wine merchant. He studied psychology and anthropology at Columbia University and New York University. From 1933 to 1934, he was the First Mate on the tramp steamer *SS Birmingham City*.⁹ When he was later asked on a security questionnaire why he left the sea, Avedon wrote, "Wanted to see the world; saw it."¹⁰ A varied civilian background, combat skills, and an uncanny ability to capitalize on opportunities enabled Avedon to find his niche.

The OSS astutely sent Avedon to the Morale Operations (MO) Branch. The MO Branch produced and disseminated 'black' propaganda intended to destabilize enemy governments, encourage resistance movements at strategic and tactical levels, and undermine enemy morale. OSS Director Major General William J. Donovan believed that "persuasion, penetration, and intimidation" were modern day counterparts to "sapping and mining in the siege warfare of former days."¹¹ As part of his training, 1LT Avedon took an OSS course on the Far East.¹² Instructors gave Avedon good feedback during specialized training: "Curly is full of ideas, and he has the initiative, energy and ability to execute them. He was an exceptional student."¹³ The OSS sent him to Burma to head the MO section in the Arakan Field Unit (AFU) of Detachment 101. He used this unique assignment as a springboard into a Psywar career in the Army.




CPT Avedon discusses a Psywar leaflet at the 14th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Battalion, Fort Shafter, HI, 1955.



An OSS MO-produced leaflet for the Far East.

After the capture of Rangoon and the subsequent dissolution of the AFU, Avedon was reassigned to north China to perform MO functions. When the OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945, 1LT Avedon transferred to its post-war successor, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) to serve for several more months.¹⁶ Avedon returned from WWII well decorated. He had a Bronze Star, Purple Heart (in Italy), Good Conduct Medal, Combat Infantry Badge, and campaign medals for the American, European (two stars and an invasion arrowhead), and Asian and Pacific Theaters (two stars and an invasion arrowhead), Presidential Unit Citation with cluster, and the British Burma Star.

After leaving the SSU in 1946, CPT Avedon chose to remain in the Army Reserve (USAR) while he managed a ranch in La Puente, CA, then worked as newspaper reporter, and shifted to advertising. He really wanted to be a professional writer and worked hard on a novel. The outbreak of war in Korea put Avedon where he belonged . . . in Psywar.



CPT Avedon helped set up the Korea Cabana Club for the enlisted men of the 1st L&L.



CPT Avedon sits at his desk in the 1st L&L. Notice the Psywar leaflets posted to the wall behind him, as well as the 1st Ranger Battalion scroll on his shoulder.



CPT Avedon instructs ROK Army Soldiers in the use of Psywar.

Recalled to active duty in 1951, Avedon was assigned as the S-3 of the 306th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (USAR).¹⁷ He completed the Officers Psychological Warfare Course at Fort Riley, Kansas, before going to war for the second time on 15 June 1951.¹⁸ After several months as an EUSA Psywar staff officer, CPT Avedon assumed command of the 1st L&L in April 1952 and instituted immediate changes. These included making the non-school trained men in the L&L attend a seven-day Psywar course, 'dumbing down' the leaflets so that the largely illiterate Chinese soldiers could understand them, and building a club for the enlisted men. Staff Sergeant (SSG) Joseph F. Lissberger recalled that Avedon was "all for the enlisted men."¹⁹ The 1st L&L Korea Cabana Club was his legacy. But, Avedon was also remembered for another event.

SSG Lissberger recalled an incident when an escaped Communist prisoner of war attacked CPT Avedon, knocking him out with a heavy board. Avedon survived with a lump and a cut on his head. The prisoner was recaptured. "As long as he was capable, he was on duty," said SSG Lissberger.²⁰ CPT Avedon commanded the 1st L&L until May 1953 when he left to become the Assistant Projects Branch Chief, Psywar, G-3, Eighth U.S. Army.²¹

After Korea, he was sent to the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), Department of the Army until June 1954 where he wrote critical assessments on the status of Psychological Warfare in Korea. During that assignment he attended courses in psychological warfare and international relations at Georgetown University.²² His next duty station was Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There he was the S-3 of the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) until 1955. Also assigned to the 6th, Private First Class Leonard M. Rudy said that CPT Avedon was an "inspiration" and "quite a guy, who made a difference to me."²³ Private Nicolas Kariouk said that while some officers took advantage of their rank, Avedon did not. He was well-liked, honest, and "strongly believed in Psywar."²⁴ These qualities made him an ideal candidate for a newly-formed Psywar unit supporting the U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC).



CPT Avedon instructs a Thai audience on the utility of psychological warfare.

As a senior Captain, Avedon became S-3, 14th RB&L Battalion, headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.²⁵ Soon promoted to Major, he did not have enough time to reach twenty years of service by age fifty-five. Discharged from active service on 28 February 1957, MAJ Avedon rejoined the active reserve as a faculty member of the USAR School in Honolulu, HI. Accepting command of the 329th Special Forces Detachment at Fort DeRussy (Waikiki Beach), Avedon volunteered for airborne training at the age of fifty-three and became a qualified parachutist.²⁶

In 1958, MAJ Avedon returned to active duty as the G-3 Special Warfare Officer, USARPAC. This was followed by a second tour with the G-2. Beginning on 28 November 1960, Avedon served as an advisor for psychological and unconventional warfare "planning, research, operations and policy including training of USARPAC Psywar and UW units," becoming known as 'Mr. Psywar.'²⁷ These assignments gave him sufficient time to get promoted and retire as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve on 1 December 1966. Meanwhile, he had already taken a Department of the Army civilian position at USARPAC.²⁸

Avedon worked as a Military Intelligence Operations Specialist until 19 November 1962. He returned Stateside to be a Psychological Warfare Specialist with the United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, consulting on training and research and development.²⁹ Family health problems forced Avedon to return to the West Coast in August 1967, to be the historian, G-3, Sixth United States Army.³⁰ He established the museum at the Presidio of San Francisco, an achievement of which he was quite proud.³¹ He retired in 1975. LTC Herbert Avedon, 97, passed away on 20 May 2004 and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with military honors.

Although the WWII veteran got little attention at the time, Avedon believed in the value of Psywar and was a

dedicated soldier that fostered the profession before and after the Korean War. He was also one of the few Psywar careerists at that time. Professionals like Avedon helped ensure that Psychological Operations became a core element of today's U.S. Army Special Operations. ♣

Thanks to Psywar veterans Joseph F. Lissberger, Leonard M. Rudy, and Nicolas Kariouk for their help in this article and Patricia Fagan, daughter of LTC Avedon.

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

Endnotes

- 1 Select items from Avedon Personnel File, Copy provided by the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 "Brief of Record," Military Service Records 1949-1961, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Personnel Record Card Work Sheet, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Support Center Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **Both the 33rd Infantry and the 16th Pursuit Group have ties to Special Operations. Many personnel that would volunteer for the 2nd Battalion of Merrill's Marauders came from the 33rd Infantry, while the 16th Pursuit Group is the predecessor unit to the United States Air Force 1st Special Operations Wing.**
- 4 "Separation Process Form," Folder (F) Avedon, Herbert, Box (B) 0027, Entry (E) 224, Research Group (RG) 226, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA); "Military Service Records 1949-1961," Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 5 **By this time, the 509th was no longer part of the 6615th.**
- 6 For more on the Rangers at Anzio, see Kenneth Finlayson and Robert W. Jones, Jr., "Rangers in World War II: Part II, Sicily and Italy," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History*, Vol 2, no 3 (2007), 49-58.
- 7 Robert W. Black, *Rangers in World War II* (New York, NY: Ivy Books, 1992), 174.
- 8 "Request for Transfer of Officer to Office of Strategic Services," F Avedon, Herbert, B 0027, E 224, RG 226, NARA.
- 9 **The SS Birmingham City was sunk off Brazil on 8 January 1943 by the German submarine U-124.**
- 10 "Statement of Personal History," Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 11 Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the O.S.S.* (New York: Walker & Company, 1976), 211.

- 12 **Presumably this is the two-week course on the economic and political backgrounds of Far-Eastern countries that was held at Georgetown University.** See Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report*, 242.
- 13 OSS training evaluation form, found in F Avedon, Herbert, B 0027, E 224, RG 226, NARA.
- 14 Herbert Avedon to Charles J. Trees, "Proposed Operations," 14 April 1945, F 1117, B 107, E 144, RG 226, NARA; Another copy is located at F 2050, B 151, E 139, RG 226, NARA.
- 15 "Det 101, Arakan Field Unit Report April 26, 1945," [27 April 1945], F 1919, B 181, E 136, RG 226, NARA. More AFU MO records can be found at F 151, B 151, E 139, RG 226, NARA.
- 16 F Avedon, Herbert, B 0027, E 224, RG 226, NARA.
- 17 "Brief of Record," Military Service Records 1949-1961, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Support Center Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 18 Charles H. Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* (Vol. 1, No. 2: 2005), 54. Also see Thomas M. Klein, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group 1951-52* (Greenwich, CT: RHP Books, 2002), 29.
- 19 Joseph F. Lissberger, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 20 April 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 20 Lissberger interview.
- 21 See Briscoe, "'Volunteering' for Combat: Loudspeaker PSYWAR in Korea."
- 22 "Biographical Data for Herbert Avedon," Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 23 Leonard M. Rudy, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 20 April 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 24 Nicolas Kariouk, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 12 May 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 25 "Biographical Data for Herbert Avedon," Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 "Application for Federal Employment," 18 May 1961, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 27 Army Reserve Qualification and Availability Questionnaire, 11 September 1958, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 28 "Application for Federal Employment," undated but after 19 November 1962, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 29 **USCONARC was split into two commands on 1 July 1973: the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).** "Application for Federal Employment," undated but after 19 November 1962, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 30 Commendation Citation from Department of the Army to Herbert Avedon, 30 September 1968, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 31 Patricia Fagan (Avedon's daughter) interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 1 February 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Army Historian Accomplishments 5 Sep 67 – 31 Dec 75, Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Avedon lectures Thai officers in Psychological Operations techniques. Notice the loudspeaker-equipped M24 Chaffee light tank.



The Psywar Center

Part II: Creation of the 10th Special Forces Group



by Eugene G. Piasecki

“These men of the Army Special Forces (Airborne) represent the first formal recognition of guerrilla warfare in modern United States Army planning.”¹

— LTC Melvin R. Blair, OCPW

The 25 June 1950 attack of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) on South Korea caught the United States and the Republic of South Korea politically and militarily unprepared. Specialized units from WWII such as the Rangers, Merrill's Marauders, and the First Special Service Force, trained to 'take the war to the enemy' and infiltrate behind enemy lines to disrupt operations, interdict lines of supply and communication and develop and employ indigenous combat forces, had not existed since 1945. When the Korean War erupted, the United States found itself in an unusual situation. Not only was it now involved in its first 'undeclared war,' it also lacked a skilled force to perform the special operations necessary to neutralize the threat. To overcome these operational short-falls, the U. S. Army created 'Special Forces' (SF) to organize and train indigenous personnel inside enemy territory.² The purpose of this article is to explain how Special Forces came into existence and revitalized the U. S. Army's ability to meet future unconventional warfare (UW) challenges.

Unsure of how to address UW, the Army's leadership turned to Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure for viable solutions. In retrospect, BG McClure was a logical choice because he had been General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower's World War II Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division chief, an assignment that made him the senior serving officer most familiar with UW. His experience


though had to be translated to meet the current situation. While BG McClure understood how Psywar fit into UW, he knew very little about direct action by guerrilla forces and their integration into conventional military campaigns. As a result, he gave higher priority to developing Army Psywar capabilities, although he believed that Psywar and UW were inextricably linked.³

To demonstrate this connectivity between Psywar and UW, BG McClure capitalized on two

of his major achievements. Heading the Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division, McClure formed a separate element under the Department of the Army G-3 Operations and staffed it with veteran UW officers like Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Russell W. Volckmann, Colonel (COL) Wendell W. Fertig, LTC Melvin R. Blair, COL Aaron Bank, and LTC Martin J. Waters. By doing this, McClure effectively put their collective experiences in guerrilla warfare and long-range penetration operations during World War II to work in his Special Operations Division. They were responsible for staff supervision of all psychological warfare and special operations activities.⁴ On 15 January 1951, the Psywar Division reorganized again, and became the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). Unique in its responsibilities, OCPW enjoyed the luxury of being the first Army staff directorate formally recognized as a Special Staff Division with direct access to the Army Chief of Staff. McClure followed this by integrating Psywar into the Army staff and establishing the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Center on 'Smoke Bomb Hill' at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 27 March 1952.⁵

In the meantime, GEN J. Lawton Collins, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, attended a guerrilla warfare conference at Fort Benning, Georgia. During the conference, GEN Collins said: "The Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activities. I personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus of expansion in this direction."⁶ The OCPW representative at the conference was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Russell W. Volckmann, the former WWII commander of the Philippine guerrilla forces on Northern Luzon. Based on his UW experience, the Infantry School asked LTC Volckmann to analyze GEN Collins' speech to determine what type of special unit the Army needed and its primary purpose. This analysis "was the first evidence within the Office of the Chief of Psywar of the philosophical basis for the creation of an Army unconventional warfare capability."⁷

Volckmann believed that 'special forces' operations should be an accepted part of conventional ground



GEN J. Lawton Collins, a veteran of WWI and WWII, was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from August 1949 through August 1953.

Creating 'Special Forces'

LTC Volckmann, probably more than any other officer on BG McClure's staff, shaped the reinstitution of UW as part of the U. S. Army's capabilities. His memorandum to GEN Collins resulted in two far-reaching decisions that affected the creation of Special Forces.⁹ First, in May 1951, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced the Lodge-Philbin Act. This legislation allowed Eastern European male citizens to be recruited into the U.S. Army. Those that volunteered for airborne training could be used in 'special forces' to organize guerrilla bands to attack lines of communication in the event the Soviets invaded Western Europe.¹⁰ Second, the deactivation of the short-lived Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) before December 1951 provided the personnel spaces to form 'Special Forces' at the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These two key decisions opened the way for highly motivated soldiers looking for more challenges and excitement to seek 'special forces' duty.



LTC Russell W. Volckmann, Commander, U. S. Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP-NL) with MG Basilio Valdes (L), the Philippine Army Chief of Staff in 1945. (LIFE photo)

warfare. They should not be considered irregular or unconventional warfare. The ultimate objective of 'special forces' operations was to organize and support guerrilla or indigenous forces that are capable of efficient and controlled exploitation in conjunction with land, air, and sea forces. Volckmann asserted that the Army had the inherent responsibility in peace to plan and prepare to conduct 'special forces' operations, since in wartime the Army would organize and execute those operations. It was unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civilian agency.⁸

To get the 'special forces' ball rolling, OCPW sent two of its staff officers to recruit soldiers. LTC Melvin R. Blair, former WWII Merrill's Marauder, traveled throughout the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Far East, while LTC Volckmann went to Europe. As LTC Blair recalled: "All applications for assignment or transfer to Special Forces were being processed by the Army's Adjutant General Office, and all over the Army, privates, noncoms, and officers were fighting to get into a unit where chances of sustained survival in combat would appear to be doubtful at least."¹¹ The two were so successful that soldiers took leave to travel to Washington to volunteer for SF. To prevent 'robbing' the Army of its best men, OCPW and The Adjutant General drafted regulations to authorize enlistment in the Army specifically for SF.¹² While Blair and Volckmann recruited Army-wide, the activity level at the Psywar Center shifted into high gear to keep pace with the soldiers coming into SF.

Volckmann explained his role in establishing and supporting SF: "The actual organizational concept for Special Forces (SF) as well as their mission and functions was based not only on my own operational experience,

but also upon every major Resistance Movement that could be researched . . . and in 1949 I undertook preparing draft Field Manuals on 'Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare' and 'Combating Guerrilla Forces.' These two draft manuals were completed just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War."¹³ He further stated that, "The concept of Special Operations and Special Forces was not the easiest task of 'selling' within the Department of Army. It took a year of effort and then when it was approved there were no personnel spaces available to man the Psychological Warfare Center and Special Forces Group to be located at Fort Bragg. Through a West Point classmate in the Operations Division, Department of Army at the time, I finally managed to get 3,000 personnel spaces and the Psychological Warfare Center and the Special Forces Group (SFG) was activated."¹⁴

In Washington, DC, while BG McClure and the OCPW's primary focus remained on activating the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), three other separate, but equally significant, tasks were also occurring. These included: continuing to move the Psywar Center and its assets from Fort Riley, Kansas to Fort Bragg, North Carolina; supporting the units in combat in Korea with trained Psywarriors; and filling new Psywar requirements being generated from Europe by Major General (MG) Daniel Noce, the U. S. European Command Chief of Staff. According to LTC Blair, "We staff officers at the Pentagon sat back with our fingers crossed, but not without confidence. We felt that the country was full of adventurous young men who would volunteer for anything if the need for it was carefully presented, and we firmly believed that we had done just that."¹⁵ For COL Bank and the 10th SFG, that philosophy produced



COL Aaron Bank, the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group.

results and more 'double volunteers' (soldiers who volunteered for both airborne and Special Forces) headed to Smoke Bomb Hill. But, other issues arose that had the potential to derail the 10th's activation.

One of the most visible was the association of Special Forces with and under the Psywar Center. According to LTC Volckmann, "We felt there was, in general, a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men that we didn't care to have 'rub off' on Special Forces. Behind-the-lines operations and the 'dirty-tricks game' had enough opposition amongst conventional military minds that had to be overcome without adding the additional problems inherent in Psychological Warfare. However, we lost that battle."¹⁶ With the decision to keep Special Forces subordinate to the Psywar Center, COL Bank focused on internal organization and starting a training program.

On 19 May 1952, the 10th SFG was formally activated with the creation of its Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). Authorized one hundred and twenty-two officers and men, it was organized and assigned to the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army.¹⁷ On 19 June 1952, OCPW's Chief of Operations, COL Aaron Bank, departed Washington, DC for Smoke Bomb Hill to assume command of the 10th SFG. Arriving on 20 June 1952, COL Bank found one warrant officer and seven enlisted men assigned to the Group.¹⁸ Although large numbers of men throughout the Army volunteered for Special Forces duty,



The Third Army SSI was worn at the Psywar Center from its activation in 1952 until it was replaced by the Continental Army Command SSI in 1962. The Airborne Tab was added in 1954.



The Airborne Command SSI was first developed in 1943 for wear by small non-divisional airborne units. The 10th SFG continued to wear it until the current Special Forces SSI was authorized in 1955.



Ranger Tab

The formation of the 10th SFG attracted many men who had previously served in either the WWII Ranger Battalions or Korean War Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne). On 30 October 1950, the Army Chief of Staff approved the Ranger Tab for wear by those men with Ranger experience. The tab replaced the earlier Ranger Scroll to identify those personnel who had completed U. S. Army Ranger training.

transfer approval rates did not keep pace despite LTC Blair's assertion that "we [the OCPW staff officers] kept the phone lines to the AGs [Adjutant General] office hot with our inquiries."¹⁹ By August 1952, the actual strength of the 10th SFG was 259, with 123 of these designated as 'operational unit' volunteer personnel.²⁰

These early Special Forces hopefuls brought many military occupational specialties (MOS) and represented units throughout the active Army. It soon became obvious that a Special Forces assignment appealed more to some soldiers than to others. Such was the case in the two remaining post-WWII Airborne Divisions: the 82nd at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the 11th at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Volunteers from the 82nd included Captain (CPT) Oscar A. Suchier, Jr., CPT David B. Crowe, CPT Herbert R. Brucker, First Lieutenant (1LT) Carl M. Bergstrom, and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Richard E. "Dick" Shevchenko. The 11th provided LTC Jack T. "Black Jack" Shannon, Major (MAJ) William Ewald, and 1LT Norman E. "Ned" Day, all from the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. Others like CPT Dorsey B. Anderson, CPT John L. Striegel, and 1LT Clarence E. "Bud" Skoien, had been members of the recently inactivated 4th, 1st, and 6th Ranger Infantry Companies, respectively. Sergeant (SGT) Joel L. Koford, a medic assigned to Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, DC, learned about Special Forces from a memorandum posted to the unit bulletin board, while Private First Class (PFC) Johnny A. Dolin volunteered after completing infantry basic combat training (BCT)

at Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky.²¹ These individuals had long and influential careers in SF.

Knowing the challenges involved in creating the OCPW and the Psywar Center, and realizing the opinions that many senior Army leaders held regarding 'special' type units, COL Bank understood his responsibility; the Special Forces concept could not fail. Other key officer leaders knew the importance of projecting only a positive image of 10th SFG success. One of these was MAJ David B. Crowe, Commander, FB Team 18 (forerunner of today's SF Company). MAJ Crowe remembered: "Outside of the 10th SFG there was no hint of any internal issues. In the early days our big job was to fight the administrative obstacles. People rallied around COL Bank and presented a unified front with no 'bad words' [negative comments] leaving the Group."²² This did not mean that Bank and the others did this by themselves. Former 10th SFG Adjutant, Carl M. Bergstrom said that COL Bank got support and encouragement from former WWII Philippine guerrilla fighters, LTCs Donald D. Blackburn and Russell Volckmann.²³

At Fort Bragg, COL Bank, with COL Charles H. Karlstad's assistance, continued organizing based on the 19 May 1952 SF Group mission concept: "To infiltrate its component operational detachments, by air, sea, or land, to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasi-military or a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air forces."²⁴ On 15 August 1952, COL Bank and his skeleton staff began forming SF Operational Detachments (SFODs) based on their World War II experience. Detachment 12, the Group Headquarters, was charged with organizing a Special Forces Area Command. The subsequent detachments were formed sequentially from 13 through 25 (company-level equivalents). These elements were responsible for organizing Special Forces District Commands comprised of two or more Special Forces (Guerrilla) Regiments.²⁵


During this process, two of the detachments were assigned additional missions. Detachment 12, the Group Headquarters, took control of the first ten Lodge Act enlistees. The group training instructors, including 1LT Ned Day, 1LT Bud Skoien, CPT Dorsey Anderson and

CPT John Striegel, were assigned to Detachment 16.²⁶ Although the entire 10th SFG would change as it matured, this configuration served its intended purpose. It gave commanders and trainers at all levels maximum flexibility, the opportunity to evaluate each man's aptitude for Special Forces, and identified those considered unsuitable. Reassignment followed quickly. MAJ David Crowe and PFC Johnny Dolin agreed that "we got rid of the 'sore-heads,' weeded out the 'weak sisters,' those who couldn't take it, and those who got in trouble."²⁷ After the administrative requirements were taken care of, training became top priority.

Because the 10th SFG training requirements were unique in the U. S. Army, the Psywar School's SF Department developed and conducted the first eight-week (guerrilla warfare) courses, attended separately by fifty-one officers and fifty-two enlisted men. Directed by COL Fillmore K. Mearns, the SF Department Operations Committee was headed by a former Korean War veteran guerrilla commander, MAJ Richard M. Ripley, and staffed with former WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veterans like CPTs Leif Bangsboll, John H. Hemingway, and Herbert R. Brucker.²⁸ As one of those fortunate enough to be able to attend the SF Department training, SGT Joel Koford remembers that "it seemed that while all the SF training was related to blowing bridges and determining the inner workings of the process of blowing a bridge, students were also taught the best time to execute an ambush, how to develop an escape and evasion (E&E)



CPT Dorsey B. Anderson was a veteran of WWII and Korea by the time he volunteered for Special Forces. He was awarded the Silver Star in Korea while commanding the 4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne).



(L to R) Colonel John G. Van Houten, Commander, Ranger Training Center, presents the 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) Guidon to Captain John L. Striegel and Private Joseph Lisi at Fort Benning, Georgia in November 1950.

plan, and how to conduct classified activities.”²⁹ For those unable to attend these classes, COL Bank established an internal individual skills training program taught by the Detachment 16 personnel. 1LT Bud Skoien remembers that he, LTs Murphy, Townsend, Meath, Mather, and several others were assembled in COL Bank’s office to discuss training. At the end of this session, their group became known as the ‘S-3- and-a-half,’ or the ‘go-fers,’ to accomplish all the necessary, mundane, but vital tasks, like writing the 10th SFG operational documents.³⁰

Instead of having a formal draft concept plan or even notes, Bank’s training meetings consisted of him telling stories about his WWII experiences. From their notes, the ‘S-3 ½-ers’ then wrote the lesson plans and created field exercises.³¹ Ned Day recalled that COL Bank’s final guidance was: “Whatever you can come up with, until its proven wrong, is as good as anything I come up with.”³² Despite this seemingly lackadaisical approach, COL Bank checked training to ensure that each man understood the significance of his discussions of clandestine operations, developing guerrilla potential, individual cross-training, establishing and enforcing security measures, and that innovation was being applied. Although more simplified than probably intended, Bank’s training philosophy was understood by every man in the Group. SFC Dick Shevchenko confirmed that simplicity: “Our mission was to go behind the lines, gather up guerrillas, and train them.”³³

By April 1953, the results of the recruiting efforts by OCPW, the SF Department, and individual 10th SFG soldiers paid dividends. The Group had reached its authorized strength of 1,700 officers and men. Individual and SF military occupational specialty (MOS) cross-training, lasting between six and eight weeks depending on individual MOS, had been completed. Certain

personnel received additional special skills training off Fort Bragg. Some attended smoke jumpers school in Montana, small boat training in Little Creek, Virginia, or the Radio Operators (O5B) Course while others, like future team medical sergeant Johnny Dolin, received training at Womack Army Hospital, Fort Bragg, before attending the Field Medical Service School at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. SGT Joel Koford, another medical sergeant, prepared lesson plans for advanced training.³⁴ Once all individual training was accomplished and everyone had returned to Fort Bragg, COL Bank decided it was time to evaluate team/detachment and group proficiency under field conditions according to Army Training Program (ATP) standards.³⁵

Although their initial training established the minimum individual and selected special skills required for all 10th SFG personnel, it was critical to evaluate how well the nominal teams had integrated at the basic operational level. To accomplish this, COL Bank drew again upon his World War II experience, formalized the team assignments, and moved them to Camp Mackall, North Carolina, for small unit training.³⁶ It was at Camp Mackall during Field Training Exercises (FTX) FREE LEGION and LEGIONNAIRE RALLY that the men learned to apply their individual and collective skills while operating in a ‘hostile environment.’³⁷ Assisting in this evaluation were SF Department instructors CPTs Leif Bangsbo and Herb Brucker. They put the 10th SFG operational detachments through their paces by having them execute missions that they had planned in the classroom.³⁸ These included infiltrations, raids, ambushes, blind radio transmissions, E&E plans, and some clandestine tactics, techniques, and procedures.³⁹

In the meantime, COL Bank readied the Group for its final training phase and evaluation. Without an ATP specifically designed to evaluate the capabilities of the Special Forces Group, COL Bank tasked MAJ William Ewald, Commander, 13th SF Operational Detachment to draft a prototype.⁴⁰ Once written, the ATP had to be validated and Ewald got the mission. Since this was a Group-level exercise, he established a base camp area (Camp Castro) to serve as the maneuver control element headquarters in Georgia’s Chattahoochee National Forest. From July through September 1953, with help from Army Field Forces personnel, MAJ Ewald conducted FTX CLEO, the formal evaluation of the entire 10th SFG training and operational readiness.⁴¹ This was a critical time for both COL Bank and the 10th SFG. Carl Bergstrom recalls, “COL Bank didn’t talk about the problems he was facing, but every week he visited every team in the field and didn’t bring along any ‘extra’ staff officers as observers who might influence his future decisions.”⁴²

The one thing that COL Bank knew, but had not shared, was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had approved war plans that employed the 10th SFG, and were just waiting for the right opportunity to send it overseas. Neither the JCS nor COL Bank had to wait long. In June 1953, German construction workers revolted against the



SGM Richard E. Shevchenko in May 1966 when he was the Sergeant Major of Company C, 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC.



Major William Ewald was a WWII 9th Infantry Division veteran assigned to the 11th Airborne Division when he reported to the 10th SFG in September 1952. As the Commander, 13th Special Forces Operational Detachment, he wrote and administered the tests to validate the initial Army Training Plan for the Special Forces Group.

Unique & Diverse Training



Part of the 10th SFG training included foreign weapons. (L-R) Three 10th SFG sergeants are familiarizing with the DshK 1938, 12.7x108mm Soviet Heavy Infantry Machinegun; the Model M29 FM 1924, 7.5x54mm French Light Machinegun; and the Soviet DP Light Machinegun, 7.62x54mm, nicknamed "The Record Player."



Captain Herbert R. Brucker was a WWII OSS veteran of Europe and Asia. Seen here as a role player during the 10th SFG's small unit training at Camp Mackall, he remained an invaluable source of practical knowledge and experience throughout his career in Special Forces.



The 10th SFG revived the WW II use of pack mules to transport their supplies and equipment. These pack mules supported an unidentified FA Team at Camp Mackall in 1953.



An unidentified FA Team preparing to jump into Camp Mackall as part of Field Training Exercise FREE LEGION in the summer of 1953. Why medic Lester J. Swenson's face was covered can only be surmised — probably a Lodge Act enlistee.



PFC Johnny Dolin (below) during mountain training at Camp Carson, Colorado from July through August 1953, and his certificate (left) for mountain training.



2LT Joseph M. Castro



UNPFK SSI

Camp Castro was named in honor of 2LT Joseph M. Castro, who had been among the first to complete Special Forces training before volunteering for duty in Korea. While assigned to the 8240th Army Unit (AU) he was killed on 17 May 1953 while conducting a raid into North Korea as part of the 2nd Partisan Infantry Regiment, United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK). It was part of the WOLFPACK 8 organization.⁴³ 2LT Castro was the first SF-trained officer to die in combat.



Camp Castro in the Chattahoochee National Forest of Georgia was named in honor of 2LT Joseph M. Castro, a former 10th SFG soldier killed in action in Korea. MAJ William Ewald established the 10th SFG headquarters here during FTX CLEO, to evaluate the Group's ability to perform its operational mission.

Communist Government in East Berlin. This provided the catalyst to move the 10th SFG.⁴⁴ By October 1953, the 10th SFG had been operationally validated during FTX CLEO. When they returned to Fort Bragg, preparation began for deployment to Bad Toelz, Germany, by December 1953. To the dismay of many SF replacements in the unit, those personnel who had not completed their initial SF training were not qualified to deploy.⁴⁵

In response to the constraints, SF personnel were separated into three groups. COL Bank, LTC Shannon (the Group Executive Officer), CPT Bergstrom (the Group Adjutant) and the Operational Detachment Commanders

decided which men would be in the first group to depart for Bad Toelz, Germany, in November 1953. A second contingent, the SF personnel to remain at Fort Bragg, became the cadre for a new SFG, the 77th, officially activated on 22 September 1953. A third element was bound for Korea. While the 10th had been forming and training from November 1952 through January 1953, BG McClure had been

pressing U. S. Far East Command (FECOM) to request SF for Korea. Finally, in April 1953, FECOM agreed and requested fifty-five SF-trained officers and nine enlisted men from the 10th SFG.⁴⁶ This number steadily grew until the Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. By then, a total of seventy-seven officers and twenty-two enlisted Special Forces soldiers were serving in the 8240th Army Unit Guerrilla Command. These men remained in Korea with the partisan units until their last official mission on 20-21 February 1954.⁴⁷


EPILOGUE

In November 1953, the 782 Soldiers of the 10th SFG were transported with little fanfare from Fort Bragg to the port of Wilmington, North Carolina. Because the existence of the 10th SFG was still classified, everyone wore 'sterile' uniforms (no visible stripes, patches or badges) to board the USNS *General A. W. Greely*. After enduring catcalls and jeers of those recruits already on board, the 10th soldiers reappeared on deck after a few hours at sea in uniforms complete with patches, rank and parachute badges.⁴⁸



77th Special Forces Group DUI

Special Forces Group (Airborne), Peacetime Operations



Every Detachment shares the common mission: To infiltrate to a designated area within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize a particular type unit within the Detachment's operational capability and/or to perform such other special forces missions as directed. The differences surface when each Detachment's level of responsibility is more narrowly defined.

Team FA, Operational Detachment, Regiment (ODA/Team)

Organize a Special Forces (Guerrilla) Regiment.

Team FB, Operational Detachment, District 'B' (ODB/Company)

Organize a Special Forces District Command composed of two or more Special Forces (Guerrilla) Regiments.

Team FC, Operational Detachment, District 'A' (ODC/Battalion)

Same as Team FB except that the ranks of commander and staff are higher since they are commanding and staffing a larger district and commanding a 'Provisional' Battalion during the pre-mission phase within friendly lines.

Team FD, Operational Detachment Area (SFOB/Group)

Organize a Special Forces Area Command composed of two or more Special Forces District Commands. Assists Group Headquarters as directed by the Group Commander.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Group

Provide administration, less supply and evacuation, for FA, FB, FC, and FD Teams committed for operations. Furnish command, staff and administration for a Special Forces Group.

Team AA, Administrative Detachment, Company

Augment and assist the FB Team to function as a Company Headquarters, and conduct the company's administration and mess.

Team AB, Administrative Detachment, Battalion

Augment and assist the FC Team to function as a Battalion Headquarters, and operate a Battalion motor pool. Messes with one of its subordinate companies.¹

¹ Draft Training Circular, The Special Forces Group, 13 May 1952. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. *FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, Department of the Army, 5 October 1951. Part II authorizes the organization of a SF Command at theater level or the integration of the SF Group (s) within a designated theater command at the discretion of the theater commander.

Back at Fort Bragg, command of the Psywar Center passed from COL Charles H. Karlstad to COL Gordon Singles in July 1953, to COL Thomas A. McAnsh in July 1954, and then to SF COL Edson D. Raff in December 1954. Under COL Raff, the role of Special Forces expanded and matured. The 77th SFG sent the first Special Forces Special Operations Detachment to Japan. COL Raff did not command the Psywar Center long. His continued wear of the unauthorized green beret after repeated warnings from MG Paul D. Adams, Fort Bragg commander and veteran of WWII's First Special Service Force (FSSF) led to Raff's relief. COL William J. Mullen, told to "keep a low profile" with respect to Special Forces, replaced COL Raff.⁴⁹ Despite the early controversy in the Army over its existence and utility, the Psywar Center demonstrated its academic professionalism and capability to perform its diverse missions. ♣

Author's Note: Prior to the publication of this article, the Army Special Operations community suffered the losses of COL (retired) William Ewald (25 December 2011) and CSM (retired) Johnny A. Dolin (17 December 2011). To their credit, both provided valuable advice and assistance to the end. Their knowledge, experience, unselfishness, and dedication to duty will be greatly missed.

Eugene G. Piasecki is a retired Special Forces officer who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. A USMA graduate, he earned his Masters Degree in military history from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a PhD. His current research interests include the history of Army Special Forces, Special Forces involvement in Korea and Somalia, and the History of Camp Mackall, NC.

Endnotes

- 1 LTC Melvin Russell Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," *Saturday Evening Post*, Volume 228, Issue 46, 12 May 1956, 41.
- 2 Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," 41.

The USNS *General Adolphus W. Greely* (T-AP-141) was commissioned in 1945 and was used as a troop transport from then until her transfer to the National Defense Reserve Fleet at Olympia, Washington in August 1959.

Thanks!


The author would like to express his sincere thanks and appreciation to the following people for the contributions, patience, and assistance they provided during the preparation of this article:

Carl M. Bergstrom
David B. Crowe
Norman E. Day
Johnny A. Dolin
William Ewald
Jane Hess
(Jack Shannon's Daughter)
Joel L. Koford
Richard M. Ripley
Richard E. Shevchenko
Clarence E. Skoien



10th Special Forces
Group unofficial DUI

- 3 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U. S. Army Special Warfare Its Origins* (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 94. **The basis for this comment is found in Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington, DC, Memorandum for Record, Minutes of Psychological Warfare Division Staff Meeting, 31 October 1950, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, box 2, File 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.**
- 4 Paddock, *U. S. Army Special Warfare*, 90. Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC, Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Collins, subject: Psychological Warfare Organization in the Department of the Army, 5 July 1950, from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., filed with G-3 091.412 S (5 July 1950), NARA.
- 5 Eugene G. Piasecki, "Smoke Bomb Hill: Birth of the Psywar Center, Part I," *Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History*, PB 31-05-2 Volume 7, No. 1, 2011, 98. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, DC, Memorandum for the Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, subject: Activation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC, from BG Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-1954, 319.5-320.3, box 13 Psy War 322 (7 April 1952), NARA.
- 6 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 122. The original memorandum can be found in Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-1954, TS Decimal Files, Box 12 NARA. **As Paddock further points out, the delineation between the roles and missions of Special Forces and Ranger units that was later insisted on by the Army Chief of Staff was neither well understood nor agreed to by the key decision makers in early 1951.**



- 7 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 122. Paddock attributes this observation to LTC Russell W. Volckmann's analysis of GEN Collins comments at the Infantry School Commander's Conference in early 1951.
- 8 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 123. This is also part of the Infantry School memorandum prepared by LTC Volckmann on 9 April 1951 and referenced in note 2.
- 9 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 125. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, DC Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Staff Studies, "Special Forces Ranger Units: and Special Forces Ranger Units, Recruiting and Training of Personnel," 12 June 1951, from BG Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 270.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 (12 June 1951), National Archives.
- 10 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 124. The original memorandum was for General C. D. Eddleman, subject: Utilization of Lodge Bill Recruits in Special (Forces) Operations, 23 May 1951, From BG McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-1954, TS Decimal Files, 370.2-370.64 box 15, Psy War 373.2 TS (23 May 1951), NARA. For additional information concerning Lodge Act Soldiers and Special Forces see Dr. Charles H. Briscoe's "America's Foreign Legionnaires, The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part II" in *Veritas*, Volume 5, Number 2, 2009.
- 11 Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," 89.
- 12 Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," 89.
- 13 Brigadier General (ret) Russell W. Volckmann, letter to Mrs. Beverly Lindsey, 21 March 1969 copy in, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 14 Volckmann letter to Lindsey, 21 March 1969.
- 15 Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," 89. The 3,000 spaces came from the disbanded Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne).
- 16 Volckmann letter to Lindsey, 21 March 1969. Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 20.
- 17 Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare*, 145.
- 18 Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare*, 145. This was confirmed in a letter from COL Bank to the U. S. A. John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance Public Affairs Office dated 17 February 1968. Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1983), 21.
- 19 Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," 89.
- 20 Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare*, 145.
- 21 Joel L. Koford, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 22 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; and Johnny A. Dolin, Medical Sergeant, Operational Detachment 22, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 20 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 22 David B. Crowe, former Commander, FB Team 18 and FB Team 3, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 16 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 23 Carl M. Bergstrom, former Adjutant, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 16 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 24 Training Circular, unnumbered, "Special Forces Group (Airborne)", 13 May 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 1. COL Charles H. Karlstad, a veteran of WWI and WWII was The Infantry Center, Fort Benning Chief of Staff when selected to be the Psywar Center's first Commandant.
- 25 Training Circular, unnumbered, 13 May 1952, 2; and GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 50, HEADQUARTERS FORT BRAGG, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 15 August 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. At the time of publication, this office has no further information as to why the detachments were numbered the way they were.
- 26 Norman E. "Ned" Day, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 14 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. In a note from Bud Skoien on 22 March 2011, he states that "I spent far more time working for Jack Striegel at Mackall and on 'CLEO' in Georgia than as an 'instructor'."
- 27 David B. Crowe, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 16 December 2010, and Johnny A. Dolin, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 20 December 2010. David Crowe did indicate that there was one shortfall in the 10th SFG. In trying to activate the Group as quickly as possible, COL Bank overlooked the need to establish an organization organic to the Group to provide the administrative and logistics functions necessary to support operations and training.
- 28 COL (retired) Richard M. Ripley, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, and Eugene G. Piasecki, 28 June 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. As the chairman of the SF Operations Committee, MAJ Ripley and his instructors developed and published all the lesson plans and the program of instruction (POI) for Special Forces Training Course Number 1.
- 29 Joel L. Koford, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 22 December 2010.
- 30 Clarence E. "Bud" Skoien, 10th Special Forces Group, note to Eugene G. Piasecki, 22 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 31 Clarence E. "Bud" Skoien, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 21 December 2010.
- 32 Day Interview, 14 December 2010.
- 33 Richard Shevchenko, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 17 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 34 Dolin interview, 20 December 2010 and Koford interview, 22 December 2010.
- 35 William Ewald, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 28 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 36 Dolin interview, 20 December 2010. The heart of the 10th Special Forces Group was the Operational Detachment Regiment. This was a fifteen-man unit based upon the original OSS Operational Group and consisted of two officers and thirteen non-commissioned officers. Early SF training stressed individual skills such as Operations and Intelligence (O & I); light and heavy weapons; demolitions; radio communications; and medical aid. Note: Each man was trained in a primary skill, but "cross-trained" in the other skills necessary for the team to remain operational.
- 37 Ian D. W. Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army, 1952/1982* (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender Publishing, 1990), 22.
- 38 Dolin interview, 20 December 2010.
- 39 Kofford interview, 17 December 2010.
- 40 Ewald, interview, 28 September 2010.
- 41 Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 22.
- 42 Bergstrom interview, 16 December 2010.
- 43 Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 30. DA Orders TAG 17134; File of Joseph M. Castro, Record Group 407 (Records of the Adjutant General's Office), Records on the Korean War Dead and Wounded Army Casualties, 1950-1970, documenting the period 2/13/50-12/31/53 NARA, College Park, MD, available on Internet at: <<http://aad.archives.gov/aad/fielded-search.jsp>>.
- 44 Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets, The First Thirty Years. A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 42.
- 45 Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 248.
- 46 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 110. Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group Airborne, Fort Bragg, NC, Letter to Commanding Officer, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, subject: Situation of Special Forces Officers in FECOM, 19 May 1953, by COL Aaron Bank, Commanding Officer, filed with Psy War 220.3 (14 May 1953), Record Group 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, NARA.
- 47 Ben S. Malcolm, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*, (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996), 188.
- 48 Simpson, *Inside the Green Berets*, 42.
- 49 Sutherland, *Special Forces of the United States Army*, 208-09.



Commander, USASOC
ATTN: AOHS (*Veritas*)
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Upcoming Articles...

The next issue of *Veritas* will cover the United States Army's involvement with partisan forces in the Korean War. The large number of anti-communist guerrillas present on both coasts of the Korean peninsula required a significant commitment of men and resulted in the creation of two headquarters and a unit dedicated to the training and support of the partisan forces. JACK (Joint Advisory Commission-Korea) was the CIA element conducting strategic intelligence collection and paramilitary operations. CCRAK (Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities-Korea) was stood up by the Far East Command (FECOM) to manage the guerrilla operations. The United Nations Guerrilla Command (later the 8240th Army Unit), worked directly with the partisans and executed intelligence gathering missions through the TLO (Tactical Liaison Office). These operations in the spring of 1953, involved the first use of trained Special Forces soldiers in combat.



WWII 11th Airborne Division veteran, Captain John F. Sadler, a JACK air operations officer, participates in C-47 Skytrain 'snatch' rescue training conducted by the CIA in August 1952 at Johnson Airbase, the headquarters for the Fifth Air Force near Sayama, Japan.